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Abstract
Over the past decades a significant number of methods to identify and mitigate security
risks have been proposed, but there are few empirical evaluations that show whether these
methods are actually effective. So how can practitioners decide which method is the best
for security risk assessment of their projects?
To this end, we propose an evaluation framework to compare security risk assessment
methods that evaluates the quality of results of methods application with help of external
industrial experts and can identify aspects having an effect on the successful application
of these methods. The results of the framework application helped us to build the model of
key aspects that impact the success of a security risk assessment. Among these aspects are
i) the use of catalogues of threats and security controls which can impact methods’ actual
effectiveness and perceived usefulness and ii) the use of visual representation of risk models
that can positively impact methods’ perceived ease of use, but negatively affect methods’
perceived usefulness if the visual representation is not comprehensible due to scalability
issues. To further investigate these findings, we conducted additional empirical investiga-
tions: i) how different features of the catalogues of threats and security controls contribute
into an effective risk assessment process for novices and experts in either domain or se-
curity knowledge, and ii) how comprehensible are different representation approaches for
risk models (e.g. tabular and graphical).
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logues; risk model comprehensibility.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An increasing role of security in software development process is recognized by both
industrial professionals [103] and academia members [73]. Security risk assessment (SRA)
plays an essential role in delivering of secure software systems and should be used from
the very beginning of the software development process to eliminate the costly redesign
of the system due to emerging issues.
In 2015 PricewaterhouseCoopers’ survey1 reported that 91% of the companies had
adopted a risk-based security method (e.g. ISO 27001 or National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework). However, the average total financial
loss due to security incidents was decreased only by 5% (from $2.7 in 2014 down to $2.5m
in 2015) while information security budgets were increased by 24%. It is still doubtful
if current security methods work and worth to adopt, and we need to understand which
security methods are actually effective?
Recently, a lot of security methods have been proposed by both industry (UK IA’s,
NIST SP 800-30, BSI 100-1, ISO 2700x, SABSA, etc.) and academia (CORAS, SREP,
LINDDUN, Secure Tropos, etc.) Most of them share a similar process: 1) identifying
assets, 2) identifying threats to the assets, 3) evaluating risk level of the threats, and 4)
identifying security controls to mitigate the risks. The methods may look effective and
easy to use on the paper, but the real experience can be different. How can we validate and
compare different SRA methods? To this end, we need to find an appropriate framework.
A number of theories has been proposed aiming to explain the factors affecting the
acceptance of a technology by users: Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [14], Moti-
vational Model [15], Innovation Diffusion Theory [49], and others. Later, [124] combined
the models mentioned above and proposed the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of
Technology. At the same time Moody proposed Method Evaluation Model (MEM) [77]
based on TAM. We found MEM more suitable for our research purposes because it pro-
1PricewaterhouseCoopers The Global State of Information Security: Survey 2016. http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/
cyber-security/information-security-survey.html. Last accessed in March 2016.
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vides a theoretical model and measurable constructs for evaluating IS methods. However,
due to the generality, the model is missing the factors that are specific to SRA nature
and cannot explain its success. Thus, another question arises: what are the criteria that
define the success of an SRA method?
1.1 Research Questions
Based on the discussion above, this thesis focuses on the following research questions:
RQ1. How can we validate and compare different SRA methods? In the
literature there are three main research streams related to the comparison of
methods and standards for identifying threats and security controls. The first
research stream is represented by those works where methodologies for identifying
threats and security controls are proven to be successful by simply showing that
they can be applied to a more or less realistic scenario [71,121]. The second stream
is related to comparative reviews of methods based on theoretical frameworks
that specify criterion for comparison [13,22,85,126]. The third stream is related
to works were SRA methods are evaluated through controlled experiments or
case studies where MSc students and/or practitioners apply the methods and
then provide feedbacks on how these methods are successful in obtaining their
goals [20, 51, 64, 65, 86, 123]. However, there is no well-defined framework for
comparison and validation of SRA methods.
RQ2. Which SRA methods are actually effective? Very few methods and tech-
niques proposed in academia are validated in empirical studies. According to
the survey conducted in 2009 [8], only 13% of research works in Requirements
Engineering relied on case studies. Recently Cruz et al. [11] revealed that 38.95%
of the papers in Cloud Computing Security area propose solutions that have
not been evaluated in real practical scenario and only 3.78% of the papers re-
port the evaluation research where the proposed solution has been implemented
in practical settings (e.g. case study). Disregarding the validation activities is
a double-edged sword: i) practitioners do not know which methods to apply in
projects because designers of methods do not provide information about methods’
effectiveness and usefulness in real cases and ii) methods designers do not know
whether their methods are efficient in practice or not because there is no experi-
ence in practical application of the methods. For this reason a series of empirical
studies comparing and validating different SRA methods should be conducted.
RQ3. What criteria define success of an SRA method? In order to help security
practitioners in selection and method designers in improvement of SRA methods,
it is important to have a clear model explaining what are the aspects affecting
success of an SRA method and how.
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1.2 Thesis Contributions
This section briefs the major contributions of the dissertation.
– An evaluation framework that defines a formal procedure for comparison of SRA
methods. In particular, the framework evaluates the quality of results of methods
application with help of external industry experts and can identify aspects affecting the
successful application of these methods.
– An empirical comparison of different SRA methods using proposed evaluation
framework. The conducted experiments assessed 6 different methods. The experimen-
tal results revealed that threat-based methods were perceived by the participants to be
superior to other goal- and problem-based methods. Further experiments revealed no
difference between visual and textual threat-based method in terms of actual effective-
ness, while visual methods had better perception over textual ones.
– A theoretical model that extends MEM and hypotheses different characteristics of
SRA methods which determine methods’ actual efficacy and perceived efficacy. The
model suggests that i) having a clear process supporting main steps of SRA and ii)
availability of visual summary positively impact method’s perceived ease of use, while
iii) modeling support and iv) help in identification of threats and security controls by
making available the catalogues of threats and security controls may increase method’s
perceived usefulness. The last feature (catalogues) also may affect method’s actual
effectiveness.
– A theory explaining how different features of catalogues of threats and security controls
contribute into an effective risk assessment process for novices and experts in either
domain or security knowledge.
– An empirical investigation on the comprehensibility of the different risk modeling
approaches and a theoretical explanation of the findings.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured to present the main contributions of the Ph.D. study. The rest
of the dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents a theory that hypotheses different characteristics of SRA methods
which determine methods’ actual efficacy and perceived efficacy. We also propose a robust
evaluation framework to compare SRA methods, to evaluate the quality of results of
methods application with help of external industrial experts and to identify aspects that
may affect application of these methods. Finally, we present the results of three controlled
experiments that validated and refined the proposed theory.
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This chapter has been partially published or will appear in:
• [55] – K. Labunets, F. Massacci, F. Paci and L.M.S. Tran. “An Experimental Com-
parison of Two Risk-Based Security Methods”. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM/IEEE
International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement (ESEM),
2013.
• [96] – R. Scandariato, F. Paci, K. Labunets, K. Yskout, F. Massacci and W. Joosen.
“Empirical Assessment of Security Requirements and Architecture: Lessons Learned”.
In Engineering Secure Future Internet Services and Systems. Springer, 2014.
• [58] – K. Labunets, F. Massacci, F. Paci and R. Ruprai. “An experiment on
comparing textual vs. visual industrial methods for security risk assessment”. In
Proceedings of the 4th IEEE International Workshop on Empirical Requirements
Engineering (EmpiRE) at the 22nd IEEE International Requirements Engineering
Conference (RE). 2014.
• [57] – K. Labunets, F. Paci, F. Massacci, M. Ragosta and B. Solhaug. “A First
Empirical Evaluation Framework for Security Risk Assessment Methods in the ATM
Domain”. In Proceedings of the 4th SESAR Innovation Days (SIDs). 2014.
• K. Labunets, F. Paci and F. Massacci. “An Empirical Comparison of Security Risk
Assessment Methods”. Working paper. To be submitted in journal.
Chapter 3 focuses on aspects of the theoretical model proposed in the previous sec-
tion, particularly on the use of supporting artifacts like catalogues of threats and security
controls. We propose a theory explaining how different features of catalogues contribute
in an effective risk assessment process for novices and experts in either domain or security
knowledge. In particular, we (1) examine the role of catalogues in the actual and per-
ceived efficacy of an SRA; (2) compare the results of SRA with catalogues by non-security
experts and without catalogues by security experts; (3) assess the role of catalogues’ fea-
tures in the actual and perceived efficacy of an SRA.
This chapter has been partially published or will appear in:
• [16] – M. de Gramatica, K. Labunets, F. Massacci, F. Paci and A. Tedeschi. “The
Role of Catalogues of Threats and Security Controls in Security Risk Assessment: An
Empirical Study with ATM Professionals”. In Proceedings of the 21st International
Working Conference on Requirements Engineering: Foundation for Software Quality
(REFSQ). 2015.
• [56] – K. Labunets, F. Massacci and F. Paci. “Which Security Catalogue Is Better
for Novices?”. In Proceedings of the 5th IEEE International Workshop on Empirical
Requirements Engineering (EmpiRE) at the 23rd IEEE International Requirements
Engineering Conference (RE). 2015.
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• K. Labunets, M. de Gramatica, F. Massacci, F. Paci, M. Ragosta and A. Tedeschi.
“On the Effectiveness of Sourcing Knowledge from Catalogues in Security Risk As-
sessment”. Working paper. To be submitted in journal.
Chapter 4 focuses on another aspect of the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2,
namely the representation of security risks. We investigate the comprehensibility of two
types of risk model representation: graphical versus tabular. We present the results of
two empirical studies and explain our findings by proposing a simple extension of Vessey’s
cognitive fit theory.
This chapter will appear in:
• K. Labunets, F. Massacci, F. Paci, S. Marczak, F. M. de Oliveira. “Model Compre-
hension in the Context of Security Risk Assessment: An Empirical Comparison of
Tabular vs. Graphical Representations”. Working paper. To be submitted in journal.
Chapter 5 recaps main contributions described in this dissertation and reveals the
future work.
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Chapter 2
An Empirical Comparison of Security
Risk Assessment Methods
This chapter aims to address our research question RQ1 by proposing a robust evalua-
tion framework to compare SRA methods, to evaluate the quality of results of methods
application with help of external industry experts and to identify aspects that can affect
the application of these methods. To address research question RQ2, we report on a
pilot and three controlled experiments on evaluation of SRA methods following the pro-
posed framework. The pilot study and the first experiment were conducted with MSc
students and professionals to compare different classes of methods: threat-based, goal-
based and problem-based methods. The second and third experiments were conducted
with MSc students to compare the best methods from the first experiment: visual and
textual threat-based methods. We measured actual effectiveness as the quality of the
security controls identified by the participants, while perceived ease of use and perceived
usefulness were measured through post-task questionnaires. The main finding is that
threat-based methods have better perceived efficacy than goal- and problem-based meth-
ods. Among threat-based methods, visual methods have higher perceived efficacy because
they have a clear process and a graphical representation for assets, threats and security
controls. However, it is unclear if they are actually more effective than textual methods.
To address research question RQ3, based on the experimental results we propose a the-
ory that hypotheses different characteristics of SRA methods which determine methods’
actual efficacy and perceived efficacy.
2.1 Introduction
Security controls (sometimes also denoted as countermeasures or security requirements)
are usually identified using SRA methods. They identify the target systems’ assets, the
threats to those assets and the risk associated with those threats. Security controls are
7
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then identified to mitigate the realization of the threats.
Many SRA methods, frameworks and standards exist – ISO 27005, NIST 800-30, CO-
BIT, SABSA, etc. – but they all face the same issue: the process looks easy on paper –
but it can be a complex and daunting task.
Despite the crucial role that SRA plays in the identification of security controls, only
few papers [51,55,86,97,116,117,119] investigated which method is more effective for the
identification of threats and security measures and why it is so. Evaluating SRA methods
is challenging because it includes a number of confounding variables: the type of training
received (e.g. all papers on the ISACA journal report methods application by a method’s
expert), previous expertise (e.g. student vs. professionals is a key distinction here), time
allocated to a task, and presence of two analysis steps (threats identification and security
controls identification depends on each other).
In this chapter we propose an empirical framework for evaluating and comparing dif-
ferent classes of security requirements elicitation methods with respect to three constructs
defined in Method Evaluation Model (MEM) [77]: actual effectiveness, perceived ease of
use, and perceived usefulness. To compare actual effectiveness of methods, we measure
number of threats and number of security measures identified by each methods while con-
trolling for the quality of identified threats and controls (domain experts from industry
and method designers evaluate the results of participants). Participants’ perceived easy
of use and perceived usefulness are measured by post-task questionnaires. We also used
qualitative analysis (post-it notes and focus groups) to understand drivers of a preference
for a method over another one.
We have applied the framework to conduct experiments with both types of participants,
professionals and MSc students. The overall evaluation reported in this chapter consist
of a pilot study with 36 professionals and 13 MSc students preliminary reported in [65]
and three controlled experiments: Experiments 2.1-2.3.
Experiment 2.1 was conducted with 15 MSc students in Computer science and 25
professionals in IT Audit for Information Systems. The participants were divided in
15 groups composed by MSc students and professionals following a between-participant
design. Each group applied a method belonging to one of methods’ classes to identify
threats and security controls for one of two real application scenarios from Smart Grid
and Healthcare domains.
In order to find better explanation of these findings we conducted two additional ex-
periments. The participants of Experiment 2.2 and 2.3 were correspondingly 28 and 29
MSc students enrolled to Security Engineering course at the University of Trento. The
aim of these experiments were to compare the best methods from Experiment 1: visual
and textual threat-based methods. The participants of Experiment 2.2 were divided in
15 groups following within-participant design. Each group applied both methods to four
tasks of the Smart Grid application scenario. The participants of Experiment 2.3 worked
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individually and applied both methods to two tasks of the same Smart Grid scenario.
Experiment 2.1 found that threat-based methods are better with respect to perceived
ease of use than goal-based and problem-based methods. The qualitative analysis suggests
that the existence of a clearly defined process to identify threats and security controls is the
major driver over and above using diagrams or tables, tools or mathematical foundations.
Experiment 2.2 shows that, processes being equally well defined, the visual method
is better in identification of threats than the textual one. In contrast, Experiment 2.3
shows that the textual method is better in threats identification that the visual one when
controlling for the results’ quality. In both experiments (2.2 and 2.3) no statistically
significant preference was found over security controls albeit tabular-based methods were
slightly better in the first experiment when controlling for the quality of the results. An
interesting open question was the potential role of catalogues in improving the effectiveness
and preference of methods.
The reminder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the
related work. Then, Section 2.3 introduces our research context and research questions.
Section 2.4 presents our framework to run comparative evaluations. After, Section 2.6
discusses the lessons that we learnt from the pilot study. The core of the chapter reports
the execution and results of the three controlled experiments (in Section 2.5), results of
the quantitative analysis of reports and post-task questionnaires, and of the qualitative
analysis of questionnaires’ open questions, post-it notes and individual or focus group
interviews (Section 2.7. Then, we summarize our findings (Section 2.8) and discussed
the refined theoretical model of methods’ success criteria. Section 2.9 discuss threats to
validity. In 2.10 we conclude the chapter.
2.2 Background on Identification of Security Measures
There are many standards, practices, and methods available for addressing information
security risks, which differ in terms of focus and process. Several surveys review security
methods based on theoretical frameworks that specify criterion for comparison [13, 22,
85, 126]. For example, [85] conducted a review of 11 security requirements engineering
methods. They classified security requirements engineering methods with respect to the
concepts that the methods are based on: goal-based, model-based, problem-based, and
process-based methods. In our work we adopted a classification of security methods
similar to the one proposed by [85].
All methods have a very similar process illustrated in Figure 2.1:
• Assets Identification. The goal of this step is to arrive at a correct understanding
of the target of analysis and to pinpoint the most important valuables to be protected.
• Threats and Security Risks Identification. The goal is to identify possible
threat scenarios targeting assets and classify risks that they represent based on the
9
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Asset 
Identification
Threats and 
Security Risks 
Identification
Security Measures 
Identification
List of 
Assets
List of 
Threats
List of 
Security 
Measures
Security Risk Assessment Process
Figure 2.1: Overview of a Typical Security Risk Assessment Process
likelihood and impact of those threat scenarios.
• Security Measures Identification. The goal is to establish a list of measures to
be achieved to address security risks.
However, specific instantiations are largely different in terms of focus, representation,
and supporting material. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 compares examples of academic and industrial
methods for SRA and compares them along these dimensions. In term of focus they can
be divided as follows:
- Threat-based methods start their analysis from the identification of assets and related
threats. Their steps are common to many SRA methods such as UK’, Eurocontrol’s
or SESAR SecRAM. Academic methods in this realm are SREP, CORAS, LINDDUN.
- Goal-based methods focus on business goals and how they can be affected by threats
and protected by corresponding security controls (or requirements, or measures) to
them. This approach is typical of business methods such as COBIT or SABSA and
academic methods like SECURE TROPOS, SI*.
- Problem-based methods use a problem-oriented notation proposed by Jackson [45] to
describe the context for a target system and representing security controls as con-
straints on functional requirements. Examples of these methods can be found among
academic methods: SECURITY ARGUMENTATION and ABUSE FRAMES.
With respect to representation, we can divide the selected methods in
- Textual methods that use text to describe assets, threats scenarios and security mea-
sures. SREP, SESAR and EUROCONTOL’s SecRAM are examples of textual meth-
ods because they use tables to document the results of the execution of each step.
- Visual methods use a graphical representation to specify assets, threats scenarios and
security measures. For example, CORAS uses diagrams to represent assets, threats
and security measures while SECURE TROPOS uses goal models.
- Hybrid methods use both graphical and textual representations to express assets,
threats and security measures. LINDDUN uses trees to represent threat scenarios but
tables to map elements of the system under analysis to the threat scenarios. Similarly,
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Table 2.1: Examples of Academic Methods
Method Focus Representation Supporting Artifacts Ref.
CORAS Threat Visual (Diagrams) CORAS tool: Software to draw CORAS Dia-
grams
[61]
LINDDUN Threat Hybrid (Data Flow Models + Threat Tree
Patterns + Tables)
Threat Tree Catalogue of Privacy Threats Sce-
narios
[18]
SEC.
TRO.
Goal Visual (Goal Models) SecTro tool: Software to draw goal models [82]
SEC.
ARG.
Problem Hybrid (Problem and Argument Diagrams
+ Argument Textual Formalization)
OpenPF tool: Software to create problem and ar-
gument diagrams, and to reason on arguments
[39]
SREP Threat Textual (Tables) Security Resources Repository: Catalogue of As-
sets, Threats, and Security Requirements
[72]
Table 2.2: Examples of Industrial Standards and Methods
Method Focus Representation Supporting Artifacts Reference
BSI 100-2
IT-Grundschutz
Methodology (DE)
Threat Textual BSI 100-4 IT-Grundschutz Catalogues (include
assets, threats, and safeguards)
www.bsi.bund.de
COBIT (ISACA) Goal Textual (Tables) Reporting Tool based on MS Excel www.isaca.org
EBIOS (FR) Threat Textual EBIOS tool www.club-ebios.org
EUROCONTROL
SecRAM
Threat Textual (Tables) EATM Catalogues of Threats and Security
Controls
www.eurocontrol.int
MAGERIT (ES) Threat Textual Catalogues of asset classes, valuation dimen-
sions, valuation criteria, typical threats, and
safeguards to be considered.
[10]
SABSA (Deloitte) Goal Textual Enterprise Security Architecture Tool www.sabsa.org
SESAR SecRAM Threat Textual (Tables) MS Excel template supporting SecRAM pro-
cess; SESAR SecRAM Tool; EATM Cata-
logues of Threats and Security Controls
Deliverable SESAR
WP16.02.03: ATM
Security Risk Assess-
ment Methodology.
www.sesarju.eu
HMG IA Standard
Numbers 1 & 2 (UK)
Threat Textual (Tables) Baseline Control Set (catalogue of security
controls)
www.cesg.gov.uk
SECURITY ARGUMENTATION uses both graphical and textual representations
for expressing security arguments.
Methods can be distinguished also based on supporting artifacts that they offer to
analysts for the execution of SRA. CORAS, SECURE TROPOS and SECURITY AR-
GUMENT provide only a software tool to draw graphical models, while the methods based
on tables like SESAR SecRAM or COBIT are supported by Excel spreadsheet template.
Some methods also give analysts security knowledge captured in catalogues of threats and
security controls, e.g. industrial EUROCONTROL’s and SESAR SecRAM, or academic
SREP and LINDDUN.
These methods are widely different with respect to focus, representation and supporting
artifacts. They may not work equally well in identifying and mitigating security risks.
Therefore, there is a need of conducting experimental comparisons to understand which
methods are the best and why.
For further investigation we use the following academic methods: CORAS, SECURE
TROPOS, SREP, LINDDUN and SECURITY ARGUMENTATION. Table 2.3 provides
more details about them. The methods were selected based on (i) scientific profile (visibil-
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Table 2.3: Methods’ Overview
Method Institution Description
CORAS SINTEF Model-driven risk assessment method. CORAS is used by SINTEF for the industrial
consultancies.
SREP University of
Castilla-La Mancha
Risk-driven and asset-based method to model and analyze security controls. This method
is used by CMU Software Engineering Institute in their tutorials.
LINDDUN Katholieke Univer-
siteit Leuven
Risk-based method to elicit privacy requirements. This is based on STRIDE.
SEC. TRO. University of East
London
Goal-based method for modeling, and reasoning on security controls. The method sup-
ports capturing, analysis and reasoning of security controls from the early stages of the
development process.
SEC. ARG. Open University Problem-based framework for security controls elicitation and analysis
ity, citations, etc.), and (ii) availability of the scientists proposing them to hold a tutorial
for our experiments. Criteria (ii) was important to avoid bias due to a lower quality train-
ing or a misinterpretation of method’s key aspects. The restriction to academic methods
in this phase was mostly due to financial reasons: training for SABSA by a SABSA spe-
cialist would cost almost 3000 euro per participant. Figure 2.2 shows example of artifacts
produced during the application of the selected methods.
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(a) CORAS - threat diagram
Name of Misuse Case: Spoof of information 
ID 1 
Summary: the attacker gains access to the message exchange between the SM and SNN and 
disclose the secret exchange of information 
Probability: Frequent 
Preconditions: 
1) The attacker have access to the communication channel between SM and SNN 
 
User Interactions Misuser interactions System Interaction 
The SM sends the information 
about power consumption 
  
 The attacker reads the 
information 
 
  The SSN receives the 
information without 
knowing that someone 
have read the message  
Postconditions: 
1) The attacker knows personal information about the power consumption of the 
customer!!!!
 
(b) SREP - threat specification using misuse cases
(c) LINDDUN - Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) and tables (d) SECURE TROPOS - diagrams
(e) SECURITY ARGUMENTATION - textual descrip-
tion and diagram
Figure 2.2: Examples of methods’ artifacts
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2.3 Research Objectives and Theory
The goal of our experiments, according to the goal/question/metric template [4] is to
analyze different SRA methods with the purpose of carrying out a comparative evaluation
of these methods with respect to how successful they are in identifying threats and security
controls from the point of view of security analysts.
In order to evaluate methods, it is first necessary to identify dimensions to measure
success. Therefore, we have elaborated preliminary theory for evaluating SRA methods’
success that is illustrated in Figure 2.3: the figure shows primary constructs and causal re-
lationships between them. Some of the constructs reflect characteristics of SRA methods:
process/focus, representation, supporting artifacts. The process/focus includes features
like the fact that a method provides clear guidelines on how to conduct SRA process
or the fact that the process starts from the identification of business goals (goal-based
or assets and threats (threats-based). The representation of assets, threats and security
measures can be either visual, textual or a mix of the two. The supporting artifacts are
of different kind including tool support to document the results of SRA or catalogues of
threats and security controls.
In addition, to allow comparison with the literature, we have considered constructs
from MEM [77], which is a theoretical framework that incorporates constructs to evaluate
methods’ success. In particular, we considered Actual Efficacy, Perceived Efficacy and
Intention to Use (ITU). Actual Efficacy is the degree to which a method achieves its
objectives (Actual Effectiveness) and is free of effort (Actual Efficiency). Perceived efficacy
is the degree to which person believes that a method achieves its intended objectives
(Perceived Usefulness (PU)) and using it is free of effort (Perceived Easy of Use (PEOU)).
ITU is the extent to which a person intends to use a particular method.
We also hypothesize that methods’ characteristics like process/focus, representation
and supporting artifacts determine method’s actual efficiency and perceived efficacy. There-
fore we can formulate our research questions in what follows.
RQ2.1 Is actual efficacy significantly different between methods?
Such research question is generic in nature and does not account for a specific nature
of SRA. Several works [51, 59, 102] and a number of preliminary interviews with security
experts has shown that there are two separate tasks which we must take into account:
a) identification of threats or risks to assets and b) identification of security measures or
controls to mitigate the risks. These tasks are located at different levels of the creativity
spectrum: threats analysis requires thinking out of the box to anticipate attackers’ be-
havior; identification of security measures requires a systematic review of threats to make
sure they have been adequately mitigated. We have thus split research question RQ2.1 on
actual efficacy into corresponding null-hypotheses for statistical hypothesis testing, one
for threats analysis and one for controls identification.
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ACTUAL EFFICACY PERCEIVED EFFICACY ACTUAL USAGE
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Figure 2.3: A Preliminary Model of Success Criteria for Security Risk Assessment Methods
RQ2.2 Is participants’ perceived efficacy significantly different between methods?
RQ2.2.1 Is participants’ PEOU significantly different between methods?
RQ2.2.2 Is participants’ PU significantly different between methods?
RQ2.3 Is participants’ ITU significantly different between methods?
The purpose of the research questions RQ2.2 and RQ2.3 is to evaluate methods’ success
with respect to the core concepts of MEM that were inherited from Technology Accep-
tance Model (TAM) [14]. Both approaches are widely used in the literature. [64] used
these constructs to compare the perception of model-driven, model-based and code-centric
software development methods. Similarly, [51] used TAM to compare perception of attack
trees and misuse cases by industrial professionals. [112] and [83] applied MEM framework
to evaluate methods that their proposed, respectively, in Security and Business Process
Management fields. Moreover, TAM is widely adopted in Information System (IS) litera-
ture. Recently it was used to study IS acceptance in airline and banking domain [54] and
adoption of mobile [29] and e-government IS [80].
RQ2.4 What qualitative drivers may explain why a method is “better” than another
one?
One of the aspects that is not considered by MEM for methods’ success is how to determine
key drivers behind different PEOU and PU. This is what practitioners would actually
want to know in order to select a method. It is also of interest for academic and industry
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method’s designers: how to improve one’s own method. In these terms, the work by [93]
is close to ours: the authors proposed cloud computing adoption model that refines TAM
and Diffusion of Innovation theories and covers some domain and organization specific
factors influencing technology adoption (e.g., complexity, compatibility, or infrastructure
factors). The lack for similar study for SRA motivates the investigation behind our final
research question RQ2.4.
2.4 Experimental Framework
This section describes the experimental framework to conduct controlled experiments for
evaluating and comparing SRA methods. This should improve repeatability and compa-
rability of results.
Conceptually the framework is divided in two parallel streams that are merged in time
as shown in Figure 2.4: i) Execution Stream is the actual execution of an experiment in
which methods are applied and its results are produced and validated; ii) Measurement
Stream gathers quantitative and qualitative data that will be used to evaluate methods.
Each of the streams is divided into three phases:
– Training. The application scenario description is administered to participants by either
an individual reading or introductory tutorial. Then, a frontal-training phase in which
method’s designer(s) introduce the method(s) to be used for SRA through a step by
step tutorial.
– Application. The participants (individually or in groups) apply the assigned method
to the scenario.
– Evaluation. The participants deliver the report documenting methods’ outcomes.
Several evaluators independently assess the quality of reports, providing marks and
comments. The participants provide feedback on their experience with methods.
Four types of actors are necessary to implement this framework (besides researchers):
method designers, domain experts, and participants. Method designers are the methods’
inventors. Their main responsibility is to train participants in the method and to answer
participants’ questions during the Application phase. They evaluate group reports to
determine if the method has been applied correctly. Domain experts are usually partners
from industry who introduce the application scenario to participants. They evaluate
the quality of security controls produced by each group of participants. They are also
available during the Application phase to answers all possible questions that participants
may raise during analysis. Participants have to identify threats and security controls for
an application scenario using the assigned method. In the literature methods’ designers
are often the same people as the one that execute experiments. It introduces bias in
methods’ evaluation.
Tables 2.4a and 2.4b compare the steps of our experimental framework with the steps
16
2.4. EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK
M1 M2 M3n
M4
Ei Mj
M5
M7M6E5E3 E4E2
E1
MSC STUDENTS
+
PROFESSIONALS
SCENARIO A
SCENARIO B
BACKGROUND
Q1
PARTICIPANTS DOMAIN EXPERTS
METHOD 1
METHOD x
METHOD
DESIGNERS
TRAINING
DOMAIN EXPERTS
+
METHOD DESIGNERS
+
RESEARCHERS
APPLICATION
GROUP A1
GROUP By
RESEARCHERS
EVALUATION
R
EP
O
R
TS
M
ET
H
O
D
S
POST IT 
SESSIONS
FOCUS 
GROUPS 
INTERVIEW
TRAINING 
QUALITY
Q2
METHOD 
IMPRESSION
Q3n
REPORT 
QUALITY 
ASSESSMENT
DOMAIN EXPERTS
+
METHOD DESIGNERS
GROUPS 
DELIVER 
RESULTS
LEGEND: - execution stream steps; - measurement stream steps;
ORGANIZATION 
QUALITY
Q4
Figure 2.4: Experimental Framework
of the protocols used in the literature. We discussed these works in details below along
with the description of framework steps.
2.4.1 Execution Stream
Training. Table 2.4a shows that half of the works reported that participants received
training on the application scenario (E1). [97] provided participants with a significant
training on the method and application domain scenario during three lectures of 2.5
hours, while [51] provided participants with a 90 minutes introduction about experimental
goals and two application cases and made available to participants the materials for both
application systems starting 4 days before the beginning of the experiment. At the same
time, most of the works reported that participants were trained on methods. [86] provided
only a brief 10 minutes training for each approach because they are easy to learn and no
training on application cases as they were simple enough. [118] provided participants with
an introduction to methods and description of an application case, but the authors did
not specify the amount and format of the training (e.g. presentation by an expert or
handout materials).
The first step (E1) targets the bias that might be introduced by previous knowledge of
participants on a scenario. The “domain expert” provides to participants a uniform focus
and target. It maybe his personal focus, but it is nonetheless the same for all participants.
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Table 2.4: Framework’s Steps in the Literature
(a) Execution Steps
Paper E1: Scenario
Tutorial
E2: Method
Tutorial
E3: Application E4: Feedback E5: Final
Report
Taubenberger et al. [123] x x
Opdahl et al. [86] x x x
Massacci and Paci [65] x x x x x
Labunets et al. [55] x x x x x
Labunets et al. [58] x x x x x
Scandariato et al. [97] x x x x
Stålhane and Sindre [115] x x x
Stålhane and Sindre [116] x x x
Stålhane et al. [119] x x x
Stålhane and Sindre [118] x x x x
Karpati et al. [51] x x x
(b) Measurements Steps
Paper M1:
Background
M3: Method
Perception
M4: Focus
groups
M6: Method
Evaluation
M7: Results
Evaluation
Taubenberger et al. [123]
Opdahl et al. [86] x
Massacci and Paci [65] x x x x
Labunets et al. [55] x x x x x
Labunets et al. [58] x x x x x
Scandariato et al. [97] x x x
Stålhane and Sindre [115] x x
Stålhane and Sindre [116] x x
Stålhane et al. [119] x x
Stålhane and Sindre [118] x x
Karpati et al. [51] x x
The rationale of the second step (E2) is to limit the implicit bias that might be introduced
by having to train participants into one’s own method and a competitor’s one.
Application. We tried to make the application session (E3n) last at least 16 hours of
work. We believe this is necessary to fully exercise the method. [97] reported that their
participants spent around 4 full days to model threats with STRIDE methodology. In
contrast, several papers in the IS and Requirements Engineering (RE) literature limited
method’s application to less than 2 hours. For example, [123] reported a controlled exper-
iment where 55 security professionals have 30 minutes to conduct SRA. The participants
of the experiment reported by [86] had only 30 minutes to find threats using one of two
techniques. In the replication [51] professionals spent around 2 hours to complete the
task. The other works [118,119] also reported the use of step E3n.
Group presentations (E4n) are essential to capture a phenomenon present in reality
and namely domain expert feedback and internal presentation. They might indeed bias
analysis, as participants will adjust their work along the received feedback. Yet, this is
precisely what happens in reality. We considered the benefit for external validity greater
than the threat to conclusion validity. Only few works reported the use of both E3n and
E4n steps [97, 118].
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Evaluation of the results. This step (E5) is widely adopted in the literature, as
it is essential for capturing the results of any process application. All works listed in
Table 2.4a mentioned this step as a part of their experimental procedure. For example,
in [86] participants were asked to deliver threats in misuse-case or attack tree diagram
format with a brief textual explanation of each threat if necessary.
2.4.2 Measurement Stream
Experiment’s Outcome. Before method’s application, participants are administered a
questionnaire to collect information about their level of expertise in requirement engineer-
ing, security and on other methods they may know (M1) and a post-training questionnaire
to determine their initial perception of the methods and the quality of the tutorials (M2).
Step M1 is common for empirical studies and used to control possible effects of partic-
ipants’ background on experimental results. However, [123] and [86] did not mention if
they performed similar step. Step M2 is not widely used in similar experiments. After-
wards, at step M5 participants are requested to answer a post-task questionnaire about
the quality of experiment organization (Q4). Similar to M2, this information is used to
control a possible effect of the experiment settings on results.
Participant’s Quantitative Evaluation. After each application session participants
are requested (M3n) to answer a post-task questionnaire (Q3n) about their perception
of the methods. This step is a key one for empirical studies aiming to compare different
methods. In particular, we adopted this post-task questionnaire from MEM. Almost all
works listed in Table 2.4b also mentioned that they collected participants’ perception of
the methods after the application.
Participant’s Qualitative Evaluation. The goal of the next step (M4) is to collect
participants’ perception and feedback on the methods through post-it notes sessions and
focus group interviews. However, most of works do not conduct qualitative study (e.g.
by mean of interviews with the participants) why a method is better than the others,
but just collect participants’ perception through questionnaires. After reports delivery,
participants are divided in groups based on the assigned methods. They are involved in
focus groups interviews where they are asked questions on their perception of methods.
A separate post-it note session is run with each group. In each session, participants are
requested 1) to annotate on post-it notes 5 positive and 5 negative aspects of the applied
method and 2) hang the post-it notes on a wall and group post-it notes that reports
similar opinions about method’s aspects. Once grouped, the post-it notes have to be
listed in order of importance.
Evaluation of the results by experts. The goal of this phase is to validate whether
participants applied correctly the method and identified threats and security controls are
specific for scenarios. First, (M6) groups’ reports are evaluated by method designers.
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Table 2.5: Types of Data Collected by the Framework
Data source Description Use Type
Questionnaires Include questions on participants’ knowledge of IT security, risk
assessment and their evaluation of the methods’ aspects
Demographics,
PEOU, PU, ITU
Quantitative
Audio/Video
Recordings
Capture application of methods by participants and record focus
groups interviews
PEOU, PU Qualitative
Post-it Notes List positive and negative aspects about the methods Drivers, PEOU, PU Qualitative
Focus Group
Transcripts
Report the discussion on the methods’ application between partic-
ipants and observers
Drivers, PEOU, PU,
ITU
Qualitative
Group Presenta-
tions
Participants summarize the results of method’s application Actual Effectiveness Qualitative
Final Reports Describe in detail how participants have identified the security con-
trols following the method
Actual Effectiveness Quantitative
They evaluate the quality of method’s application. The level of quality is on a four item
scale: Unclear (1), Generic (2), Partial (3) and Total (4). After, (M7) the group reports
are evaluated by domain experts. Domain experts assess the quality of identified threats
and security controls. The level of quality is on a four item scale: Unclear (1), Generic
(2), Specific (3) and Valuable (4). Table 2.4b shows that only one work [97] evaluated the
quality of the results produced by participants like we do in our framework (M6).
2.4.3 Rationale
Steps M6 and M7 address two issues that may affects both conclusion and construct
validity. Literature opinion varies on whether the quality of results should be evaluated
by some independent expert. Some authors [23] argue that it is not necessary, other papers
don’t mention whether this steps have been performed [51,118], other people would deem
it essential and practitioners put it "If the quality of your risk assessment doesn’t matter
then any method works well." Any method can be effective if it does not need to deliver
useful results for a third party (hence the evaluation by a domain expert). It can also be
properly easy to use if participants do not follow it (hence the evaluation by a method
designer). It is important to show which method is better in delivering not just results but
good ones [59, Ch. 3]: “the security risk assessment report is expected to contain adequate
and relevant evidence to support its findings, clear and relevant recommendations, and
clear compliance results for relevant information security regulations.”
In order to assess actual effectiveness (RQ2.1), final reports delivered by groups were
evaluated by domain and methods’ experts M6 and M7. In order to lessen the load
of domain experts, researchers count the number of threats and security controls in the
reports and provide the list of threats and controls to the experts.
To evaluate perceived easy of use (RQ2.2.1), perceived usefulness (RQ2.2.2) and in-
tention to use (RQ2.3) we look at the answers on questionnaires distributed at step M3n.
Table 2.5 summarizes types of data that we collect and how they measure different
aspects (actual effectiveness, PEOU, PU and ITU).
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Table 2.6: Statistical Tests Selection
Comparison Type Interval/Ratio (Normality is
assumed)
Interval/Ratio (Normality is
not assumed), Ordinal
2 paired groups Paired t-test Wilcoxon test
2 unpaired groups Unpaired t-test Mann-Whitney (MW) test
3+ matched groups Repeated-measures ANOVA Friedman test
3+ unmatched groups ANOVA Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test
To analyze final reports and questionnaires, we select statistical tests depending on
the design type and the assumption on normal distribution of the samples. Table 2.6
(shortened version of the Table 37.1 from [40, Chap. 37]) gives an overview of how we
select statistical tests in our empirical studies. Actual statistical tests being used will be
reported in the sections describing each individual study. For all statistical tests we adopt
5% as a threshold of α (i.e. probability of committing Type-I error) [128].
Instead, to investigate responses to open questions about positive and negative aspects
of the methods, we analyze post-it notes and transcripts of focus group interviews using
coding [120] – a qualitative analysis method used in grounded theory. The analysis com-
prises the following steps:
Open coding. Each researcher analyzed open questions and post-it notes to identify codes
that represent patterns related to methods’ positive (negative) aspects.
Focused coding. The researchers worked in groups to code and classify the codes into
iteratively emergent categories relevant for PEOU and PU.
Theoretical coding. The researchers identified core categories and relationships between
them.
2.5 Summary of Experiments
Figure 2.5 provides a bird’s eye view of the empirical studies and key components of the
experiments. The pilot study debugged our experimental framework. Experiment 2.1
further polished the experimental framework and gave insights about what impacts effec-
tiveness and perception of different classes of IT SRA methods. For experiments 2.2 and
2.3 we chose the methods of the class that were perceived as better methods by partici-
pants in Experiment 2.1 in order to further investigate the reasons behind their success.
Table 2.7 compares the experiments. All experimental materials used by participants (i.e.
scenarios description, methods tutorials) are available on-line1.
Demographics Tables 2.8-2.10 report descriptive statistics about participants of the three
experiments. We have spent a significant effort by incorporating professionals because
having only students is known to be a major threat to external validity [89].
1https://securitylab.disi.unitn.it/doku.php?id=validation_of_risk_and_security_requirements_
methodologies
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Figure 2.5: Empirical Studies Overview
Table 2.7: Summary of the Experiments
Setting Pilot (2011) Exp. 2.1 (2012) Exp. 2.2 (2013) Exp. 2.3 (2014)
Participants 36 professionals +
13 MSc students
25 professionals +
15 MSc students
28 MSc students 29 MSc students
Design Type Between-participant Between-participant Within-participant Within-participant
Methods CORAS, LINDDUN,
SEC. TRO., SI*, and
SEC. ARG.
CORAS, LINDDUN,
SEC. TRO., SREP, and
SEC. ARG.
CORAS and SREP CORAS and
EUROCONTROL Se-
cRAM
Scenarios Healthcare Collaborative
Network
Smart Grid and e-Health Smart Grid, different
tasks
Smart Grid, different
tasks
Variables N/A PEOU, PU Actual Effect., PEOU,
PU, ITU
Actual Effect., PEOU,
PU, ITU
Experiment 2.1: The experiment involved 15 MSc students in Computer Science from
the University of Trento and 25 professionals who were attending a part-time MBA in
Audit for Enterprise Information System at Paris Dauphine University where students
spend half of the week working in consulting companies from different domains like Man-
agement Consulting Services and Audit (PwC, Accenture plc), Oil and Gas industry (Total
S.A.), Pharmaceutics (Sanofi S.A.), Telecommunications (SFR), and Banking (Banque de
France, Exane, RCI Banque). Participants were divided in 15 groups composed by one
MSc student and one or two professionals. A significant fraction (30%) of participants re-
ported that they worked specifically on security/privacy projects. The rest of participants
(40%) reported no information about their work experience.
Experiment 2.2: Participants for the experiment were recruited among MSc students
enrolled in a Security Engineering course at the University of Trento. The experiment
involved 28 MSc students. Some participants (18%) reported that they were involved in
security/privacy activities. Majority of the participants (60%) reported that they had
working experience while the remaining did not provide any information.
Experiment 2.3: The participants were 29 MSc students enrolled in a Security Engi-
neering course at the University of Trento. Similar to Experiment 2.2, 18% of participants
reported that they were involved in security/privacy activities. Most of participants (69%)
reported that they had at least 2 years of working experience while the remaining reported
no working experience.
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Table 2.8: Overall Participants’ Demographic Statistics – Experiment 2.1
Variable Scale Mean Med. Distribution
Age Years 25.46 - 58.97% were 20-24 years, 33.33% were 25-29 years and 7.69% were 30-60
years old
Work
experience
Years 2.97 - 17.5% not specified, 15% have less 1 year, 42.5% have 1-2 years, 25% have
> 2 years
Expertise in
Security
1(Novice)-
5(Expert)
2.43 2 15% novices, 42.5% beginners, 27.5% competent users, 15% proficient users,
0% experts
Expertise in
RE/Modelling
1(Novice)-
5(Expert)
2 2 45% novices, 25% beginners, 15% competent users, 15% proficient users
Table 2.9: Overall Participants’ Demographic Statistics – Experiment 2.2
Variable Scale Means Med. Distribution
Age Years 24.33 - 51.85% were 21-24 years, 44.44% were 25-29 years and 3.7% were 30-35
years old
Work
experience
Years 2.76 - 39.3% not specified, 28.6% have ≤ 2 years, 32.14% have > 2 years
Expertise in
Security
1(Novice)-
5(Expert)
2.18 2 25% novices, 39% beginners, 29% competent users, 7% proficient users
Expertise in
RE/Modelling
1(Novice)-
5(Expert)
2.57 3 29% novices, 18% beginners, 25% competent users, 25% proficient users, 4%
experts
Table 2.10: Overall Participants’ Demographic Statistics – Experiment 2.3
Variable Scale Means Med. Distribution
Age Years 25.72 - 48% were 21-24 years; 41% were 25-29; 10% were 30-40
Work
experience
Years 2.46 - 31% had no experience; 31% had < 2 years; 28% had 3-5 years; 10% had
>6 years
Expertise in
Security
1(Novice)-
5(Expert)
2.38 2 28% novices; 31% beginners; 21% competent users; 17% proficient users;
3% experts
Expertise in
RE/Modelling
1(Novice)-
5(Expert)
2.31 2 24% novices; 34% beginners; 28% competent users; 14% proficient users
Application Domain Selection To conduct our experiments we selected two different in-
dustrial application scenarios from Siemens and Atos Research:
E-Health. The application scenario by Siemens was related to the management of elec-
tronic healthcare records. The scenario focused on registering new patients in a clinic
and includes assigning clinicians (doctors, nurses, etc.) to patients, reading and updating
a record, retrieving patient information from external sources, and providing results of
examinations and treatments to authorized externals entities.
Smart Grid. Atos Research proposed a scenario about Smart Grid which is an electricity
network using information and communication technology to optimize the transmission
and distribution of electricity from suppliers to consumers. In particular, the scenario fo-
cused on a smart meter which records consumption of electric energy and communicates
daily this information back to the utility for monitoring and billing purposes.
In Experiment 2.2 the Smart Grid scenario was refined into a number of tasks. The
tasks were Security Management (Mgmnt), Web Application/Database Security (WebAp-
p/DB), Network/Telecommunication Security (Net/Teleco), and Mobile Security (Mo-
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Table 2.11: Collected Data and Research Questions
Variable Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
RQ2.1: Actual
Effectiveness
Final reports: sec. controls (E5,
M6 and M7)*
Final reports: threats & sec. con-
trols (E5, M6, M7)
Final reports: threats & sec. con-
trols (E5, M6, M7)
RQ2.2.1: PEOU Post-task questionnaire (M2 and
M3n)
Post-task questionnaire (M3n) Post-task questionnaire (M3n)
RQ2.2.2: PU Post-task questionnaire (M2 and
M3n)
Post-task questionnaire (M3n) Post-task questionnaire (M3n)
RQ2.3: ITU N/A Post-task questionnaire (M3n) Post-task questionnaire (M3n)
RQ2.4: Qual.
drivers
Post-it notes, focus group inter-
views (M4)
Individual interviews (M4) Individual interviews (M4)
*Note: In parentheses we report steps of the framework that are involved in data collection
bile). For example, in the WebApp/DB task, groups had to identify application and
database security threats like cross-site scripting or aggregation attacks and propose mit-
igations. In Experiment 2.3 we used only Network and WebApp/DB security tasks as
participants were asked to work individually.
Collected Data In Experiment 2.1 we collected 15 methods applications. In Experiment
2.2 we collected 64 methods applications (16 groups× 4 tasks) and each group summarized
the identified threats and security controls in a single report per group. In Experiment
2.3 participants were asked to work individually. In total, we collected 58 methods appli-
cations (29 participants × 2 tasks). In each of three experiments participants were asked
to reply individually to a post-task questionnaire. Table 2.11 summarizes the data that
were collected during the experiments.
2.6 Lessons Learned from the Pilot Study
The pilot study helped us to refine research questions and our experimental framework.
The most important lessons are stated below. We stress that i) they mostly concern
practitioners and ii) are often not reported from the literature. We speculate that our
problems raised because experiments in the literature are usually run with students who
tend to be compliant to instructor’s guidelines.
Limit data collection. Too frequent measurements disrupt the natural flow of activities
of an experienced group or could be perceived by participants as intrusive. The former
introduces bias in the process and the latter leads to participants dropping from the
experiments.
Avoid usage of previous knowledge. Practitioners have experience of “appropriate” security
controls from past job assignments. If they think they have already seen the scenario,
then they will deliver their pre-cooked security controls (without running through any
method at all). This is a major threat to validity and it is very difficult to spot if one
only collects the final requirements. So, our final report always includes a brief section
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Only groups using SREP demonstrated better results. Unfortunately, the experiment does not allow to draw statis-
tically significant conclusions on actual effectiveness due to the small sample (an average of 3 groups per method).
Figure 2.6: Median Quality of Identified Security Controls – Experiment 2.1
where participants are supposed to illustrate how the method allowed deriving the final
controls.
Clarify importance of assigned method application. Practitioners (and students to some
extent) focus on results. Some groups thought security controls mattered so they ditched
the assigned method (“it was not working”) and used a completely different method that
they already knew. This can be detected by reading the section on the method, but the
work of the group cannot be used; it is a data loss.
Have method designers and domain experts available. The presence of method’s designers
and domain experts during the Application phase allows participants to ask for additional
information that may have not been provided during Training.
Beware of language issues. Most studies in the literature are mono-lingual and this aspect
is overlooked, whereas the participants from our studies were of mixed nationalities. Care
should be taken during focus groups sessions to misinterpret or lose feedback because
participants do not feel confident to speak in English.
2.7 Results
We compared different SRA methods with respect to their actual efficacy that was mea-
sured in terms of number of identified threats and security controls and their quality.
The results of Experiment 2.1 (see Figure 2.6) revealed that the textual methods helped
groups to identify security controls of a better quality (median quality is 4) than other
methods (median quality is 3).
The results of the post-task questionnaire that measured methods’ perceived efficacy
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To compare methods we collected answers to all questions about perceived efficacy (both PEOU and PU) and ran
a post-hoc MW test on the comparison (appropriately corrected for multiple tests) of methods X and Y: Perceived
efficacy of X is better than perceived efficacy of Y. We draw an arrow from method X to method Y if method Y has a
statistically significant higher perceived efficacy than method X. The vertical position has been spaced to reflect the
relative level of the answers.
After the training, only the textual and visual threat-based methods are perceived as better than other non-threat-
based methods. After a calendar month of remote application and almost two days full time of controlled application,
all threat-based methods are perceived as better than others. Observations are statistically significant (post-hoc MW
test).
Figure 2.7: Overall Assessment of Methods’ Perception – Experiment 2.1
(see Figure 2.7) show that threat-based methods (SREP, CORAS and LINDDUN) were
perceived by participants to be superior to other methods. Therefore, in consequent
experiments we focused on two types of threat-based security methods, namely visual
and textual.
2.7.1 Actual Efficacy
Experiment 2.2 showed that the visual method is more effective in identifying threats
(on average 50% more threats) than the textual one for both good and all groups (see
Figure 2.8), while the textual method was found to be more effective in identifying security
controls (on average 20% more controls) for good controls and this is supported by the
Friedman test (p = 7.4 ·10−3). The division on bad and good threats and security controls
were done based on the assessment results by domain experts. Experiment 2.3 aimed to
generalize the previous results and investigated different textual method. The results of
the third experiment, in contrast to the second one, showed that the textual method
is more effective in identifying threats (on average 40% more threats) for good threats
(see Figure 2.9) but this result is not statistically significant. There is also no difference
between two methods in identifying security controls.
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The visual method performed better in threats identification in both cases: if we consider threats of any quality
(on average 50% more threats) and if we apply quality filter and take only good ones. Observations are statistically
significant in the number of threats of any quality (ANOVA test returned p = 1.95 · 10−4 and Friedman test returned
p = 8.9 · 10−3) and good threats (Friedman test returned p < 1 · 10−3).
Figure 2.8: Numbers of Identified Threats by Quality – Experiment 2.2
2.7.2 Perception
The results of questionnaire analysis (see Table 2.12) show that the visual method is better
than the textual one with respect to each perception variable (PEOU, PU, ITU) across
all participants but this is not statistically significant. Good participants demonstrate
a statistically significant preference for the visual method for ITU, and a small but not
statistically significant preference for the visual method with respect to PEOU and PU.
Table 2.13 presents the results of Experiment 2.3 and shows that the visual method is
better than the textual one with respect to each perception variable (PEOU, PU, ITU)
across all and good participants and this is statistically significant.
2.7.3 Qualitative analysis
Experiment 2.1: From responses to open questions, post-it notes and transcript of focus
group interviews we coded 159 positive and 139 negative statements on PEOU, and 38
positive and 18 negative statements on PU. The results are detailed in Section 6.1 in
Tables 6.5a and 6.5b.
CORAS, SREP and LINDUN had most of positive comments related to PEOU which
were respectively 40, 41, and 31. All other methods had less than 30 positive comments.
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The textual method is found to be more effective in identifying threats than the visual one. But the results of the
statistical tests did not confirm this for both all threats (Friedman test returned p-value = 0.57) and good threats
(Skillings–Mack test returned p-value = 0.17).
Figure 2.9: Numbers of Identified Threats by Quality – Experiment 2.3
Table 2.12: Participants’ Perception by Variables and Quality of Results – Experiment 2.2
All participants Good participants
Variable Median ZW ZMW Median ZMW
Textual Visual Textual Visual
PEOU 3 3 -0.57 -0.9 3.5 4 -1.82 •
PU 3 4 -1.35 -0.96 3 4 -1.69 •
ITU 3 3 -0.86 -1.01 3 4 -2.59 *
Table 2.13: Participants’ Perception by Variables and Quality of Results – Experiment 2.3
All participants Good participants
Variable Median ZW ZMW Median ZMW
Textual Visual Textual Visual
PEOU 3 4 -6.51 *** -6.16 *** 2.5 4 -4.19 ***
PU 3 4 -4.82 *** -4.56 *** 3 4 -3.88 ***
ITU 3 4 -3.57 *** -3.67 *** 3 4 -2.94 ***
Tables report participants’ responses to questions aggregated by perception variable (PEOU, PU, ITU), the median
of responses by all and by good participants (the one who were part of groups that produced good quality threats and
security controls based on experts’ assessment), and the level of statistical significance based on the p-value returned
by the Wilcoxon test for the paired comparison (all participants) and the MW test for both all and good participants.
Note: • - p-value <0.1, * - p-value <0.05, ** - p-value <0.01, *** - p-value <0.001
Negative comments on PEOU where distributed among various methods. Each of them
faring around 30 statements except LINNDUN which only had 16 negative statements.
There were very few comments on PU either positive or negative (less than 10 per method).
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In summary, the following elements a) clear process, b) easy to understand, and c) visual
summary are the main aspects impacting PEOU of studied methods, and a) modeling
support, and b) security/privacy specificity are the key aspects influencing methods’ PU.
For example, the presence (resp. absence) of a clear process was one of the most frequent
causes offered by participants to describe their reason for methods’ perceived ease of
use. It accounted for 31% of positive statements (resp. 21% of negative statements)
over the total number of recorded statements. For CORAS (40% positive statements)
and LINDDUN (29% of positive statements and no negative one) having a clear process
positively affects their PEOU. Here are some examples: “For me it was very clear steps
from the first till the last one.” (CORAS); “The process is very clear and it is easy to
understand the method.” (LINDDUN); “The process is not so technical, so it is easy
to understand.” (SREP). For other methods participants stressed that methods were
convoluted or just not clear: “I think the process of the method is heavy, slow, complex
to follow.” (SECURITY ARGUMENTATION).
This provides a clear explanation for the measured perceived superiority of threat-
based methods (SREP, CORAS and LINDDUN) over other methods. In fact, the former
methods have clear process to follow.
Some participants pointed that having a visual summary was also important. Both
CORAS and SECURE TROPOS have a visual representation language and participants
appreciated that: 15 people mentioned it for CORAS and 4 mentioned it for SECURE
TROPOS. SECURE TROPOS has also a richer modeling language and 7 participants
explicitly mentioned it (“I liked the fact that it helps you to model the use case that you
are treating.”). Yet, this was not enough to revert the judgment on the ambiguity of
process, and hence the less positive appraisal of SECURE TROPOS over CORAS.
In summary, our analysis shows that the main driver is process clarity, while other
aspects are second order drivers.
Experiment 2.2: We analyzed transcripts of individual interviews and coded 80
positive and 53 negative statements on PEOU, and 85 positive and 20 negative statements
on PU. Tables 6.12a and 6.12b in Section 6.2 detail results.
Visual method had most (both positive and negative) of statements related to PEOU:
53 out of 80 positive and 33 out of 53 negative statements out. With respect to PU textual
method had most of positive statements (46 out of 85 statements) while visual method
had more negative statements (19 out of 20 statements).
The results of qualitative analysis show that a) clear process, and b) visual summary
are the main aspects impacting methods’ PEOU, while a) complexity of visual summary,
and b) help in identifying threats and security controls are the main aspects influencing
methods’ PU. Like in Experiment 2.1 participants of Experiment 2.2 reported a clear
process as one of the main aspects that describes methods’ perceived ease of use. They
made 35% of positive statements (resp. 25% of negative statements) over the total number
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of PEOU statements. For CORAS (23% of positive statements) having a clear process
has a positive effect on its PEOU. For example, “steps are very clear.” But there is no
consensus about clear process of SREP because participants made 59% of positive and
55% negative statements about this aspect. Here are some examples: “Well defined steps.
Clear process to follow” and “steps are not well explained.”
Similar to Experiment 2.1, another important PEOU aspect reported by participants
is availability of visual summary. About 45% of positive statements in CORAS were made
by participants in relation to this aspect. A typical statement was: “Diagrams are useful.
You have an overview of the possible threat scenarios and you can find links among the
scenarios”.
Experiment 2.3: In Experiment 2.3 we analyzed transcripts of individual interviews
and coded 161 positive and 212 negative statements on PEOU, and 107 positive and 63
negative statements on PU. Table 6.16 in Section 6.3 detail results.
Visual method had most (both positive and negative) of statements related to PEOU:
121 out of 161 positive and 115 out of 212 negative statements out. With respect to PU
textual method had most of negative statements (37 out of 63 statements) while visual
method had more positive statements (71 out of 107 statements).
Experiment 2.3 supports the findings of the qualitative analysis of Experiment 2.2 both
for PEOU and PU aspects. Similar to Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, participants of Experiment
2.3 supported that a clear process is among the main aspects defining methods’ PEOU:
12% of positive statements (resp. 9% of negative statements) over the total number of
PEOU statements. For CORAS 23% of positive statements were made about this aspect:
“the advantages of CORAS is very clear structure”. For the textual method still there is
no agreement on clear process of SecRAM: participants made 45% of positive and 29% of
negative statements about it. For example, “the steps are very clear” and “the steps and
even the methodology was not really quite clear”.
Another important PEOU aspect is having a visual summary: participants made 36%
of positive statements about this aspect for CORAS. Here some examples: “there are
many summary diagrams which are useful to summarize what has been done” and “the
advantage is the visualization”.
The results of Experiments 2.2 and 2.3 can explain participants’ perceived preference
of the visual method over the textual one. In conclusion, the analysis results support the
findings of Experiment 2.1 and show the importance of clear process and visual summary
as key drivers.
2.7.4 Correlation Analysis
Based on the results of Experiment 2.2 we conducted a correlation analysis between actual
effectiveness, PEOU, PU and ITU to validate relations proposed by MEM. Our data have
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Table 2.14: Summary of Empirical Results
Note: in italics reported statistically significant results, in normal text reported results with 10% significance level
unless explicitly mentioned that there is no statistically significance.
RQ & Results
Concept Experiment 2.1 Experiment 2.2 Experiment 2.3
RQ2.1 Actual
effectiveness
OPEN (Not enough
data)
a)More threats were found with visual
method than with textual method.
b) Slightly more security controls were
found with textual method than with
the visual one BUT the difference is
not statistically significant.
a) Slightly more threats were
found with textual method than
with visual one BUT the difference
is not statistically significant.
b) No difference in the number of
identified security controls.
RQ2.2.1
PEOU
PEOU is higher for
threat-based meth-
ods with statistical
significance.
Threat-based visual method is per-
ceived as easier to use than textual one
BUT the difference is not statistically
significance.
Threat-based visual method is per-
ceived as easier to use than textual
one.
RQ2.2.2 PU PU is higher for threat-
based methods BUT
the difference is not sta-
tistically significance.
Visual method is perceived as more
useful than the textual one BUT the
difference is not statistically signifi-
cant.
Visual method is perceived as more
useful than the textual one.
RQ2.3 ITU Not tested. Participants intend to use the visual
method more than the textual one.
Same as in Experiment 2.2.
ties and we used Kendall’s tau rank correlation coefficient to compare participants’ actual
effectiveness, PEOU, PU and ITU.
According to MEM there is a correlation between actual effectiveness and PU. To verify
this we tested correlation between overall PU with the numbers and quality of identified
threats and security controls for each of two methods and both methods in general. The
results of the Kendall’s tests show no statistically significant correlation between these
variables, with a small exception when we consider the correlation between the numbers
of security controls identified with correspondingly textual method and its overall PU
(p = 0.012, τ = −0.25) and visual method and its overall PU (p = 0.025, τ = 0.23).
However, it is not enough to conclude that actual effectiveness correlate with PU. The
results of the Kendall’s tests in Experiment 2.3 also revealed no correlation between the
number and quality of threats and security controls with perception variables. Therefore,
we cannot support corresponding MEM’s claim. In contrast, correlations between PU,
PEOU and ITU are statistically significant according to the results of the Kendall’s tests
both in the second and third experiments. Thus, our experiments supports MEM’s claim
in this respect.
2.8 Discussion and Implications
In this section we discuss the results of our validation of MEM and the main drivers behind
MEM’s constructs that we derived from the results of qualitative analysis. Table 2.14 also
presents the main findings of both experiment regarding each research question.
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Figure 2.10: Refined Model
We have investigated the main drivers behind PU and PEOU of the methods, a part
that is missing in MEM. The analysis results of focus groups and individual interviews,
post-it notes, and open questions allow us to identify the main aspects impacting methods’
PU and PEOU. These aspects are presented in Figure 2.10.
The main driver for methods’ PEOU is presence in a method of clear process support-
ing main steps of SRA (identification of assets, threats and security controls). Also the
importance of this aspect is confirmed by the results of correlation analysis of control
question about process (see Q13 results in Table 6.11 on page 107 and question’s state-
ment in Table 6.17 on page 117) in Experiment 2.2 with overall PEOU of both methods
(Kendall’s test returned p = 0.02, τ = 0.24). Based on the results of all three experiments
we can conclude that availability of visual summary is reported as an aspect that posi-
tively impacts methods’ PEOU. However, if visual summary does not scale well, it can
harm methods’ PU. If method helps in identification of threats and security controls than
it can increase PU. For drivers related to help in identification of threats and security
controls we have additional evidence from Experiment 2.2 based on the results of corre-
lation analysis of control questions about help in brainstorming on threats and security
controls (Q16 and Q17). The results support the fact that these drivers positively im-
pacts methods’ PU. We can also suppose that help in identification of threats and security
controls can be increased with availability of catalogs of threats and security controls as
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suggested by answers to post-task question Q14 in Experiment 2.2 and questions Q2 and
Q3 in Experiment 2.3.
One of the main implications both for industrial practitioners and researchers that
comes from the refined theoretical model is that there is a number of SRA specific features
that should be taken into account for comparison or selection of methods: a) the presence
of clear process supporting SRA steps, b) availability of visual summary and c) catalogues
of threats and security controls. However, both methods’ designers and users should be
aware about scalability issues with visual representation that may appear in case of large
systems modeling. A possible solution may be a tool supporting SRA steps and work
with large models that decrease the effort required to model large systems.
2.9 Threats to Validity
We discuss the four main types of threats to validity [128] in what follows.
Conclusion Validity is concerned with issues that affect the ability to draw the cor-
rect conclusion about relations between the treatment and the outcome of the experiment.
– Heterogeneity of participants. If groups in a sample are too heterogeneous, the variation
due to individual differences may be larger than due to treatment. We have reduced this
threat by running experiments with groups which participants had similar knowledge
and background. For Exp. 2.1 we had groups composed of at least one professional and
one MSc student, while in Exp. 2.2 and 2.3 we had MSc students only.
– Low Statistical Power An important threat to validity is related to the sample size that
must be big enough to come to correct conclusions. Since our sample in Experiment 2.1
is between 5 and 20 participants we used the Kruskal-Wallis test [53] and the Mann-
Whitney U test [84]. For Experiments 2.2 and 2.3 we conducted a post-hoc power
analysis with G*Power 3 tool 2 for participants from good groups. In Experiment 2.2
for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test we obtained a power (1-β) equal to 0.86 setting as
parameter the effect size ES=0.71, the total sample size N = 24, and α = 0.05. For
the ANOVA test, we have instead a power of 0.89 with 32 observations for each method
and between variance least 16 observations are needed to have an effect size of 2 like
in our experiment. We thus have enough observations to conclude that our results on
methods’ actual effectiveness, PEOU, PU, and ITU are correct.
In Experiment 2.3 for the results of Wilcoxon test with good participants we obtained
a low power (PEOU = 0.54, PU = 0.31, and ITU = 0.3, where N = 20), while
for all participant we received the following powers: PEOU = 0.84, PU = 0.35, and
ITU = 0.34 with N = 56. To obtain 0.8 power we would need to have at least 40
participants for PEOU up to 96 good participants for ITU.
2http://www.psycho.uni-duesseldorf.de/abteilungen/aap/gpower3/
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Internal Validity is concerned with issues that may falsely indicate a causal relation-
ship between the treatment and the outcome, although there is none.
– Bias in data analysis. To avoid bias in reports analysis, coding of participants’ reports
was conducted by two researchers independently. In addition, the quality of threats and
security controls identified by each group was assessed by experts external to experi-
ments. In Experiment 2.1 we had two experts due to the presence of two application
scenario while in Experiment 2.2 we had only one application scenario and one expert.
However, in Experiment 2.3 we asked two experts to evaluate participants’ results to
have at least two opinions about results quality.
Construct Validity.
– Experimenter expectancies. The main threat to construct validity in our experiment
is the design of research instruments: interviews and questionnaires. In Experiment
2.1 we measured participants’ overall perception of methods. In Experiment 2.2 our
questionnaire was designed following TAM with questions for each independent variable
we wanted to measure: PEOU, PU and ITU. The interview guide included questions
concerningRQ2.2 and methods’ advantages and disadvantages. Several researchers have
checked questions included in the interview guide and in questionnaires. Therefore, we
believe that our research instruments measure what we want to measure. Moreover, to
reduce this threat we have gathered data using other data sources (audio files, post-it
notes, open questions and participants’ reports) and performed data triangulation.
– Hypothesis guessing. Participants did not know which hypotheses were stated, and were
not involved in any discussion on advantages and disadvantages of other methods, thus
they were not able to guess what the expected results were.
Other threats to construct validity are considered small.
External Validity concerns the ability to generalize experiment results beyond ex-
perimental settings. External validity is thus affected by the objects and the participants
chosen to conduct experiments.
– Use of students instead of professionals. Using students rather than professionals as
participants is known as a major threat to external validity. In Experiment 2.1 we mit-
igated this threat by involving both MSc students and professionals that were working
in groups. In Experiment 2.2 we mitigated this threat by using MSc students enrolled
in a Security Engineering course. This allowed us to rely on students with the required
expertise in security and to ensure that they had the same level of knowledge.
– Realism of the application scenario and tasks. We reduce the threat to external validity
by making experimental environment as realistic as possible. In fact, as object of our
experiment we have chosen two real industrial application scenarios proposed by Atos
Research (Smart Grid) and Siemens (e-Health).
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2.10 Conclusions
The chapter presented an evaluation framework to compare different SRA methods, a
pilot study to test and refine the framework, and the results of three empirical studies
conducted a) to compare three classes of academic methods to identify threats and secu-
rity measures: threat-based methods (CORAS, SREP, LINDDUN,), goal-based methods
(SECURE TROPOS), and problem-based methods (SECURITY ARGUMENTATION);
b) to compare two types of threat-based methods: visual method (CORAS) and textual
method (SREP and EUROCONTROL SecRAM). We compare methods with respect to
actual effectiveness, overall perception, perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness and
intention to use. Experiment 2.1 involved MSc students in Computer Science and secu-
rity audit professionals who have applied different classes of methods to analyze security
issues of industrial application scenarios. Experiments 2.2 and 2.3 were conducted with
MSc students in Computer Science. They have applied visual and textual threat-based
methods to conduct SRA of an industrial application scenario.
Experiment 2.1 shows that threat-based methods have higher overall perception and
perceived ease of use than goal-based and problem-based methods. This could be due to
the fact that these methods have a clearly defined process to identify threats and security
controls and use a graphical notation to present results. These findings are confirmed
by the results of Experiment 2.2. The first experiment has also shown that there is no
difference in perceived usefulness of different classes of methods.
In Experiment 2.2 we found out that the visual method is better in identification
of threats than the textual one. Also participants of Experiment 2.2 were intending to
use the visual method more than the textual one. In contrast, Experiment 2.3 failed to
reveal any difference between textual and visual methods with respect to their actual
effectiveness. However, the results showed that participants reported higher preference
for visual methods over the textual ones with respect to PEOU, PU and ITU.
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Chapter 3
The Role of Catalogues of Threats and
Security Controls in Leveraging
Security Knowledge
In Chapter 2 we presented a theoretical model that hypotheses different characteristics
of SRA methods that determine methods’ actual efficacy and perceived efficacy. One of
the aspects proposed by the model in Chapter 2 is the usage of catalogues of threats and
security controls. This chapter aims to investigate the role of catalogues in an SRA and
proposes a theory to explain how different catalogues’ features contribute into an effective
risk assessment process for novices and experts in either domain or security knowledge.
3.1 Introduction
SRA is a key step in the design of critical systems. But IS architects often lack the
necessary security knowledge to identify all appropriate security risks. Even experts
can forget to treat risks that might be relevant for a system. To alleviate this issue,
industrial SRA methods and standards come with catalogues of threats and security
controls. Essentially, catalogues are a form of knowledge reuse [111] created at community
level [63] and made available to individuals. Security catalogues can be divided into
domain-general and domain-specific catalogues. Table 3.1 presents some examples of
these two categories of catalogues.
Table 3.1: Examples of the Catalogues of Security Threats and Controls
Type Catalogues
Domain-general catalogues BSI IT-Grundschutz, ISO/IEC 27002 and 27005, NIST 800-53
Domain-specific catalogues PCI DSS for banking information security, EATM for security and
safety in Air Traffic Management, OWASP for web application
security, CSA Cloud Control Matrix for cloud security
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The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how security analysts with different levels
of expertise (novices, domain experts, security experts) can benefit from knowledge reuse
in an SRA, and how effective knowledge reuse is. The expectations are that catalogue
should reduce errors for security experts and should enable domain experts (as opposed
to security expert) to perform a prima-facie SRA.
This chapter proposes a theory to explain how different features of catalogues con-
tribute into an effective SRA process for novices and experts in either domain or security.
We built the theory by using a grounded theory from interviews of security experts. First,
it focuses on two types of knowledge involved in an SRA: community knowledge (in a cat-
alogue form) and personal knowledge of a security analyst. Further, it explains a) the
core tasks essential to successfully perform an SRA at different levels of expertise and
b) the features of the catalogue needed for these tasks. At the end, the theory models
the relationships between catalogues’ features and actual and perceived efficacy of SRA
methods. We conducted two controlled experiments aiming to provide empirical support
to our theory.
The quantitative analysis shows that domain experts that are not security experts can
obtain almost the same quality results as experts in both domain and security working
without catalogues. Regarding perceived efficacy, for students without domain expertise
domain-specific catalogues were perceived to be useful than domain-general ones because
they provides exhaustive set of threats and security controls specific to an application
domain.
In addition, the qualitative analysis of focus group interviews shows that non-experts
and security experts have a different perception of catalogues. Non-experts found cata-
logues useful as starting point to identify threats and controls but at the same time they
were concerned about the difficulty in navigating catalogues because there were no link
between threats and security controls. Security experts instead found catalogues mostly
useful because they provide a common terminology to discuss about threats and controls
and they can be used to check completeness of results.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses background and presents the
related works; Section 3.3 presents grounded theory construction for the theoretical model
of the effects of catalogues features on an SRA that is proposed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5
presents the research method; Section 3.6 presents the motivation of domain selection and
describes the setting of the study, whose findings are presented in Sections 3.7 and 3.8.
Threats to validity to our study are discussed in Section 3.9. The findings and implications
are discussed in Section 3.10 and conclusion are presented in Section 3.11.
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Table 3.2: Security Risk Assessment and Management Steps
Steps 2 through 8 are repeated until the recommended controls are sufficient to reduce the level of risk to the IT
system and its data to an acceptable level.
Steps Step description (from ISO 31000 standard)
Step 1: System Charac-
terization
In this step, the boundaries of the IT system are identified, along with the resources and the
information that constitute the system.
Step 2: Threat Identifi-
cation
The goal of this step is to identify potential threat-sources and compile a threat statement listing
potential threat-sources that are applicable to the IT system being evaluated.
Step 3: Vulnerability
Identification
The goal of this step is to develop a list of system vulnerabilities (flaws or weaknesses) that could
be exploited by the potential threat-sources.
Step 4: Control Analy-
sis
The goal of this step is to analyze the controls that have been implemented, or are planned for
implementation, by the organization to minimize or eliminate the likelihood (or probability) of a
threat’s exercising a system vulnerability.
Step 5: Likelihood De-
termination
The goal of this step is to derive an overall likelihood rating that indicates the probability that a
potential vulnerability may be exercised within the construct of associated threat environment.
Step 6: Impact Analy-
sis
The goal of this step is to determine the adverse impact resulting from a successful threat exercise
of a vulnerability.
Step 7: Risk Determi-
nation
The purpose of this step is to assess the level of risk to the IT system. The determination of risk for
a particular threat/vulnerability pair can be expressed as a function of threat-source likelihood, its
impact and the adequacy of planned or existing security controls for reducing or eliminating risk.
Step 8: Control Recom-
mendations
During this step, controls that could mitigate or eliminate the identified risks, as appropriate to the
organization’s operations, are provided.
Step 9: Results Docu-
mentation
Once the risk assessment has been completed (threat-sources and vulnerabilities identified, risks
assessed, and recommended controls provided), the results should be documented in an official
report or briefing that helps senior management, mission owners, to make decisions on policy,
procedures, budget, management and system operations.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Security Risk Assessment and Knowledge Reuse
SRA is a complex problem solving process. Table 3.2 describes the steps of a typical
security risk assessment and management process based on the NIST 800-30 standard.
The steps of the SRA process are usually supported by a security catalogues which are
a form to encode expert knowledge that can be reused. However, the knowledge reuse
practice is not well investigated in security [111]. In contrast, the importance of knowledge
and its managements and communication is well understood in IS. The survey by [105]
investigated knowledge management state-of-the-art in IS through a literature analysis of
94 knowledge management papers published between 1990 and 2000 in six IS journals.
Overall, the authors concluded that IS research tends to "adopt an optimistic view of the
role of knowledge in organizations." Later [106] extended the previous work and proposed
a theoretical framework where knowledge can be considered as an asset that can be owned
and transferred, and the role of knowledge is to progress individuals and organizations. [30]
also argued that knowledge is a fundamental component for organizational processes, and
organization structure should be designed to facilitate knowledge communication between
workers. This idea is also supported in Software Engineering (SE) by [92] and by [88] who
emphasized the importance of knowledge sharing practice.
Knowledge can be divided into personal and community knowledge [127]. Personal
knowledge is tacit knowledge that people create by themselves or learn from their own
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experience. Based on personal knowledge people make decision in their future projects. If
people lack necessary knowledge they turn to community knowledge, which is "personal
knowledge" shared between members, for example, in a documented form (catalogue
being just one of such form). Indeed, a theory of knowledge reuse by [63] suggests that
the work of experts can be facilitated by providing knowledge about proven solutions or
best practices to problems in a new context. Knowledge reuse can also mitigate lack of
expertise for novices or make easier work of professionals because they do not need to
solve a problem again. For example, a catalogue of Non-Functional Requirements (NFR)
was proposed as a part of NFR Framework to help developers to satisfy most common
NFRs from SE practice [7]. The role of the knowledge in software security engineering
is well described by [3], "software security practitioners place a premium on knowledge
and experience", who also discussed different types of knowledge catalogues in security,
namely principles, guidelines, rules, attack patterns, historical risks, vulnerabilities and
exploits. The authors suggested that security catalogues dissemination will help to refine
and validate this knowledge and may be move the field toward standardization. [111]
showed that threats and security requirements are the most reusable elements due to
their importance for an SRA process. Usually these elements are presented in form of
security patterns [98, 107] which can be also organized in catalogues.
3.2.2 Empirical Studies on Knowledge Reuse
The importance of reusable knowledge in its various forms is being advocated by academia
and industry but very few studies have empirically investigated its effectiveness. [25]
conducted empirical study with 69 software development teams which revealed that teams
performance is strongly related to a knowledge communication practice adopted in teams.
There is no agreement in the literature whether external community knowledge (as
captured by catalogues) is always effective in practice. For example in requirements anal-
ysis, the use of structured knowledge led to better coverage and completeness of gathered
requirements [67]. However, the use of catalogue of NFRs needed to be coupled to a sys-
tematic method to result in significantly better performance in NFR elicitation than using
only a catalogue or only a method [12]. In 1994 the "Gang of Four" published a book
describing design patterns, solutions to common problems in software design [28] which
became a bestseller in the SE community. Unfortunately, [134] showed that the Gang
of Four patterns have limited usability and do not help novices to learn about design.
Similarly, [133] was not able to demonstrate that the usage of security patterns improves
neither the productivity of software designers nor design security. Business process im-
provements patterns were proposed to support users in application of improvements on
business processes [24]. However, a combination of routing patterns and decision guidance
for business process models creation was found to be time consuming due to increase of
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efforts on the evaluation of different alternatives and decision making [129]. To the best
of our knowledge this topic has not yet been investigated for SRA.
3.3 Qualitative Theory Construction for Security Risk Assess-
ment Activities
In this study we used focus group interviews to collect data and grounded theory ap-
proach proposed by [32] to construct a theory based on collected data [36]. Figure 3.1
summarizes the approach we used. It follows the principle of emergence [120], according
to which data gain their relevance in the analysis through a systematic generation and
iterative conceptualization of codes, concepts and categories. Data are analyzed in con-
stant comparison, broken into manageable pieces (codes) and compared for similarities
and differences. Data that are similar in nature are grouped together under the same
conceptual heading (category). Categories are developed in terms of their properties and
dimensions and finally they provide the structure of the theory [120]. We approached this
research by identifying a relevant problem currently experienced by security experts and
practitioners in the field [3] and for which most empirical papers only focuses on compar-
ing notations (e.g. graphical vs. textual). See for example [55, 58, 86, 118]. The major
question from a knowledge management perspective is still unanswered: how codified
community knowledge helps an SRA process?
As we can see from Table 3.2, SRA and management process involves activities like
1) identifying system boundaries, 2) finding/identifying/collecting necessary information,
3) validating and 4) presenting the results. To validate if these activities are really the
core tasks for security risk assessment and management process, we conduct an empirical
study with security professionals reported in the rest of the section.
3.3.1 Study Context
As a context for our study we selected SESAR ATM (Single European Sky ATM Re-
search). SESAR is a public-private partnership which includes a total 70 organizations.
SESAR coordinates and concentrates all EU R&D activities for future ATM research,
including the development of its operational concepts (estimated at 2.1 billion euro).
This domain research is particularly interesting from a IS perspective as the technolo-
gies developed in the projects are mostly IS substituting existing physical systems. To
illustrate this we provide some examples of IS in the scope of SESAR. For example, it in-
cludes the development of a fully remote control tower where physical out-of-the-window
view is replaced by its digital version. Another projects, Airport Departure Data Entry
Panel and Extended Arrival Management, aim at replacing manual assignment of landing
and departure of flights by a fully automatic IS. SESAR Conflict Management and Au-
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Figure 3.1: Research Approach
tomation project aims at significantly reducing controller work load through a substantial
improvement of integrated automation support.
Our qualitative study involved Air Traffic Management (ATM) experts from SESAR
Working Group. SESAR working groups include around 3,000 experts in Europe both in
technological and organizational systems in ATM. We interacted with the experts in the
Working Group in charge of the SRA for all developed solutions.
3.3.2 Data Collection
Various techniques exist for knowledge elicitation [42], but variation of structured or semi-
structured interviews are most commonly involved in tasks analysis [113, Ch. 42]. The
data analyzed in this research have been collected through a purposive sampling [38]
from stakeholders attending the 6th Jamboree meeting of the SESAR Working Group in
Brussels, 12th November 2013.
Table 3.3 presents demographic statistics about participants attending the meeting (to-
tal 20 experts). The participants were professionals with 17,5 years of working experience
in average and in particular 7 years of experience in risk assessment. These participants
can be defined as a small but representative selection of ATM and IS stakeholders carrying
qualified opinions about and insights into SRA both physical and information security.
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Table 3.3: Participants’ Demographic Statistics
Variable Scale Mean Distribution
Age Years 42 5% were <30 years old; 58% were 30-45 years old; 37% were >45 years old
Gender Sex - 79% male; 21% female
Degree Education - - 6% High School; 17% BSc; 44% MSc; 17% MBA; 17% PhD
Professional Experience Years 17,5 11% have <5 years; 37% have between 5 and 10 years; 53% have > 10 years
Professional Experience
in Risk Assessment
Years 7 56% have <5 years; 28% have between 5 and 10 years; 17% have >10 years
We collected primary data from four parallel focus groups sessions [FG1, FG2, FG3
and FG4] lasted approximately 30 minutes. The participants were randomly assigned to
the groups. In each group were 5 participants plus an individual moderator. The focus
group interviews were audio recorded, then transcribed and coded with Atlas.ti software.
The focus groups were conducted in form of semi-structured interviews as they al-
low uncovering real interests perceived by participants rather than forcing a topic on
them [132]. In order to extract type of knowledge, expertise and supporting artifacts
needed to successfully perform the steps of an SRA method, the following areas of con-
cern were used to facilitate keeping interviews in focus without biasing the responses
from interviewees: a) aspects making an SRA method successful; b) weaknesses in SRA
methods; c) factors influencing intention to use an SRA method; d) aspects making an
SRA method easy to use; e) aspects making an SRA method effective; f) importance of
compliance requirement when choosing an SRA method. The questions used to guide the
discussion in the focus groups are reported in Table 7.3 on page 122 in the Appendix.
3.3.3 Data Analysis
Our analysis of qualitative data was inspired by the coding guidelines in [120, pp. 216-219].
The first phase of analysis (open coding) consists of collating the key point statements
from each focus group transcript; a code summarizing the key points in some words is
assigned to each key point statement. An example from our research is as follows:
Interview quotation: “If you have different people do the risk assessment from different
parts, you have a human factor [...]. Different experience, so this might somehow deviate
the final result of the risk assessment.” (Code: Comparability of results).
In order to replicate the findings of another study we used the codes listed in Table 6.16
in Chapter 6; following the “iterative process” typical of coding method [94, Ch. 1] we
finally identified 31 success criteria. Table 7.2 in the Appendix Chapter 7 reports the
success criteria. A ∗ symbol marks codes different from the codes reported in Table 6.161.
We proceeded extracting from the success criteria some categories (selective coding) that
we identified as the “tasks” needed to be performed by an expert during an SRA. “Finding
Information”, “Presenting/Sharing Information” and “Validating Information” have been
1We speculate that much difference may be due to the sample: here we used experts with 10+ years of experience,
Table 6.16 presents the results of the qualitative study with MSc students
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Figure 3.2: Co-occurrence between success criteria and tasks
selected as “tasks” emerged from the coding. The example below can explain how we
moved from the quotation drawn from the interview to the code (success criteria) and
lastly to the category (task):
Interview quotation: “[The methodology] has to support the risk analysts in achieving
the results they want, of course. So either identification of threats or estimation of like-
lihood or identification of security controls or whatever. . . ” (Code: Help to identifying
threats; Task: Finding Information).
As a proxy for salience [36], in addition to presenting the relevance of each success criteria
and task in terms of frequency in the interviews (Table 7.2 in the Appendix), we also
calculated the frequency of their co-occurrence in the same statement. This is graphically
shown in Figure 3.2.
3.3.4 Evidence from Interviews
Finding Information. Data analysis reveals that Finding Information is the core task
of the whole risk assessment process: it is supported by the highest number of different
success criteria identified by the participants. Its main task is to identify specific threats
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and controls (FG1, 2, 3 and 4). In particular the methodology fulfills its own purpose
when it allows to acquire some knowledge previously unknown (Learn new things): “The
best methodology leads to [...] [a] specific solution that is not covered by best practice”
(FG4).
According to some experts a method is not stand-alone and it requires support also by
other sources and tools: “The effectiveness is strongly linked with what are the tools that
are around the methodology: the knowledge bases, the registers, the things that you build
upon and you use to keep track of what you’re looking for” (FG4). The availability of the
Catalogue of threats and security controls is thus perceived to be important, as it can pro-
vide a good starting point in the analysis: “The methodology should have a comprehensive
threats catalogue so people may start from a base catalogue and then eventually add other
threats” (FG1). A catalogue can help in finding the right Granularity of the analysis: “It
will help you to identify the level of detail required to perform the risk assessment” (FG3).
Among the other tools improving the methodology there are the Practical guidelines
and the Documentation template: “It’s not enough just to say: ‘Okay, in this step the
goal is this and that’. You need really to know exactly how to do it, and you should also
have guidance on what kind of information you are supposed to gather during this step
and how to document it, whether it’s in a table or in a graphical format” (FG1).
Presenting/Sharing Information. The analysis of focus group discussion shows
that when presenting the results, the most relevant aspect considered by interviewees is
to have a well-defined terminology as this enhances the interoperability among experts
and stakeholders and it is so important that: “There is no sense if you have a super
method, if the results cannot be exchanged [...]. You have to share the situation” (FG2).
The need for a common naming scheme is perceived as even more critical when interacting
with, for example, customers, stakeholders, and regulators. This aspect is also related to
the comprehensibility of method outcomes: “ [A good methodology] allows me to explain
to the person that’s got to pay for the controls, what they need” (FG3). The existing
gap between experts and customers at the comprehension and communication level is
summarized in the need to provide to stakeholders what is called “the big picture” (FG2)
and to “visualize” it (FG3). In this phase, documentation templates and catalogues of
security controls as a baseline can support the presentation of the analysis results.
Validating Information. Participants involved in the discussion highlighted the
importance of being compliant with standards: “[We shall] address governmental security
needs and address the Austrian or French needs and so on” (FG4). Moreover, the results
produced by the methodology implementation need also to be repeatable and comparable
in order to be verifiable. This is perceived as important mainly in relation to repeatability
when the context has changed to avoid the case that differences in the expertise of security
risk assessment participants might affect final results of the risk assessment (FG2). This
concern can also be addressed by using a well-defined terminology in this final phase.
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Figure 3.3: A Theoretical Model for Catalogues as Knowledge Sources
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Finally, the level of coverage of results provided by the methodology implementation
is also important, as it should ensure a complete and exhaustive comprehensiveness of
threats and security controls, as well as a coverage of the full life cycle of the system
under threat.
3.4 A Theoretical Model for Catalogue Effectiveness
We summarize the findings of the previous section with a theoretical model of how users’
expertise, identified tasks, and catalogues combine to produce an SRA. Figure 3.3 illus-
trates the key elements of the model and their relationships. The three tasks for SRA
identified above are at its core: (a) Finding information, which implies identification of
assets, threats and security controls, (b) Validating information, which means checking if
the results produced by the analyst are complete and comply with standards, and (c) Pre-
senting/sharing information, namely documenting results to other stakeholders using a
terminology appropriate to the domain.
Novices are the main consumers of community knowledge. They use catalogues mostly
to find information and adopt the appropriate language to present results. These activities
are impacted by the following features:
- Catalogue Structure. If a catalogue does not have clear and logical structure it can
affect novices’ perceived efficacy and increase the effort needed to find the necessary
information.
- Catalogue Content (amount of information). Novices can struggle with catalogues
that are too big because they do not know how to start a risk assessment if they
have too many options. Hence, the amount of information presented in a catalogue
can affect both the actual and perceived efficacy of a security assessment.
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- Terminology. A catalogue can support novices with standard terminology accepted
in both the domain and the security field. Even users without solid background in
domain or security can produce results understandable by experts (albeit the latter
may disagree with the recommendations). The clear and uniform presentation of the
results improves their actual efficacy.
Experts rely on their own knowledge as a source of information. They may benefit from
the use of community knowledge to validate the correctness and coverage of their findings
as well as to check the terminology used to present results to the particular customers.
The following features play a major role:
- Catalogue as a Checklist may be useful when the user has experience (“personal
knowledge”) and needs to check that nothing important was overlooked. The com-
pleteness of the results has a positive effect on their actual and perceived efficacy.
- Terminology. Security experts often work across domains. They can use catalogues
as a source of terms accepted in the domain, and thus ensure that results are under-
standable by relevant stakeholders, who are likely domain experts but not security
experts, using an appropriate language. Thus, a domain-specific catalogue can make
easier the work of experts in a new domain and can improve the actual efficacy of
the results.
3.5 Experimental Validation
The goal of our empirical studies is to provide empirical support to the model depicted
in Figure 3.3 and investigate whether different catalogues equally facilitate execution of
an SRA. In particular, we want to assess whether the use of catalogues has an effect on
actual and perceived efficacy of an SRA when used by people with no security expertise
and comparing it with the effect of running the same assessment by security experts
without catalogues.
We follow the protocol reported in [86] as amended by [55] to insert an expert evaluation
of the artifacts produced by participants. Before execution of any activity, participants
are administered a questionnaire to collect information on their background and previous
knowledge of other risk assessment methods. Then the following steps are performed:
– Training. A scenario description is administered to participants by either individual
reading or by an introductory presentation. Then, a frontal-training phase follows in
which the expert in the method introduces the methodology to be used for the SRA
through a step-by-step tutorial.
– Application. Participants apply the method to the scenario.
– Evaluation. External evaluators from industry assess the quality of threats and secu-
rity controls identified by participants, providing marks and comments. These expert
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evaluators are neither researchers nor their colleagues. They are independent industry
experts contracted for the task.
After the application phase a post-task questionnaire is administered to participants to
gather their perception of the method (and catalogues). Then they are involved into focus
groups to discuss drawbacks and benefits of the method and catalogues they used. A list
of questions is used to guide the discussion that is audio recorded for further analysis.
The main positive and negative aspects reported in the focus groups then are reported
on post-it notes by participants. The qualitative analysis attempted to cast light on
catalogues’ features affecting actual and perceived efficacy of SRA.
3.5.1 Treatment Groups
In the first experiment we only considered participants without significant domain exper-
tise and therefore only divided them in two groups: the first group conducted an SRA
with the support of a domain-specific catalogue (DOM CAT), the second group with the
support of a domain-general (GEN CAT) one.
In the second experiment we only considered professionals and we created two groups as
in the first experiments (DOM CAT, GEN CAT) and a third group which worked without
catalogue (NO CAT). All participants in the NO CAT group had security knowledge,
while most of the participants in the DOM CAT and GEN CAT groups had limited or
no security knowledge.
3.5.2 Constructs and Measurements
The actual efficacy of a method can be measured in several ways. For example, [86]
proposed to measure actual performance of the user by counting number of identified
threats. This metric was also used by [51] and [97]. Similar metrics, e.g. number of
identified failure modes or hazards, were adopted for safety analysis [115, 116, 118, 119].
Coverage is an alternative, more qualitative metric that is especially important for mea-
suring effectiveness of methods for software testing [27,33]. In SRA, coverage is the type of
threats identified [51,86] or the comparison of the proposed assessment against a baseline
developed by an expert [78,97].
In this work we measured actual efficacy as the quality of results produced by par-
ticipants. Using the number of threats and security controls as a performance metric
would be meaningless because there are lot of threats and security controls available in
catalogues, and participants could include any of them in the analysis. Yet, they maybe
irrelevant. This is also advocated by the experts who assessed results of our previous ex-
periments: “Threats are generic but understandable, although many threats are missing.”
and “Very generic threats. Lack of understanding around the motivation of the threats.”
We therefore asked each expert to rate the overall quality of results on a 1-5 scale as fol-
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lows: Bad (1), when it was not clear which are the final threats or security controls for the
scenario; Poor (2), when threats/security controls were not specific for the scenario; Fair
(3), when some of them were related to the scenario; Good (4), threats/security controls
were specific for the scenario; and Excellent (5), when the threats were significant for the
scenario and security controls propose an effective solution for the scenario. Figure 7.1 in
the appendix reports the quality assessment guidelines agreed with the experts.
To assess perceived efficacy we used both the quantitative and qualitative approach.
We first asked participants to fill in a post-task questionnaire. The questionnaire contains
10-20 questions about different constructs specific to perceived usefulness (PU) and per-
ceived ease of use (PEOU) variables [14]. This approach was also applied to measure per-
ceived efficacy of security and safety methods in numerous studies like [50,79,86,118,131].
Questions were formulated as opposite statements with answers on a 5-point Likert scale.
Table 7.4 in the appendix reports the post-task questionnaire.
To validate the proposed theoretical model we also investigated transcripts of interviews
on the basis of the set of codes already discussed in Section 3.3.
3.5.3 Data Analysis
In our study we are interested to prove the equivalence of different types of catalogues
over expertise. Therefore, we use equivalence testing – TOST, which was proposed by
Schuirmann [104] and is widely used in pharmacological and food sciences to answer the
question whether two treatments are equivalent within a particular range δ [26, 75]. We
summarize the key aspects of TOST as it is not well known in SE and refer to the review
paper by Meyners [75] for details. The problem of the equivalence test can be formulated
as follows:
H0 : |µA − µB| > δ vs Ha : |µA − µB| ≤ δ. (3.1)
where µA and µB are means of methods A and B, and δ corresponds to the range within
which we consider two methods to be equivalent.
Such question can be tested as a combination of two tests, as:
H01 : µA < µB − δ or H02 : µA > µB + δ
Ha1 : µA ≥ µB − δ and Ha2 : µA ≤ µB + δ, (3.2)
The p-value is then the maximum among p-values of the two tests (see [75] for an
explanation on why it is not necessary to perform a Bonferroni-Holms correction). The
underlaying statistical test for each of these two alternative hypothesis can then be any
difference tests (eg. t-test, Wilcoxon, Mann-Whitney etc.) as appropriate to the under-
lying data.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Function Min Max Mean Median σ
Mean of samples 1.48 4.05 2.92 2.96 0.68
σ of samples 0.35 1.28 0.86 0.835 0.25
In several cases for treatment equivalence it is preferrable to test for equivalence within
a percentage value and namely test whether
Ha1 : ρ1 · µB ≤ µA and Ha2 : µA ≤ ρ2 · µB (3.3)
However, when the percentage is applied to values on an ordinal scale it may harm
equivalence analysis because the percentage of mean values ≤ 2 is significantly less than
the percentage of mean values ≥ 4 on 1-5 scale. It means that samples with bigger mean
values have higher chance to be found equivalent while the samples with smaller mean
values are likely to be found non-equivalent. To eliminate this dependence on the mean
values we decided to use an absolute value for δ.
To define δ we relied on an empirical approach and calculated δ that corresponds to a
σp pooled across the samples reported in the literature. In our case we are looking for σp
that estimates standard deviation of the variables on a 5-item Likert scale in experiments
with people. To collect the sample of Information Systems studies we used Google Scholar
search service, as it allows to search in the text of the papers, and the following criteria:
- Publication year: between 2010 and 2016.
- Journals: “MIS Quarterly” (MISQ), “INFORMS Information Systems Research”
(ISR), and “INFORMS Management Science” (ManSci).
- Search terms: (“5-point scale” OR “Likert scale”) AND (“standard deviation” OR
“stdev”).
The results of literature search are reported in Section 7.1 in Appendix. From the
identified papers we extracted descriptive statistics of ordinal variables for 36 samples.
Table 3.4 reports descriptive statistics of variables means and standard deviations across
collected samples.
To calculate pooled σ we used the following formula:
σp =
√∑k
i=1(Ni − 1) · σ2i∑k
i=1(Ni − 1)
, (3.4)
where Ni is the sample size and σi is the variance of sample i. Using (3.4) on collected
dataset of 36 samples we obtained σp equals to 0.7. This value we adopted as the δ for
equivalence test. The individual test chosen for the comparison is the Mann-Whitney
rank sum test as we have independent samples.
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3.6 Experimental Settings
3.6.1 Domain
The application scenario was chosen among one of the ATM new operational scenarios that
have already been assessed by SESAR with SecRAM method: the Remotely Operated
Tower (ROT). The Remote and Virtual Tower, is a new operational concept proposed by
SESAR2. The main change with respect to current operations is that control tower oper-
ators will no longer be located at the aerodrome. The visual surveillance by the air traffic
controller will be replaced by a virtual reproduction of the out-of-the-window view, by
using visual information capture and/or other sensors such as cameras with a 360-degree
view and overlaid with information from additional sources such as surface movement
radar, surveillance radar, etc. LFV and Saab in Sweden did the first implementation of
the ROT3
As apparent from the description, the ROT concept is a complex cyber-physical in-
formation system encompassing both by cyber-security issues (e.g. data confidentiality,
integrity and availability of sensor data) as well as physical security issues, like on-site pro-
tection of the remotely located cameras and sensors. We think it is a good representation
of security challenges faced by modern companies.
3.6.2 Method
We selected the SESAR ATM Security Risk Assessment Method (SecRAM)4 as SRA
method to be applied by participants for four main reasons: a) it is a method used in the
ATM domain to conduct SRA of operation concepts, and its steps are very close to steps
of other risk assessment standards, e.g. NIST 800-30; b) SESAR has conducted an SRA of
the ROT operational concept with SecRAM that can be used to benchmark participants’
results: c) the application of SecRAM is supported by the use of catalogues of threats
and security controls; d) a SecRAM expert was available to train our participants; and e)
the method was deliberately designed to be easy to understand by personnel with little
expertise and background in security and risk management.
3.6.3 Catalogues
SecRAM supports personnel with catalogues of threats and security controls specific for
the ATM domain (DOM CAT) developed by EUROCONTROL, the European Organi-
sation for the Safety of Air Navigation. Our domain-specific catalogues have clear and
2SESAR Project P12.04.07: Single Remote Tower Technical Specification Remotely Operated Tower Multiple Controlled
Airports with Integrated Working Position
3"LFV first in the world to have an operating license for remote towers" (http://news.cision.com/lfv/r/
lfv-first-in-the-world-to-have-an-operating-licence-for-remote-towers,c9672916).
4SESAR Deliverable WP16.02.03: ATM Security Risk Assessment Methodology
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Table 3.5: Catalogues’ Main Characteristics
DOM CAT GEN CAT
Developer EUROCONTROL BSI
Threats (num. and
types)
32 (Physical, Information and Pro-
cedural)
621 (Basic threats, Force Majeure, Organizational Shortcom-
ings, Human Error, Technical Failure and Deliberate Acts)
Sec. controls (num.
and types)
51 (Pre- and Post- controls) 1444 (Infrastructure, Organization, Personnel, Hardware and
software, Communication and Contingency planning)
Link between threats
and sec. controls
Yes (two-way); as a part of threats
or sec. controls description
Yes (two-way); in a separate section
simple structure (32 threats divided into three topics with links to security controls), rea-
sonable size (155 pages), support users with ATM specific terminology, and covers main
problems related to ATM and proposes effective controls for them. For general catalogues
we selected the BSI IT-Grundschutz catalogues developed (GEN CAT) by the German
Federal Office for Information Security. It is compatible with the ISO 2700x family of
standards. Domain-general catalogues have complex structure (621 threats and 1444 secu-
rity controls in 6 topics with links between threats and controls in a separate section), big
size (~2500 pages), supports users with common security terminology, and cover a wide
range of IT security problems and solutions. The main characteristics of two catalogues
are summarized in Table 3.5.
Since DOM CAT catalogues are confidential materials for EUROCONTROL, partic-
ipants received only a paper version of the catalogues and had to sign a non-disclosure
agreement. To avoid differences in the use of the two type of catalogues, we provided a
paper version also of GEN CAT catalogues (but not the page with detailed implemen-
tation of controls), but participants were allowed to access online the full version of the
GEN CAT.
3.6.4 Demographics
The first experiment was conducted in February 2014. The participants were 18 MSc
students from different universities in Europe. The participants worked in groups of
two. Nine groups were randomly assigned to the treatments: five groups applied SESAR
SecRAM method to the ROT scenario using EUROCONTROL ATM catalogues (DOM
CAT), while the other four groups used BSI IT-Grundschutz (GEN CAT).
Table 3.6 presents descriptive statistics about the participants. A significant share of
participants (44%) reported a limited working experience (at least 3 years), some partic-
ipants (22%) reported ≤ 2 years of workings experience, and the rest did not report any
working experience. Some participants (28%) reported that they were involved in secu-
rity/privacy initiatives; the rest did not report any similar experience. Our participants
had limited expertise in safety and security regulations, while in security technologies they
reported a general knowledge. Our participants also had no prior knowledge of the ATM
domain.
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Table 3.6: Participants’ Demographic Statistics – Experiment 3.1 (Students)
Variable Scale Mean Distribution
Age Years 25.06 33% were 21-24 years old; 67% were 25-29 years old
Gender Sex 56% male; 44% female
Education Length Years 5.17 44% had <5 years; 6% had 5 years; 50% had >5 years
Work Experience Years 2.90 33% had no experience; 22% had 1-2 years; 44% had 3-5 years
Experience in Securi-
ty/Privacy Initiatives
Yes/No - 28% involved; 72% not involved
Expertise in Safety
Technology
1(Novice)-
5(Expert)
1.83 44% novices; 28% beginners; 28% competent users
Expertise in Safety Reg-
ulation and Standards
—"— 1.56 61% novices; 22% beginners; 17% competent users
Expertise in Security
Technology
—"— 2.28 17% novices; 50% beginners; 22% competent users; 11% proficient users
Expertise in Secu-
rity Regulation and
Standards
—"— 1.89 33% novices; 44% beginners; 22% competent users
Expertise in ATM —"— 1.06 94% novices; 6% beginners
Table 3.7: Participants’ Demographic Statistics – Experiment 3.2 (Professionals)
Variable Scale Mean Distribution
Age Years 33.1 20% were 25-29 years old; 53.3% were 30-39 years old; 20% were 40 and
older
Gender Sex 66.7% male; 33.3% female
Academic Degree 73.3% had MSc degree; 26.7% had PhD degree
Work Experience Years 7.9 26.7% had ≥ 2 and <5 years; 46.7% had ≥ 5 and <10 years; 26.7% had ≥
10 years
Experience in Risk As-
sessment
Years 0.67 Three participants had 2 years, 1.5 years and 0.25 years, respectively
Security/Privacy Expe-
rience
Yes/No - 60% had experience; 40% had no experience
The second experiment was run in May 2014 at premises rented for the occasion and
consisted of an empirical study with 15 professionals from several ATM Italian companies.
As an incentive for professionals to participate, the activity was presented as a free training
on SESAR SecRAM method for Risk Assessment by qualified experts5. The security
trainings in ATM can be very expensive, e.g. a training on Aviation Cyber Security by
the International Air Transport Association costs 2000 dollars. We divided participants
into three groups and assigned to three different treatments. Then we asked them to
apply individually the same method, namely SESAR SecRAM, with the support of DOM
CAT, GEN CAT or without any catalogues (NOCAT).
Table 3.7 presents descriptive statistics about the participants. Most of the participants
(73.4%) reported that they had at least 5 years of working experience, some participants
(26.7%) reported from 2 to 5 years of workings experience. In addition, the majority of
participants (60%) reported that they had security/privacy knowledge; the rest did not
report any similar knowledge. Three out of sixteen participants reported from 3 months
up to 2 years experience in SRA.
5Participants were aware that the results of their "exercises" would be used for research purposes.
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Figure 3.4: Experts assessment of quality of threats and security controls.
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(b) Experiment 3.2.
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3.7 Quantitative Results
The quantitative analysis investigates (1) whether different catalogues of threats and
security controls have similar effect on the execution of an SRA and (2) whether the use
of catalogues has an effect on the actual and perceived efficacy of SRA when used by
people with no security expertise, and comparing that with the effect of running the same
assessment by security experts without catalogues – essentially determining whether the
upper chain of Figure 3.3 (“community knowledge + novice”) can obtain the same results
as the lower chain (“personal knowledge + expert”). We also investigate whether the
features of the catalogue make a difference.
Quality Evaluation. Two ATM security experts independently assessed the quality of the
results collected in the first experiment with students. They reported a similar assessment
for each group. Only one group out of nine performed “poorly”. Note that the expectations
in terms of results of the assessment were higher for domain experts. Figure 3.4a illustrates
the average of experts’ evaluation for threats (reported on the x-axis) and security controls
(on the y-axis) for the participants of the first experiment.
Figure 3.4b illustrates the average of experts’ evaluation for threats (reported on x-
axis) and security controls (on y-axis) for the second experiment with ATM professionals.
Six participants out of fifteen performed poorly. In terms of the final assessment we
observed that: a) the experts marked bad participants the same way; b) they consistently
marked moderately good participants; and c) they had a different evaluation only for
the threats of one participant and for the security controls of another participant out
of 15 participants. The best results one of the experts commented with the following
statement: “Threats cover wide range including technical physical, social engineering and
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personnel issues. Controls demonstrate defense in depth and holistic approach. Excellent
because the only one to have a threat relating to ATM (loss of aircraft separation)”. Even
when experts would slightly disagree on the overall mark, they would actually agree in
the comment on the deficiencies of the evaluated work. For example, the first expert
assessed security controls of one participant as Bad: “For controls, Bad because simply
not reasonable to accept risks where the impact is high (e.g. jamming radar)”, while the
second expert put Fair for the security controls of the same participant: “Some controls
present but in most of cases risk was classified as tolerable and in consequence no PE or
PO Controls were identified.” Hence, for a quantitative study we can use the average of
experts’ votes.
Tables 3.8 to 3.10 report the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables for Exper-
iments 3.1 and 3.2, the corresponding values of the statistical tests for equivalence with
TOST over MW and difference with MW, and effect size d.
We present the main quantitative findings of the two experiments as follows:
We summarize the main quantitative findings of the two experiments as follows:
AE1 There is no difference in actual efficacy of catalogues for people without domain ex-
pertise. This is supported by the first experiment in which both groups using domain-
specific and domain-general catalogues delivered threats and security controls of sim-
ilar quality. The comparison of DOM CAT vs GEN CAT has a p = 0.056 for the
TOST on threats and p = 0.087 for controls. We only have significance at the 10%
level. Domain experts with no security experience using catalogues identified threats
and controls (2.5 as mean) of a slightly lower quality then security and domain ex-
perts without catalogues (2.8 as mean) but the results are not statistically significant
(TOST p = 0.15 for threats and p = 0.12 for controls).
AE2 For domain experts, use of catalogues improves the quality of identified threats and
security controls. This is supported by the second experiment, in which domain and
security experts used catalogues and delivered threats and security controls of better
quality as people with domain and security expertise but without catalogues. The
quality of results identified by the group with catalogues is better than for the group
without catalogues and this is statistically significant at p = 0.02 for threats and
p = 0.03 for controls with very large effect size.
PU People without domain expertise think that domain- specific catalogues are more use-
ful than domain-general ones. This is supported by the first experiment, in which
people who applied method with domain-specific catalogues reported higher PU of
the method than participants who used domain- general catalogues. This is confirmed
by a MW test that returned p = 0.05 for threats with large effect size according to
Cohen’s criteria, while TOST returned p = 0.13. For security controls results are
inconclusive. The results of statistical tests showed that PU of two catalogues is
equivalent at 10% significance level and PU of domain-specific catalogues is signif-
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Table 3.8: Experiment 3.1 (Novices): Summary of Quantitative Results
For people with no domain experience there is a 10% significant equivalence between a specific or a general catalogue
with respect to actual efficacy (AE) and perceived ease of use (PEOU); domain-specific catalogues have slightly better
perceived usefulness (PU) than general catalogues.
Threats DOM CAT GEN CAT Statistical Tests Eff. size
µ med σ µ med σ TOSTMW MW d
AE 3.33 3.33 0.63 3.08 3.00 0.17 0.056 0.24 0.51
PU 3.60 3.67 0.47 3.11 3.28 0.49 0.13 0.05 1.03
PEOU 3.49 3.69 0.82 3.67 3.69 0.70 0.07 0.81 -0.24
Sec. DOM CAT GEN CAT Statistical Tests Eff. size
Ctrls µ med σ µ med σ TOSTMW MW d
AE 3.27 3.33 0.64 3.58 3.67 0.17 0.087 0.50 -0.64
PU 3.66 3.67 0.40 3.22 3.33 0.41 0.08 0.03 1.07
PEOU 3.52 3.62 0.74 3.69 3.69 0.64 0.08 0.74 -0.23
Table 3.9: Experiment 3.2 (Domain Experts): Results for Non-security Experts with Catalogues and
Security Experts without Catalogues
For people with domain experience a catalogue improves the results of non security expert in comparison to security
experts but not enough to make it equivalent in terms of selected δ. Regarding perceived efficacy both non- security
and security domain experts reported PU and PEOU equivalent with 10% significance level.
Threats No Sec. Expert Sec. Expert. Statistical Tests Effect
CAT NO CAT p-value Size
N µ med σ N µ med σ TOSTMW MW d
AE 6 2.50 2.50 0.71 5 2.80 2.50 0.45 0.15 0.50 -0.50
PU 6 3.33 3.50 0.66 5 3.77 4.00 0.46 0.25 0.23 -0.75
PEOU 6 3.20 3.30 0.59 5 3.64 3.80 0.52 0.31 0.36 -0.78
Sec. No Sec. Expert Sec. Expert. Statistical Tests Effect
Ctrls CAT NO CAT p-value size
N µ med σ N µ med σ TOSTMW MW d
AE 6 2.50 2.50 0.45 5 2.80 3.00 0.57 0.12 0.40 -0.59
PU 6 3.31 3.43 0.61 5 3.77 3.71 0.41 0.26 0.21 -0.87
PEOU 6 3.00 2.90 0.55 5 3.64 3.80 0.52 0.58 0.07 -1.19
Table 3.10: Experiment 3.2 (Domain Experts): Results of Security Experts with Catalogues and without
Catalogues
For people with domain and security experience a catalogue improves the results over security experts who conducted
SRA without catalogues. This difference is statistically significant for AE of both threats and security controls with
very large effect size. For PU of threats and controls and for PEOU of threats both groups reported results equivalent
at 10% significance level. For PEOU of controls the results neither are equivalent nor different.
Threats Sec. Expert Statistical Test Effect
CAT NO CAT p-value size
N µ med σ N µ med σ TOSTMW MW d
AE 4 4.12 4.00 0.63 5 2.80 2.50 0.45 0.95 0.02 2.49
PU 4 3.64 3.64 0.44 5 3.77 4.00 0.46 0.087 0.75 -0.28
PEOU 4 3.50 3.60 0.53 5 3.64 3.80 0.52 0.095 0.69 -0.27
Sec. Sec. Expert Statistical Test Effect
Ctrls CAT NO CAT p-value size
N µ med σ N µ med σ TOSTMW MW d
AE 4 3.75 3.75 0.29 5 2.80 3.00 0.57 0.72 0.03 2.02
PU 4 3.68 3.50 0.41 5 3.77 3.71 0.41 0.095 0.69 -0.23
PEOU 4 3.30 3.40 0.66 5 3.64 3.80 0.52 0.19 0.61 -0.58
56
3.8. QUALITATIVE RESULTS
icantly better then PU of domain-general catalogues at p = 0.03. But this is not
tested for domain experts as we have a small number of participants in the second
experiment.
PEOU There is no difference in PEOU of catalogues for people without domain experi-
ence. This is supported by the first experiment, where people with domain-specific
and with domain-general catalogues reported similar PEOU. This results is statisti-
cally significant at 10% level as TOST returned p = 0.07 for PEOU of threats and
p = 0.08 for PEOU of controls. Due to small sample in the second experiment this
results cannot be validated with domain experts.
The detailed results of risk assessment delivered by the participants are reported in
Tables 7.5 and 7.6, and the detailed statistics on post-task questionnaire responses are
reported in Tables 7.7 and 7.8.
3.8 Qualitative Results
The qualitative analysis clarifies how the relationships and catalogue features proposed in
Section 3.4 are supported by the results of focus groups interviews with participants and
post-it notes sessions summarizing each discussion within groups in the second experiment.
One issue identified in the analysis is the difference in opinions of security-experts and
security-novices about their general perception towards the catalogue. Security-novices
tend to express a positive judgment on the benefits of using catalogues. In contrast,
security-experts tend to be more uncertain about actual advantages of catalogues. This
could be explained by the fact that catalogue represents an essential support for users
with no or little experience, as argued by one participant: “The catalogue is really helpful
if you do not have any background ”.
Catalogue Structure. The analysis of interviews shows that the structure of a
catalogue is a key aspect in the identification of threats and security controls. Thanks to
its basic layout, clear tables, and its relatively short length, the domain-specific catalogues
are generally perceived by participants as easier to browse and to read: “I read only
the titles [namely the reference to the “Generic Threat” and the “Attack Threat”], they
were quite explanatory, therefore a very short consultation of the catalog allowed me to
produce enough content”. This is particularly true in comparison with the domain-general
catalogues, consisting of a long list of items, perceived as “not user-friendly at a first read ”
and “difficult to navigate and master due to its length and structure”.
Another relevant aspect in the structure of catalogues is the presence of linking refer-
ences between threats and security controls. According to some participants this feature
makes the identification of controls an automatic mechanism: “Once identified the threat,
finding out controls was really a mechanical work ”. Even more so for security-novices,
traceability is perceived as a fundamental feature in catalogues structure. It provides a
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one-directional link between the two objects of interest that makes mistakes difficult. In
contrast, the domain-general catalogues do not provide this support and therefore the
findings are affected: “The identification of security controls was more difficult because
you had to map them with the threats previously identified but there was no direct link in
the catalogue. It was mainly due to a problem of usability of the catalogue”. Examples,
present in the specific-domain catalogues, are also perceived as helpful for identification
of threats and security controls.
Catalogue Content (amount of information). Even if a catalogue is meant for
security-novices providing too many details and too much information may be counterpro-
ductive. Security-novices can feel overwhelmed and not able to find any threat or security
control at all. This is particularly the case of the general-domain catalogues, judged as:
“Very difficult to consult for non-technical people” given the high number of threats and
controls proposed. An interesting statement in this regard, comes from a participant who
was not assigned to any catalogue but had a chance to glance at the general-domain cat-
alogues: “I saw people near to me; they were not able to find out stuff in the catalogue,
they kept on getting lost in the pages and eventually they came up always with the same
two or three items”.
Catalogue Content (Check-list). Regarding the ability of catalogues to cover a
variety of threats and controls, the opinions expressed by participants were quite varied:
security experts claimed that the suggestions in both catalogues were very generic, rather
than specific, precise and well-defined threats and controls: “[The catalogue provided a] list
of non-specific threats impacting the specific concept under investigation” (from a domain-
generic catalogue security-expert user). The same result comes from the domain-specific
catalogues: “I found the catalogue useful, but I noticed that many threats were repeated ”.
In contrast, security-novices were in general more satisfied by the use of catalogues. This
is probably due to the fact that, without any experience any kind support is of great
benefit and that participants could not really judge the quality of the catalogue itself.
The statements collected from security-experts suggest an additional aspect: “The first
step is to use your own experience and then to use the catalogue to cover generic aspects
that could be forgotten”. For security-experts the catalogue is perceived as a check-list,
as something that can be used after a brainstorming session where users work based on
their own experience. In this way, the catalogue is supposed to validate the efficiency
and coverage of the identified threats and security controls. For security-novices on the
contrary, the catalogue represents: “A good starting point for the evaluation of the threats
and the controls.”.
Catalogue Terminology. One feature of the catalogue perceived as essential by
every participant, irrespectively of the type of catalogue employed, is the fact that a
catalogue by itself provides a common terminology for all users. As suggested by one
participant, “The catalogue could be seen as a useful tool, able to formalize the controls
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that have been formulated in an informal way, and to lead them back into a common
nomenclature”. “The problem arises when we are in the same group and we use a different
language”. The demand for a standard language caused by the need of sharing, discussing
and presenting results by all stakeholders is an important feature of the risk assessment
process. Unsurprisingly, this aspect is mostly perceived as important by participants who
were not assigned to any catalogue.
In summary, participants with security knowledge cared more about the quality of
threats and security controls that they could identify with the support of the catalogues.
They expected more specific results from the support of the catalogue. Security-novices
were not able to judge the quality of the identified threats and controls. Therefore, they
were more concerned about catalogues’ usability, as demonstrated by their observations
on the traceability and navigability of the catalogues.
3.9 Threats to Validity
This section discusses threats to validity of the theoretical model and experimental results.
The critical question in qualitative studies is the generalizability of the findings. We built
our theoretical model using grounded theory analysis of the data collected in focus groups
interviews with security experts. We expect that this model can be validated by other
studies that maintain a settings similar to ours. For example, similar observations can be
expected if the focus groups include other people that share same context (i.e. background,
working experience, domain expertise) with those who participated in our focus groups.
In what follows we discuss threats to validity of experimental results. Domain-general
catalogues are significantly larger than the domain-specific ones as they cover a wide
variety of scenarios. We mitigated this threat to internal validity by making available
domain-specific catalogues of relatively large size (155 pages) and by preparing an index
of the general catalogues (~55 pages) that contained the list of available threats and
security controls for ease of reference. Participants had also access to the full version of
the domain-general catalogues (~2500 pages).
The main threat to conclusion validity is related to the sample size that must be big
enough to come to correct conclusions. Our low number of participants (NExp1 = 18 and
NExp2 = 15) makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions. [74] shows that it is possible to
have statistically significant results also for small samples. To understand possible effect of
participants’ background on the results we collect information about participants’ through
demographics and background questionnaire at the beginning of the study. To mitigate
possible previous knowledge about object of the study the participants were given a step-
by-step tutorial on the SRA method and received a textual description of the application
scenario.
Another threat to conclusion validity could be the number of security analyses con-
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sidered as low quality by experts in the second experiment (6 out of 15). However, we
think the level of quality illustrates the diversity of participants’ knowledge and expertise.
Therefore, we have different experiences of SRA. It could be a threat to validity if we had
all risk assessments of the same quality.
The main threat to external validity is that both the risk assessment method and
scenario were chosen within the ATM domain. However, the chosen risk assessment
method is compliant with ISO 27005 standard that can be applied to different domains
not just to the ATM. Therefore, this threat is fairly limited in our study. Another threat
to external validity are the participants selected to conduct the experiment. We limit
this threat by using professionals from ATM companies in addition to MSc students.
Another threat to external validity is the realism of experimental settings. Our experiment
significantly counters this threat in comparison to the literature [52,79,109,118] as we had
the duration of two days rather than a couple of hours. This longer duration suggested
by [55] allowed us to use a complex enough application scenario and thus to generalize
our results to the real projects. In addition to the longer duration, we limited threats to
conclusion validity because a) participants were trained by an expert in the method who
usually trains professionals working in the ATM domain, and b) participants had two full
days to apply the method to a new ATM operational concept.
3.10 Discussion and Implications
Our study shows that the use of catalogues can mitigate a lack of security expertise and
provide a good starting point for the analyst. The results showed that in quantitative
terms there is little difference between novices in actual efficacy of an SRA method when
used with domain-specific or domain- general catalogues. A domain-specific catalogue was
perceived to be more useful than a domain-general by novices with statistical significance.
While professionals perceived domain-specific catalogue to be slightly more ease to use
than a domain-general one but this result is not statistically significant. A more interesting
result is that in the second experiment with ATM experts: there is a small difference in
actual efficacy of a security method when used with catalogues by non-experts and without
catalogues by security experts. Albeit only few groups achieved a high quality score in
terms of identified threats and security controls. Also the security and domain experts
identified threats and security controls of significantly higher quality using catalogues in
comparison to security and domain experts performed SRA without catalogues. It shows
that to limited extent security expertise can be codified and used by domain experts.
The qualitative analysis with ATM professionals, carried with focus group interviews
and a post-it notes session, supported the relationships proposed by the theoretical model.
Non-experts were mostly worried about the difficulty of navigating through catalogues
while expert users found it mostly useful to get a common terminology and a checklist
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that nothing was forgotten. Catalogues could provide support for discussion among the
analysts because they provide a common language for analysts with different background.
They could also be used to check the completeness and coverage of the results.
The main managerial implication that comes from the results of our study is that
non-experts with catalogues can deliver results of a comparable quality to those produced
by security experts. Thus, to facilitate the security analysts we should have a method
that supports catalogues usage from the first steps. Usually, an SRA process requires
to identify three main components: 1) assets that should be protected, 2) threats that
can harm identified assets, and 3) security controls that can mitigate identified threats.
Catalogues can provide an ample source of knowledge for all three components. Analysts
just need to limit scope to the assets which are relevant to the system and in this respect
domain knowledge is all that is needed. Consequently, a set of preliminary threats and
security controls can be identified by using catalogues. Thus, catalogues facilitate a prima
facie SRA by domain expert. From a company’s perspective domain experts are easier to
find internally than security experts who are expensive to get6.
However, such conclusion should not be stretched to present knowledge sourcing through
catalogues as a complete solution. Indeed, our first experiment and our qualitative analy-
sis showed that complete novices are not entirely better off. In particular, general, hard to
search catalogues, which are the ones that novices in both domain and security knowledge
are likely to download from the internet, does not seem to warrant a similar effectiveness.
Finding effective source of knowledge requires more than simply collecting solutions or
problems.
3.11 Conclusion
Security catalogues are an important part of the SRA process: "as the [security] field
evolves and establishes best practices, knowledge management can play a central role in
encapsulating and spreading the emerging discipline more efficiently" [3].
The aim of catalogues of threats and security controls is to put best security practices
into a uniform format that can be re-used. In this chapter we have presented a theoret-
ical model for the impact of codified knowledge (catalogues) on SRA process. We have
investigated in both qualitative and quantitative terms the effect of using domain-specific
catalogues versus domain-general catalogues, and have compared them with the effects of
using the same method by security expert but without catalogues.
In summary, the study shows that with the use of catalogues a satisfactory number
of threats and controls can be identified. If security expertise is expensive to get, a
domain-specific catalogue is your second best bet.
6“Cybersecurity Professional Trends: A SANS Survey”, SANS Institute, 2014. URL https://www.sans.org/
reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/cybersecurity-professional-trends-survey-34615 (Last accessed: March 2016).
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Chapter 4
The Comprehensibility of Security Risk
Modeling Approaches
This chapter aims to further investigate the aspects of the theoretical model presented
in Figure 2.10 in Chapter 2 and answer the question: “ how comprehensible are different
representation approaches for risk models?”
Tabular and graphical representations are used to communicate the results of SRA for
IT systems. However, there is no consensus on which type of representation better sup-
ports the comprehension of risks (such as the relationships between threats, vulnerabilities
and security controls). Cognitive fit theory predicts that spatial relationship should be
better captured by graphs.
4.1 Introduction
Security risk analysis plays a vital role in the software development life cycle because “it
provides assurance that security concerns are identified and addressed as early as possible
in the life cycle, yielding improved levels of attack resistance, tolerance and resilience” [70].
Risk analysis is usually performed by security experts but its results are consumed by
‘normal’ IT professionals (from managers to software architects and developers).
Presenting and communicating risk to all stakeholders is a key step to make sure risk
analysis is not an empty exercise (e.g. it is an explicit step out of nine in the US NIST
800-30 standard process). This is particularly challenging as risk analysis tries to link
a multitude of entities into a coherent picture: threats exploit vulnerabilities to attack
assets and are blocked by security controls; attacks may happen with different likelihood
and may have different levels of severity; one vulnerability may be present in several assets
and an asset may be subject to several threats; security controls must address and reduce
risks to acceptable levels in an optimal manner. Hence, the representation of security risk
assessment results should be clear to all involved parties, from managers to rank-and-file
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developers otherwise, they “[. . . ] may find themselves lost in the process, misinterpreting
result, and unable to be a productive member of the team.” [59, p. 45]. A qualitative
empirical study on the success criteria for security risk assessment with professionals with
17.5 years of work experience on average and in particular 7 years of experience in risk
assessment highlighted communication as one the key features [57, Table 2].
Existing risk analysis methods and techniques use different notations to describe the
result of risk analsys. Industry methods typically use a tabular modeling notation (eg.
ISO 270001, NIST 800-30, SESAR SecRAM, SREP [71]) whereas academic based meth-
ods use graphical modeling notations (eg. SI∗ [31], Secure Tropos [81], ISSRM [66], or
CORAS [61]). Yet, there is limited empirical evidence whether one of the two risk mod-
eling notation better supports the comprehension of security risks. Hence, this chapter
aims to investigate the following research questions:
RQ4.1 Which risk modeling notation, tabular or graphical, is more effective in extracting
correct information about security risks?
RQ4.2 What is the effect of task complexity on participants’ actual comprehension of
information presented in risk models?
To answer these research questions we have conducted two studies with 69 and 83 stu-
dents. The first study consisted of three experiments: one performed at the University of
Trento, Italy, and two performed at PUCRS, Porto Alegre, Brazil. In Trento, the experi-
ment involved 35 graduate students; in Porto Alegre, the two experiments were run with
13 graduate and 21 undergraduate students. The second study included two experiments:
one performed at the University of Calabria in Cosenza, Italy, the experiment involved
52 master graduates attending a professional post-master course in Cybersecurity, and
the second one at the University of Trento with 51 master students attending a Security
Engineering course.
We considered comprehension tasks of different complexity in line with Wood’s theory
of task complexity [130]. We selected scenarios from the healthcare and online banking
domains, modeled the security risks of the scenario in the two modeling notations, and
asked the participants to answer several questions of different level of complexity. By using
the metrics of precision and recall on the answers provided by participants we compared
the effect of the modeling notation and other potential factors (education, modeling or
security experience, knowledge of the English language) on the comprehensibility of the
risk models.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses related
work. Section 4.3 describes the study design. Section 4.4 reports the experiments realiza-
tion. Section 4.5 presents the analysis results and Section 4.6 discusses their implications.
Section 4.7 discusses the threats to validity of our study.
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4.2 Related Work
Several studies have compared textual and visual notations: some studies have proposed
cognitive theories to explain the differences between the two notations or to explain their
relative strengths [76, 125]; other studies have compared different notations from a con-
ceptual point of view [48, 95]. Several empirical studies have compared graphical and
textual representations for requirements [108, 116, 118, 119] , software architectures [41],
and business processes [87]. Studies that focus on comparing textual and visual notations
for security risk models are less frequent [35, 43] or compared the effectiveness of tabu-
lar or graphical methodologies as whole [55, 58, 65] as opposed to the specific aspect of
comprehensibility.
4.2.1 Empirical Comparisons of Software Modelling Notations
Among the works which reported empirical studies on the effectiveness of visual vs. tex-
tual notions focusing on the early stages of software development Hoisl et al. [44] compared
three notations for defining scenario-based tests (a semi-structured natural-language no-
tation, a diagrammatic notation, and a fully structured textual notation). The metrics
considered accuracy and effort involved in understanding scenario-test definitions, and
detection of the errors in the models under test. The results of the study showed that
the participants who used the natural-language notation spent less time and completed
the task with higher accuracy than the participants who used the other two notations.
Participants also expressed higher preference for the natural-language notation. Based on
the results of the ex-post questionnaire, the authors concluded that possible explanations
of these results could be that (1) the diagrammatic notation has poor scalability and for
complex scenarios it becomes hard to understand, and (2) fully structured notation needs
specific preparation and additional materials in order to be understood.
Scanniello et al. [99] conducted four controlled experiments with students and profes-
sional to investigate the effect of UML analysis models on comprehensibility and modifia-
bility of source-code. The participants were asked to complete tasks using both treatments
(i.e., having source code and analysis models and having source code only) for two differ-
ent systems to control learning effect. The results revealed no difference in understanding
source code and ability to modify it with and without having UML analysis models.
The authors explained the results by the fact that the provided UML models did not
contain any details on the systems implementation, and therefore, not very helpful for
understanding and modifying source code.
Sharafi et al. [108] assessed the effect of using graphical vs. textual representations on
participants’ efficiency in performing requirements comprehension tasks. They found no
difference in accuracy of the answers given by participants who used the textual and the
graphical notations but it took them considerably more time to perform the task with a
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graphical notation than with textual one. Still, the participants preferred the graphical
notation. Surprisingly, the participants spent significantly less time and less effort while
working on the third model with both graphical and textual representations than with
the other two models. The authors explained this finding as being due to the fact that the
participants learned the graphical notation after performing the comprehension task which
led to the improved results with the mixed model. Similarly, Abrahao et al. [1] assessed
the effectiveness of dynamic modeling in requirements comprehension. The study included
5 controlled experiments with 112 participants with different levels of experience. The
paper revealed that providing requirements specification together with dynamic models,
namely sequence diagrams, significantly improves comprehension of software requirements
in comparison to having just specification document.
Heijstek et al. [41] investigated the effectiveness of visual and textual artifacts in com-
municating software architecture design decisions to software developers. Their findings
suggest that neither visual nor textual artifacts had a significant effect in that case. Otten-
sooser et al. [87] compared the understandability of textual notations (textual use cases)
and graphical notations (BPM) for business process description. The results showed that
all participants well understood the textual use cases, while the BPMN models were well
understood only by students with good knowledge of BPMN.
4.2.2 Empirical Comparisons of Security Modeling Notations
In the specific domain of modeling security issues, Stalhane et al. conducted a series of
experiments [116, 118, 119] to compare the effectiveness of textual and visual notations
in identifying safety hazards during security requirements analysis. Stålhane and Sin-
dre [116] compared misuse cases based on use-case diagrams to those based on textual
use cases. The results of the experiment revealed that textual use cases helped to identify
more threats related to the computer system and category “wrong patient” than use-case
diagrams. This can be explained by the fact that the layout of the textual use case
helps the user to focus in the relevant areas which led to better threat identification for
these areas. In more recent experiments [117–119] they compared textual misuse cases
against UML system sequence diagrams. The experiments revealed that textual misuse
cases are better than sequence diagrams when it comes to identifying threats related to
functionalities or user behavior. Sequence diagrams outperform textual use cases when
it comes to threats related to the system’s internal working. The authors concluded that
“It is not enough to provide information related to the system’s working. It must also be
continuously kept in the analyst’s focus.”
As far as we know, only two studies have investigated the comprehensibility of security
risk models. In the first work Hogganvik and Stølen [43] reported two empirical exper-
iments with students to test (a) understanding of the conceptual model of the CORAS
66
4.3. STUDY DESIGN
and (b) the use of graphical icons and their effect on the understanding of risk mod-
els. The results showed little difference in the correctness of answers using CORAS over
UML models, while the participants used less time to complete a questionnaire with the
CORAS models than with the UML models. The only difference between the two type
of risk models was the presence of graphical CORAS-specific icons. In the second work
Grøndahl et al. [35] investigated the effect of textual labels and graphical means (size,
color, shape of elements) on the comprehension of risk models. The study involved 57 IT
professionals and students and shows that some textual information in graphical models
is preferred over purely graphical representation. These works focused on the graphical
representation of risk models and leaves open the question of which modeling notation,
graphical or textual, is better to represent security risks.
We have started to fill this gap by investigating the actual and perceived effective-
ness of textual and visual methods for security risk assessment in two previous empirical
studies with MSc students in Security Engineering [55, 58]. Although the two types of
methods were similar in terms of actual effectiveness, participants always perceived the
visual methods as more effective than the textual methods. For example, Labunets et
al. [55] reported that “some of the participants indicated that a visual representation for
threat would be better that a tabular one”, and in [58] participants emphasized that “the
advantage [of graphical method] is the visualization” and that the results obtained with
the graphical method would be easy to explain to customer [58, Table III]. In this chap-
ter we explore whether such preference may be explained by the widely held belief that
graphical representations are easier to read.
4.3 Study Design
4.3.1 Motivation
In our previous study [57] we conducted a qualitative study with security experts in
the ATM domain to investigate the success factors of a security risk assessment. The
participants were 20 professionals with 17.5 years of work experience on average and
in particular 7 years of experience in risk assessment. As reported in [57, Table 2],
among method’s success criteria we identified category “Comprehensibility of method
outcomes”. We have reviewed the experts’ statements that were included in this category
and discuss them below in order to understand the role of comprehensibility in security
risk assessment.
According to some experts “for a method to be successful means that you get the
means to reason about your problem and to analyze the information and to extract the
results that you want.” Indeed, an effective security risk assessment method “must support
understanding and communication [of the information]” because the possible shortfall in
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the risk assessment process is that “people don’t understand each other, so they’re using
the same words, but they think about totally different things”. Besides the common
language that should be used throughout risk assessment process, it is also important to
have a comprehensive representation: “If you have a good template, it would be easy to
understand.” Also “you need a definition that lots of people can understand, not just a
security expert” in order to have a “basis to share with other stakeholders, and to have the
same way of thinking”. In fact, you need “to address different stakeholders who look at the
risk assessment. And basically you can divide them into two [types]: the ones who need
the big picture and the ones who need ... operation knowledge [low level picture] . . . The
first kind is making the basic decisions and the others for subsequent execution of the
results.” Some experts believe that “The big picture is effective when you provide usually
a graphical representation of it.”
4.3.2 Designing Comprehensibility Tasks
The understanding of the results by different stakeholders is one of the main factors for
the success of security risk assessment. Different presentations of the same findings might
require different levels of cognitive effort to extract the correct information. Hence, we
aim to investigate which risk model representation is more comprehensive for stakeholders
from the point of view of extracting correct information about security risks?
To design a comprehensibility task we reviewed existing works investigating compre-
hensibility of different notations in requirements engineering [37, 101] and data model-
ing [17, 90]. In summary, all proposed comprehensibility questions tested the ability of
the user to identify (1) an element of a specific type that is in relationship with another
element of a different type and (2) an element of a specific type that has multiple rela-
tionships with other elements of a different type. We used both approaches to formulate
questions for our comprehensibility task as they provide a possibility to investigate the
comprehension of different elements of a notation and relations between them.
4.3.3 Task Complexity and Other Factors
We also take into consideration the complexity of the questions, as this may be a signif-
icant factor for the risk model comprehensibility. To define this we rely upon the work
of Wood [130], according to which a task (or question) complexity is defined by the in-
formation cues that need to be processed and the number and complexity of the actions
that need to be performed to accomplish the task:
• “Information cues are pieces of information about the attributes of stimulus objects”
[130, p. 65];
• “The required acts for the creation of a defined product [output] can be described at
any one of several levels of abstraction. . . ” [130, p. 66];
68
4.3. STUDY DESIGN
• “Coordinative complexity refers to the nature of relationships between task input
and task product. As the number of precedence relationships between acts increases,
the knowledge and skill required will also increase. . . ” [130, pp. 68–69].
In the definition of task complexity Wood also used the notion of “product” as a specific
entity produced by the task. We do not use this concept because only one product is
given to the participants (a risk model) and every question only asks them for one type
of element of the risk model. We map other components to the elements of a security risk
modeling notation as follows:
• Information cues (IC) describe some characteristics that help to identify the desired
element of the model. They are identified by a noun. In the sentence “Which are the
assets that can be harmed by the unwanted incident Unauthorized access to HCN ?”
the part in italics is an information cue.
• Required acts (A) are judgment acts that require selecting a subset of elements meet-
ing some explicit or implicit criteria. For example, in “What is the highest conse-
quence?” or “What are the unwanted incidents that can occur?” the parts in italics
are judgment criteria.
• Relationships (R) are relationships between a desired element and other elements of
the model that must to be identified in order to find the desired element. They are
identified by a verb. In the sentence “the assets that can be harmed by”, the part in
italics is a relationship.
To calculate the complexity of question i (QCi) we extend Wood’s formulation as
follows:
QCi = |ICi|+ |Ri|+ |Ai|, (4.1)
where ICi is the number of information cues presented in question i, Ri is the number of
relationships that the participant needs to identify, and Ai is the number of judgments to
be performed over a set of elements.
As an example of computing task complexity, consider the following question: “What is
the highest possible consequence for the asset “Data confidentiality” that Cyber criminal or
Hacker can cause? Please specify the consequence.” The question complexity according
to formula (4.1) is 3 + (2 + 1) = 6 because there are three information cues (“Data
confidentiality” for the element type “consequence”, and “Cyber criminal” and “Hacker” for
the element type “threat”), two relationships among them (A “possible consequence for” B
and C “can cause” D), and one judgment on the product (“highest possible consequence”).
Another possible confounding factor is the complexity of the particular execution of
the experiment itself. Therefore, after the comprehension task we asked participants to
fill in a post-task questionnaire about their perception of the clarity of the questions and
the overall settings and whether the risk model was easy to understand. The aim of the
post-task questionnaire is to control for possible effects of the experimental settings on
the results as done in previous studies [2,37]. Table 8.1 in Chapter 8 reports the post-task
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questionnaire that we proposed to our participants.
4.3.4 Selection of Risk Modeling Notations
There are many different methods for security requirements engineering and risk assess-
ment that use either graphical, or tabular, or mix of two representations. To make the
study fair and representative we need to find notations that have similar level of ex-
pressiveness and cover the core security concepts used by many international security
standards, e.g. ISO/IEC 27000, NIST 800-30, or BSI Standard 100-2 IT-Grundschutz. In
this respect, Fabian et al. [22] presented a comprehensive comparison of various security
requirements engineering methods based on their conceptual framework that is consis-
tent with the framework by Mayer et al. [68] (see [22, Table 3]). The core concepts that
emerged from the studies are asset, threat, vulnerability, risk, and security control.
The comparison by Fabian et al. [22] showed that only several methods adopted these
concepts, namely tabular SREP [71], graphical CORAS [61], and model-based informa-
tion system security risk management (ISSRM) approach proposed by Mayer et al. [69].
The ISSMR method initially used i* models to support risk analysis and has been later
adapted to by Matulevičius et al. [66] to combine the graphical-based method proposed
by Mouratidis and Giorgini [81] Secure Tropos.
To the best of our knowledge, the work by Massacci and Paci [65] is the only study
that empirically investigated and compared different security methods including Secure
Tropos, CORAS, si∗, and Security Argumentation. Both CORAS and Secure Tropos
methods were empirically evaluated in [65]. The study also included goal-based method
si∗ and problem frame-based method Security Argumentation. The results showed that
the CORAS is the best method across the four investigated methods.
Further, neither ISSRM nor Secure Tropos provide a comprehensive one-diagram mod-
els that provides a global picture of security risk assessment results and that can be com-
pared to a single table summarizing the risk assessment result as provided by NIST’s or
ISO’s standards. In contrast, CORAS has a treatment overview diagram that fits these
requirements. Asking the particpants to go over several diagrams would have significantly
biased the results against graphical methods.
As tabular representation we used the risk tables provided by the NIST 800-30 [114]
standard for security risk assessment. The NIST standard adopts a different table for
each step of the security risk assessment process. CORAS similarly comes with a number
of different kinds of diagrams. In our study we focused on the NIST table template for
adversarial and non-adversarial risk, and the CORAS treatment diagrams, because these
two give an overview of the most important elements of the risk assessment. In order
to ensure the same expressiveness of the two notations we needed to add three columns
to the NIST template to represent impact, asset and security controls, which are usu-
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ally documented in different tables. Figure 4.1a shows an example of CORAS treatment
diagram related to the risk of a Healthcare Collaborative Network, and Figure 4.1b il-
lustrates the same risks using the NIST table template. The graphical model provides a
good visual view of several attacks that can be committed by a “threat”. At the same
time, tabular model reports all possible attacks (one per line) which requires duplication
of the information for the similar attacks with slight difference. However, this redundancy
is compensated by simple navigation providing a possibility to look-up the information
related to the same notation’s concept. The availability of labels with concepts’ name
may provide a significant benefit comparing to the graphical icons, but Hogganvik and
Stølen [43] showed that there is a little difference in the correctness of responses by par-
ticipants using models with graphical icons from the CORAS notation and UML models
that contained textual labels with concepts’ names. Moreover, the participants used less
time to find response with graphical icons comparing to the UML models with textual
labels. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 in Chapter 8 illustrate the full graphical and tabular risk
models that we provided to our participants.
4.3.5 Variables
The independent variable of our study is the risk model representation which can take one
of the values: tabular or graphical. The dependent variable is the level of comprehensibility
which is measured by assessing the answers of the participants to a series of comprehension
questions about the content presented in the risk models. In what follows, we will use
the word “task” when referring to the entire exercise of answering all questions. The
answers to the questions were evaluated using information retrieval metrics that are widely
adopted in the empirical software engineering community for the measurement of model
comprehension [2, 37, 100, 101]: precision, recall, and their harmonic combination, the
F-measure. Precision represents the correctness of given responses to the question, and
recall represents the completeness of the responses. They are calculated as follows:
precisionm,s,q =
|answerm,s,q ∩ correctq|
|answerm,s,q| , (4.2)
recallm,s,q =
|answerm,s,q ∩ correctq|
|correctq| , (4.3)
Fm,s,q = 2 ∗ precisionm,s,q × recallm,s,i
precisionm,s,q + recallm,s,q
, (4.4)
Fm,s = mean(∪q∈{1...Nquestions}Fm,s,q} (4.5)
where answerm,s,q is the set of answers given by participant s to question q when looking
at model m, and correctq is the set of correct responses to question q.
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Threat Threat scenario
Vulnerability
Treatment
Unwanted incident
Asset
Likelihood
Consequence
(a) CORAS diagram
(b) NIST table row entries
Figure 4.1: Fragment of a risk model in graphical and tabular notations
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Table 4.1: Experimental Hypotheses
Hyp Null Hypothesis Alternative Hypothesis
H4.1 No difference between tabular and graphical
risk modeling notations in the level of com-
prehension (as measured by precision, recall,
F-measure of answers) when answering com-
prehension questions.
There is a difference in the level of com-
prehension between tabular and graphical
risk models when answering comprehension
questions
H4.2 No difference between simple and complex
questions in the level of comprehension when
answering comprehension questions for both
modeling notations
Difference between simple and complex
questions in the level of comprehensibility
when answering comprehension questions
for some modeling notation
Since we want to measure the level of comprehension such activity should be performed
by keeping the other confounding variable (time for comprehension) fixed. Hence we
limit the amount of time that can be used to complete the comprehension task. As
a consequence, there may be participants which could not answer all questions within
the allotted time. We follow the approach in [1] and aggregate all answers to calculate
precision and recall for the individual participant.
precisionm,s =
∑Nquestions
q=1 |answerm,s,q ∩ correctq|∑Nquestions
q=1 |answerm,s,q|
, (4.6)
recallm,s =
∑Nquestions
q=1 |answerm,s,q ∩ correctq|∑Nquestions
q=1 |correctq|
, (4.7)
Fm,s = 2 ∗ precisionm,s × recallm,s
precisionm,s + recallm,s
. (4.8)
A similar function aggregates over participants when reporting precisionm,q and recallm,q
for each question q.
4.3.6 Hypotheses
The main objective of our study was to compare the effectiveness of tabular and graphical
approached for risk modeling in extracting information about security risks from the mod-
els (RQ4.1). Additionally, we wanted to investigate if the complexity of comprehension
task affects participation’ comprehension of risk models. We formulated the alternative
two-way hypotheses as there is no consensus about the superiority of one type of nota-
tion over the other in the literature (see Section 4.2), and therefore, we did not make
any assumptions in this regard. For example, [118] and [43] report opposite results on
the superiority of the textual and graphical notation for the comprehension of use cases.
Thus, the null and alternative hypotheses were formulated as presented in Table 4.1.
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4.3.7 Experimental Design
In the first study (study 4.1) we chose a between-subjects design with one factor (risk
modeling notation) and two treatments (graphical and tabular risk models) to avoid in-
terference between the treatments [62, Ch. 5]. The participants were randomly assigned
to one of the two treatments and worked individually. Each experiment that we executed
followed the same design. The graphical and tabular risk models provided to the partici-
pants are presented in Chapter 8 in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 respectively. The material used
during the experiment is available online (e.g., risk models and tutorial slides).1
The experiments consist of three main phases:
• Training phase. All participants attend a short 10 min presentation about both types
of risk models and the application scenario. Then they answer a short demographics
and background questionnaire.
• Application phase. During this phase the participants are asked to review proposed
graphical or tabular risk models of the application scenario and complete the task
which contains 12 comprehension questions. The order of the questions in the task
was randomized for each participant. Moreover, the participants are randomly as-
signed to Group 1 or Group 2 so that half of them answer questions related to the
graphical risk model, and the other half respond to questions on the tabular risk
model. We ask participants to complete the task in 40 minutes. All necessary ma-
terials, like risk model diagrams or tables and tutorial slides, are provided to the
participants in electronic form at the beginning of the task. After completion of the
task, the participants answer a post-task questionnaire.
• Evaluation phase. Researchers independently check the responses of the participants
and code correct and wrong answers to each comprehension question based on the
predefined list of correct responses.
Inspired by similar studies [17, 37, 44], for the second study (study 4.2) we chose a
within-subjects design with two factors (risk modeling notation and application scenario)
and two levels for each factor. This allowed us to collect participants’ level of compre-
hension of both risk models. To mitigate a possible effect of the treatments’ order on
the experimental results we used a Latin square. Table 4.2 summarizes the experimental
design that we adopted. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four
groups and worked individually. The graphical and tabular risk models provided to the
participants were similar to the ones used in the first study with several small changes.
We have made available online the risk models and tutorial slides that we used in the
second study.2
1https://securitylab.disi.unitn.it/doku.php?id=validation_of_risk_and_security_requirements_
methodologies
2https://securitylab.disi.unitn.it/doku.php?id=unitn-comprehensibility-exp-2015
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Table 4.2: Experimental design of the second study
Each group applied one of the method on a scenario and then the second method on the remaining sce-
nario (OB=Online Banking scenario; HCN=Health Care Network scenario; Tab=Tabular risk modeling notation;
Graph=Graphical risk).
Session Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Session 1 Tab; OB Tab; HCN Graph; OB Graph; HCN
Session 2 Graph; HCN Graph; OB Tab; HCN Tab; OB
Table 4.3: Comprehension questionnaire design
Half of the answers require no judgment and combine 1 or 2 information cues connected by 1 or 2 relationships.
The other half of the questions have the same combination of information cues and relationships augmented by the
judgment element. There are no question with one information cue and two relationships as this combination is
impossible.
One Relationship Two Relationships
One information Cue 2 questions -
One Information Cue + Judgment 2 questions -
Two information Cues 2 questions 2 questions
Two Information Cues + Judgment 2 questions 2 questions
The experimental procedure of the second study is similar to the one reported previ-
ously, with one difference. Basically, each session of the second study is the application
phase. Therefore, in the second study we have two consecutive application phases (Session
1 and Session 2) of about 40 minutes each. To mitigate the learning effect in Session 2
each participant receives a treatment different from the one that he received in Session 1.
Section 4.5.4 will provide statistical verification that there were no significant differences
between the results of the two sessions and between the results of the two application
scenarios.
Comprehension Questionnaire Revision. The results of the first study revealed
a statistically significant effect of task complexity on the participants’ comprehension of
the risk models. Thus, we revised the comprehensibility questions for our second study
with the focus on the task complexity to better investigate RQ4.2. Table 4.3 presents
the distribution of the questions by the number of information cues, relationships and
judgments present in the question. Table 8.3 in Chapter 8 reports the comprehension
questionnaire for the graphical risk model in the second study. Similar to the first study
these questions were reviewed by independent researchers from SINTEF who are the
experts in the graphical risk modeling notation. The questions for the textual risk model
are the same but the names used to denote the elements and relations are instantiated to
the textual risk modeling notation.
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4.3.8 Selection of Application Scenarios
In the first study we used an application scenario developed by IBM about the Healthcare
Collaborative Network (HCN). HCN is a health information infrastructure for intercon-
necting and coordinating the delivery of information to participants in the collaborative
network electronically.
In the second study in order to avoid learning effects between two application sessions
we used two different application scenarios. In addition to the HCN scenario, we used an
Online Banking scenario developed by Poste Italiane, describing online banking services
provided by Poste Italiane’s division through a home banking portal, a mobile application
and prepaid cards.
The graphical risk models for the two application scenarios were developed by indepen-
dent researchers from the Norwegian research institute SINTEF who are the designers of
the CORAS graphical risk modeling notation in the framework of the EMFASE project.
We developed the corresponding tabular risk models. After the models were developed,
together with experts from SINTEF we checked that the models are conceptual copies of
one another to the extent that the two different notations allow this.
For each risk model we developed the comprehension questionnaire. The questionnaires
were reviewed by the researchers from SINTEF. In cooperation with the designers from
SINTEF we developed the list of correct responses. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 in Chapter 8
report the comprehension questionnaire for the graphical risk model for both studies.
The questions for the textual risk model are identical but for the names used to denote
the elements and relations that are instantiated to the textual risk modeling notation.
4.3.9 Analysis Procedure
We test the null hypothesis H4.10 using an unpaired statistical test in the first study as we
have a between-subjects design, and a paired statistical test in the second study because of
a within-subjects design. Distribution normality is checked by the Shapiro–Wilk test. If
our data are normally distributed we use an unpaired t-test to compare comprehension of
independent groups in the first study and paired t-test to compare the comprehensibility
of matched groups in the second study; otherwise we use their non-parametric analogs,
the MW and Wilcoxon tests respectively.
We investigate the effect of task complexity and test the null hypothesisH4.20 using the
Wilcoxon test for non-normal distribution. We have paired data because we investigate
the difference in responses to questions with different complexity level obtained from the
same participant.
We also use interaction plots to check the possible effects of co-factors on the dependent
variable. If the plot reveals any interaction between co-factors and the treatment we
also use a permutation test for two-way ANOVA to check whether this interaction is
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Table 4.4: Participants Distribution to Treatments – Study 4.1
In total 36 participants completed the comprehension task using the graphical risk model and 33 participants used
the tabular notation.
Experiment Graph Tabular Total
4.1. UNITN-MSC 18 17 35
4.1. PUCRS-MSC 6 7 13
4.1. PUCRS-BSC 12 9 21
Total 36 33 69
statistically significant. The post-task questionnaire is used to control for the effect of the
experimental settings and the documentation materials.
We adopt 5% as a threshold of α (i.e., the probability of committing Type-I error). To
report the effect size of observed differences between treatments we used Cohen’s d with
the following thresholds: negligible for |d| < 0.2, small for 0.2 ≤ |d| < 0.5, medium for
0.5 ≤ |d| < 0.8, and large for |d| ≥ 0.8. To run statistical tests we used RStudio3.
4.4 Study Realization
4.4.1 Experiments Execution
Table 4.4 summarizes the experimental set-up for the first study. The first experiment was
conducted at the University of Trento in the fall semester of 2014 as part of the Security
Engineering course. The participants were 35 MSc students in Computer Science. The
experiment took place in a single computer laboratory. The experiment was presented
as a laboratory activity and only the high-level goal of the experiment was mentioned;
the experimental hypotheses were not provided so as not to influence the participants but
they were informed about the experimental procedure. At the end of the experiment we
had a short discussion on the experiment’s procedure and on the two modeling notations.
The same settings were maintained in two replicated experiments which were exe-
cuted at the PUCRS University in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The first replication involved
13 MSc students enrolled in the Computer Science program. The second one involved 27
BSc students attending the Information Systems course taught at the Computer Science
department. Both replications took place in a single computer laboratory.
Six participants failed to complete the task and we discarded their results: one partic-
ipant answered the question in Portuguese instead of English and they were not related
to the model, other participants did not provide responses based on the model.
Table 4.5 summarizes the experimental set-up for the second study. The first experi-
ment was conducted in Cosenza at Poste Italiane cyber-security lab (a large corporation)
3www.rstudio.com
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Table 4.5: Participants Distribution to Treatments – Study 4.2
In total we had 83 participants who were randomly assigned to one of four groups. The description of the groups see
in Table 4.2. each group answered questions on a scenario described in one risk modeling notation and then questions
on a different scenario on the other risk modeling notation.
Session Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Total
4.2. POSTE 12 9 10 10 41
4.2. UNITN 12 10 10 10 42
in September 2015. The participants were 52 MSc/MEng graduates attending a profes-
sional master course in Cybersecurity. The experiment took place in a single computer
laboratory. The experiment was presented as an entry evaluation activity for the course
and only the high-level goal of the experiment was revealed. The participants were in-
structed about the experimental procedure.
The same settings were kept in the replication conducted at the University of Trento in
October 2015 as part of the Security Engineering course. The replication involved 51 MSc
students in Computer Science. The experiment was presented as a laboratory activity.
There were some participants who failed to complete both sessions, i.e. they finished
the task at home, or had a problem with the SurveyGizmo platform and restarted their
task4. We removed the responses of these participants from our dataset to eliminate the
bias created by the varying time. In total we discarded 11 participants from the first
experiment (21%) and 9 participants from the second one (18%) which allowed us to keep
a significant number of participants without compromising the internal validity of the
experiment.
4.4.2 Demographics
Table 4.6 summarizes the demographic information about the participants of our ex-
periments for the first study. Most participants (75%) reported that they had working
experience. With respect to security knowledge most participants had limited expertise.
In contrast, they reported good general knowledge of modeling languages: software engi-
neering courses taught at both universities are compulsory and included several lectures
on UML and other graphical modeling notations. The participants only had very basic
knowledge of the application scenario.
Table 4.7 summarizes the demographic information about the participants of our ex-
periments for the second study. Most participants (52%) reported that they had working
experience. The participants of the second study had slightly better security knowledge
4When a participant by mistake closes the web page with the task in SurveyGizmo she loses the session and cannot
restore it and must restart from scratch. From the platform perspective she has used the same amount of time of other
participants, but in practice might have had significantly more time.
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Table 4.6: Demographic Statistics – Study 4.1
The participants were 35 Italian MSc students attending a Security Engineering course at the University of Trento,
13 MSc and 21 BSc students studying Computer Science the PUCRS University in Porto Alegre, Brazil.
Variable Scale Mean/Med. Distribution
Age Years 25.8 (mean) 45% were 19–23 yrs old; 38% were 24–29 yrs old;
19% were 30–46 yrs old
Gender Sex 78% male; 22% female
Work experience Years 3.9 (mean) 25% had no experience; 43% had 1–3 yrs; 15%
had 4–7 yrs; 17% had >7 yrs
Expertise in secu-
rity
0(Novice)–
4(Expert)
1 (median) 29% novices; 49% beginners; 17.5% competent
users; 4.5% proficient
Expertise in model-
ing languages
0–4 2 (median) 11.5% novices; 21.5% beginners; 54% competent
users; 10% proficient users; 3% experts
Expertise in HCN 0–4 0 (median) 67% novices; 23% beginners; 10% competent
users
Table 4.7: Demographic Statistics – Study 4.2
The participants were 42 Italian MSc/MEng graduates attending a professional master in cybersecurity in Cosenza
organized by Poste Italiane, a large corporation, and 41 MSc students attending a security engineering course at the
University of Trento.
Variable Scale Mean/Med. Distribution
Age Years 26.4 (mean) 25% were 21–23 yrs old; 55% were 24–29 yrs old;
20% were 30–40 yrs old
Gender Sex 75% male; 25% female
English level A1–C2 1% Elementary (A1); 5% Pre-Intermediate (A2);
37% Intermediate (B1); 31% Upper-Intermediate
(B2); 14% Advanced (C1); 11% Proficient (C2)
Work experience Years 1.3 (mean) 49% had no experience; 39% had 1–3 yrs; 11%
had 4–7 yrs; 1% had >7 yrs
Expertise in secu-
rity
0(Novice)–
4(Expert)
1 (median) 19% novices; 52% beginners; 19% competent
users; 5% proficient; 5% experts
Expertise in model-
ing languages
0–4 2 (median) 15% novices; 33% beginners; 36.5% competent
users; 13% proficient users; 2.5% experts
Expertise in online
banking
0–4 0 (median) 73% novices; 21% beginners; 4% competent
users; 1% proficient users; 1% experts
Expertise in HCN 0–4 0 (median) 80% novices; 19% beginners; 1% experts
and slightly worse knowledge of modeling languages compared to the participants of the
first study (see Table 4.6). They also had very basic knowledge of the application domains.
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4.5 Experimental Results
In this section we report the results obtained in two studies and its analysis. The results of
preliminary analysis with Shapiro–Wilk test showed that our dependent variable (precision
and recall) was not normally distributed. Thus, in RQ4.1 we proceeded with a non-
parametric MW test for the results of the first study as it has a between-subjects design
and with Wilcoxon test for the second study because it has a within-subjects design. In
RQ4.2 we used Wilcoxon test as we compare the responses to questions with different
complexity but from the same participant, and therefore, our data were paired.
4.5.1 RQ4.1: Effect of Risk modeling notation on Comprehension
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 report descriptive statistics for precision and recall based on the results
of application phase across experiments of the first and second study respectively. As
can be seen, in the first study the answers to the questions on the tabular risk model
demonstrated 7% better average precision and 22% better average recall over the questions
posed on the graphical risk model. In the second study we got similar results: the
responses to the questions on the tabular risk model showed an overall 13% better precision
and an overall 30% better recall over the responses given with the graphical risk model.
We also report precision and recall by questions in Tables 8.4 and 8.5 in Appendix.
Figure 4.2 presents precision and recall of participants’ responses to the comprehension
task in the two studies. Participants who used tabular risk model showed better precision
and recall of responses than the participants who used a graphical model. Tables 4.8
and 4.9 support this observation. When looking at individual experiments we can observe
that in the first study the participants of experiment PUCRS-BSC demonstrated the least
difference in precision. A possible reason can be language issue as the participants were
BSc students from Brazil speaking Portuguese and may have problems with understanding
English text.
The H4.10 is tested with Wilcoxon and MW tests and the results presented in Ta-
ble 4.10. The tests revealed a statistically significant difference in precision and recall for
most of the experiments with effect size ranging from small to very large except PUCRS-
BSC where we obtained p-value > 0.05. Only for overall recall of the first study Levene’s
test returned p-value <0.05 which means that sample does not meet homogeneity of
variance assumption required by MW test. To validate its result we run Kruskal-Wallis
test that can be used instead of MW test and does not require homogeneity of variance.
The test returned p-value = 1.2 ∗ 10−5 and confirmed the findings of MW test. Overall,
we can conclude that the tabular risk modeling notation is more effective in supporting
comprehension of security risks than the graphical one.
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Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics of Precision and Recall by Modeling Notation – Study 4.1
For both precision over all questions and recall over all questions the tabular risk model was easier to comprehend
than the graphical one within each experiment and overall across the three experiments.
Tabular Graphical
Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
Precision
4.1. UNITN-MCS 0.90 0.92 0.06 0.84 0.88 0.11
4.1. PUCRS-MCS 0.82 0.87 0.12 0.70 0.74 0.10
4.1. PUCRS-BSC 0.81 0.90 0.15 0.80 0.83 0.13
Overall 0.86 0.92 0.11 0.80 0.84 0.12
Recall
4.1. UNITN-MCS 0.89 0.89 0.07 0.75 0.78 0.15
4.1. PUCRS-MCS 0.89 0.93 0.09 0.61 0.66 0.11
4.1. PUCRS-BSC 0.89 0.96 0.12 0.75 0.79 0.17
Overall 0.89 0.89 0.09 0.73 0.76 0.16
Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics of Precision and Recall by Modeling Notation – Study 4.2
For both precision and recall over all questions the tabular risk model was easier to comprehend than the graphical
one within each experiment and overall across the two experiments.
Tabular Graphical
Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
Precision
4.2. POSTE 0.92 0.96 0.09 0.80 0.88 0.19
4.2. UNITN 0.93 0.95 0.09 0.84 0.86 0.14
Overall 0.92 0.96 0.09 0.82 0.87 0.17
Recall
4.2. POSTE 0.87 0.88 0.11 0.64 0.65 0.19
4.2. UNITN 0.89 0.91 0.11 0.71 0.72 0.17
Overall 0.88 0.90 0.11 0.68 0.69 0.18
4.5.2 RQ4.2: Effect of Task Complexity on Comprehension
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b compare the distribution of precision and recall of the participants’
responses to full comprehension task (Q1–Q12) (left) and only to the complex questions
(right), namely question complexity level > 2.
There is a significant difference in recall of the responses to the complex questions
between tabular and graphical risk models. In the first study 76% of the participants who
used the tabular risk model achieved recall better than or equal to the overall median
value, whilst only 28% of the participants who used the graphical risk model passed the
recall threshold. In the second study we observed bigger difference: 80% and 23% of the
participants passed therecall threshold in tabular and graphical group respectively.
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For both studies participants using a tabular risk model showed a much better significant recall than the graphical
one (see the number of points to the left of median bar and the non overlapping boxplots on the top of the diagrams).
The participants using a graphical model have a slightly lower significant precision than participants using tabular
models as can be seen from the number of points below the median bar and the boxplots on the right of the diagrams.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Participants’ Precision and Recall by Modeling Notation
Table 4.10: RQ4.1 – Summary of Experimental Results by Modeling Notation
The results of Wilcoxon test for the first study and MW test for the second study revealed showed that tabular risk
modeling notation are statistically easier to comprehend as measured by both in precision (small-medium effect) and
in recall (large-very large effect) at the 5% confidence level.
Experiment #part. #obs. µT -µG σ p-value Cohen’s d
P
re
ci
si
on
4.1. UNITN-MCS 35 35 0.06 0.12 0.024 Small 0.49
4.1. PUCRS-MCS 13 13 0.13 0.18 0.046 Medium 0.71
4.1. PUCRS-BSC 21 21 0.01 0.22 0.66 Negligible 0.06
4.2. POSTE 41 82 0.12 0.15 6.7 · 10−5 Medium 0.79
4.2. UNITN 42 84 0.09 0.12 4.1 · 10−6 Large 0.81
Study 4.1: Overall 69 69 0.06 0.17 0.018 Small 0.32
Study 4.2: Overall 83 166 0.11 0.13 1.9 · 10−8 Medium 0.79
R
ec
al
l
4.1. UNITN-MCS 35 35 0.14 0.14 0.002 Large 0.95
4.1. PUCRS-MCS 13 13 0.27 0.15 0.001 Very large 1.87
4.1. PUCRS-BSC 21 21 0.15 0.21 0.054 Medium 0.7
4.2. POSTE 41 82 0.23 0.16 1.9 · 10−9 Very large 1.46
4.2. UNITN 42 84 0.18 0.14 5.7 · 10−9 Very large 1.25
Study 4.1: Overall 69 69 0.16 0.17 5.0 · 10−6 Large 0.98
Study 4.2: Overall 83 166 0.2 0.15 4.1 · 10−13 Very large 1.35
In the case of precision the gap in comprehension is reduced: in the first study 67% and
39% of the participants who used respectively tabular and graphical risk models passed
the threshold. In the second study the difference is smaller and these proportions were
66% and 34% for tabular and graphical risk models respectively.
To better investigate this effect, we used the interaction plots between precision, re-
call, and questions’ complexity. Figures 4.4a and 4.4b shows that there is no significant
interaction between precision, recall and risk modeling notation.
82
4.5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
m
e
di
an
 a
ll =
 0
.8
3
median all = 0.87
T: N= 1 
G: N= 7
T: N= 21 −>
G: N= 7 −>
T: N= 4 
G: N= 1
T: N= 7 
G: N= 21
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Aggregated Recall
Ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 P
re
sis
io
n
l
l
l
All questions
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
m
e
di
an
 a
ll =
 0
.8
1
median all = 0.82
T: N= 1 
G: N= 8
T: N= 19 −>
G: N= 7 −>
T: N= 6 
G: N= 5
T: N= 7 
G: N= 16
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Aggregated Recall
Ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 P
re
sis
io
n
l l
l
l
Complex questions
METHOD
l Graphical
Tabular
(a) Study 4.1
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
m
e
di
an
 a
ll =
 0
.8
3
median all = 0.92
T: N= 6 
G: N= 13
T: N= 49 −>
G: N= 15 −>
T: N= 13 
G: N= 4
T: N= 15 
G: N= 51
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Aggregated Recall
Ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 P
re
sis
io
n
l
lll l
l
l
l
l
All questions
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
m
e
di
an
 a
ll =
 0
.8
2
median all = 0.91
T: N= 8 
G: N= 15
T: N= 47 −>
G: N= 14 −>
T: N= 14 
G: N= 4
T: N= 14 
G: N= 50
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Aggregated Recall
Ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 P
re
sis
io
n
l
l ll
l
l
l
Complex questions
METHOD
l Graphical
Tabular
(b) Study 4.2
For both simple and complex questions participants using a tabular risk model have better recall than the graphical
one. There is a significant difference in precision across simple and complex questions. The participants using a
graphical model have a lower precision than participants using tabular models as can be seen from the larger number
of points below the median bar and the boxplot on the right of the diagrams.
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Participants’ Precision and Recall by Task Complexity
For both simple and complex questions the tabular risk model has better recall than the
graphical one and this holds for both studies. The difference in precision is significant only
in the first study, where tabular risk model showed significantly better precision for simple
questions (0.96 as mean value) over the complex ones (0.80). In the second study for both
risk modeling notations there is no significant difference in precision between simple and
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There is no significant interaction between precision, recall, and risk modeling notation. Only for simple questions
participants using the tabular notation performed significantly better albeit for a small effect.
Figure 4.4: Interaction Among Risk Modeling Notation and Task Complexity
complex questions. As there is no major interaction between risk model notation and
either precision or recall, we can simply use the F -measure as an aggregated measure of
participants’ comprehension for further co-factor analysis and for answering RQ4.2.
To make this analysis more precise we calculate the F -measure by aggregating it by
questions’ complexity, so that Fm,s,` is the mean value for participant s using risk model
m over all questions q with complexity level `. We aggregate the levels as ` = 2 and ` > 2
(see complexity levels in Tables 8.4 and 8.5 in Appendix). The formulation is essentially
identical to (4.5) except that q only ranges over the questions with complexity `.
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 presents the descriptive statistics for F -measure of simple and
complex questions for tabular and graphical models in two studies. In both studies par-
ticipants’ obtained better F -measure for simple questions in comparison to the complex
ones. Interesting fact that the participants of the experiment PUCRS-MCS in the first
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Table 4.11: Descriptive Statistics of F -measure by Task Complexity – Study 4.1
In the first study F -measure of simple questions was significantly higher than of complex questions and this is true
for both risk modeling notations. Only in experiment PUCRS-MSC when participants used graphical risk model the
difference in F -measure between simple and complex questions was smaller (0.03) than in the other experiments.
Simple Complex
Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
T
ab
ul
ar
4.1. UNITN-MCS 0.98 1.00 0.04 0.83 0.88 0.10
4.1. PUCRS-MCS 0.90 1.00 0.17 0.82 0.86 0.13
4.1. PUCRS-BSC 0.91 1.00 0.17 0.81 0.84 0.13
Overall 0.94 1.00 0.12 0.82 0.86 0.11
G
ra
ph
ic
al 4.1. UNITN-MCS 0.85 0.86 0.15 0.75 0.80 0.17
4.1. PUCRS-MCS 0.67 0.66 0.18 0.64 0.65 0.13
4.1. PUCRS-BSC 0.81 0.85 0.23 0.74 0.79 0.14
Overall 0.80 0.83 0.19 0.73 0.79 0.15
Table 4.12: Descriptive Statistics of F -measure by Task Complexity – Study 4.2
In the second study still there was a difference in F -measure in favor of simple questions over the complex ones, but
it was smaller for tabular risk model and same for the graphical one. In experiment UNITN the participants who
used graphical risk model obtained same mean F -measure for simple and complex questions (0.76).
Simple Complex
Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
T
ab
ul
ar 4.2. POSTE 0.93 1.00 0.20 0.89 0.90 0.09
4.2. UNITN 0.94 1.00 0.15 0.90 0.91 0.09
Overall 0.93 1.00 0.17 0.89 0.90 0.09
G
ra
ph
. 4.2. POSTE 0.76 0.86 0.27 0.70 0.75 0.18
4.2. UNITN 0.76 0.86 0.26 0.76 0.79 0.15
Overall 0.76 0.86 0.26 0.73 0.77 0.17
study obtained small difference (0.03) and UNITN in the second study showed no differ-
ence in F -measure of simple and complex questions when respond using graphical risk
model.
The H4.20 is tested with Wilcoxon test and the results reported in Table 4.13. Overall
the results revealed small but statistically significant difference in favor of simple questions.
The difference is significant in most of the experiments when participants’ used tabular
risk model but not for graphical one. We can conclude that tabular notation is more
prone to the effect of task complexity comparing to the graphical notation.
In Section 8.1 we report the additional information showing the effect of different task
complexity elements (IC, R, and J) on F -measure by mean of interaction plots.
4.5.3 Post-task Questionnaire
To control the effect of the experiment settings on the results, we analyzed participants’
feedback collected with post-task questionnaire after the application task. Tables 4.14a
and 4.14b present descriptive statistics of the responses to post-task questionnaire of the
first and second studies respectively. Responses are on a five-category Likert scale from
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Overall, for both tabular and graphical risk
85
CHAPTER 4. THE COMPREHENSIBILITY OF SECURITY RISK MODELING APPROACHES
Table 4.13: RQ4.2 – Summary of Experimental Results by Tasks’ Complexity
The results of Wilcoxon test for tabular risk model revealed a statistically significant difference in F -measure in favor
of simple questions (µC ≤ µS). Only for PUCRS-MSC and PUCRS-BSC experiments the test returned p-value
> 0.05. The results for graphical risk modeling notation is less convincing as only the experiment UNITN in the first
study and overall for the first study we obtained significant results and only for a small effect.
Experiment #part. #obs. µC -µS σ p-value Cohen’s d
T
ab
ul
ar
4.1. UNITN-MCS 17 17 -0.14 0.08 1.5 · 10−5 Very large 1.69
4.1. PUCRS-MCS 7 7 -0.08 0.23 0.30 Small 0.36
4.1. PUCRS-BSC 9 9 -0.10 0.23 0.055 Small 0.45
4.2. POSTE 41 41 -0.04 0.24 0.0003 Negligible 0.19
4.2. UNITN 42 42 -0.04 0.20 0.002 Negligible 0.18
Study 4.1: Overall 33 33 -0.12 0.17 1.1 · 10−5 Medium 0.68
Study 4.2: Overall 83 83 -0.04 0.22 6.4 · 10−6 Negligible 0.18
G
ra
ph
ic
al
4.1. UNITN-MCS 18 18 -0.09 0.23 0.03 Small 0.41
4.1. PUCRS-MCS 6 6 -0.03 0.25 1.00 Negligible 0.11
4.1. PUCRS-BSC 12 12 -0.07 0.30 0.15 Small 0.23
4.2. POSTE 41 41 -0.06 0.36 0.08 Negligible 0.16
4.2. UNITN 42 42 0.00 0.33 0.41 Negligible -0.00
Study 4.1: Overall 36 36 -0.07 0.27 0.01 Small 0.28
Study 4.2: Overall 83 83 -0.03 0.35 0.06 Negligible 0.08
Table 4.14: Post-task Questionnaire Results
For both modeling notations participants agreed that settings were clear, tasks were reasonable, and documentation
was clear and sufficient. Scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
(a) Study 4.1
Tabular Graphical
Q# Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
Q1 4.67 5.00 0.54 4.67 5.00 0.54
Q2 3.88 4.00 1.05 3.88 4.00 1.05
Q3 4.18 4.00 0.68 4.18 4.00 0.68
Q4 4.00 4.00 0.75 4.00 4.00 0.75
Q5 4.00 4.00 0.83 4.00 4.00 0.83
Q6 4.27 4.00 0.76 4.27 4.00 0.76
Q7 4.33 4.00 0.82 4.33 4.00 0.82
Q8 4.30 4.00 0.77 4.30 4.00 0.77
Q9 Yes (64%) / No (36%) Yes (50%) / No (50%)
(b) Study 4.2
Tabular Graphical
Q# Mean Median sd Mean Median sd
Q1 4.22 4.00 0.83 4.22 4.00 0.83
Q2 3.86 4.00 0.84 3.86 4.00 0.84
Q3 4.10 4.00 0.77 4.10 4.00 0.77
Q4 3.93 4.00 0.82 3.93 4.00 0.82
Q5 3.92 4.00 0.80 3.92 4.00 0.80
Q6 3.98 4.00 0.78 3.98 4.00 0.78
Q7 4.02 4.00 0.87 4.02 4.00 0.87
Q8 4.04 4.00 0.77 4.04 4.00 0.77
Q9 Yes (45%) / No (55%) Yes (39%) / No (61%)
models participants concluded that the time allocated to complete the task was enough
(Q1). Participants who used the tabular risk model were more confident in the adequacy
of allocated time than participants who used the graphical risk model. They found the
objectives of the study (Q2) and the task (Q3) clear. In general, the participants were
confident that the comprehension questions were clear (Q4) and they did not experience
difficulty in answering the comprehension questions (Q5). Also, neither group experienced
significant difficulties in understanding (Q6) and using electronic versions (Q7) of risk
model tables or diagrams. The online survey tool was also easy to use (Q8).
Since we provided participants with electronic versions of the tabular and graphical
risk models, we decided to investigate whether the participants used search/filtering in-
formation in tables and diagrams. In the first study most of the participants (64%) who
used tabular risk models also used search or filtering information in a browser or MS
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Excel, while only half of the participants who used the graphical risk model used search
in PDF format. In the second study this ratio was 21% less for participants who used the
tabular risk model and 11% lower for participants who used the graphical risk model.
4.5.4 Co-factor Analysis
We investigated the effect of co-factors on the dependent variable through interaction
plots. We considered co-factors like education degree (BSc or MSc), working experience,
experience in security and privacy projects or initiatives, and level of expertise in security,
modeling languages, and in the domain. In the first study only an handful number
of participants reported their knowledge as “proficient user” in Security, and therefore
we merged this category with the category “competent user”. For the same reason we
merged the category “expert” in Modeling with the category “proficient user”. Similarly,
in the second study we had small number of participants who reported their knowledge
as “expert” in either Security or Modeling we merged this category with the category
“proficient user”.
Figure 4.5a shows the interaction plots between the F -measure by modeling notation
(graphical vs. tabular) and education degree, security knowledge, or modeling knowledge
for the first study. The results of permutation test for two-way ANOVA showed that
these interactions are not statistically significant. The test returned p = 0.55 for security
knowledge vs risk modeling notation, p = 0.74 for modeling knowledge vs risk modeling
notation, and p = 0.42 for education degree vs risk modeling notation. Thus, we did not
observe a statistically significant interaction between factors and dependent variable.
In the experiments of the second study we considered co-factors like knowledge of
English, working experience, experience in security and privacy projects or initiatives,
level of expertise in security, modeling languages and in the domain. Figure 4.5b shows the
interaction plots between the F -measure by modeling notation (graphical vs. tabular) and
level of English, security knowledge, or modeling knowledge. The results of permutation
test for two-way ANOVA showed that these interactions are not statistically significant.
The test returned p = 0.95 for the security knowledge level and risk modeling notation,
p = 0.56 for the modeling knowledge level and risk modeling notation, and p = 0.38 for
the level of English and risk modeling notation. Thus, in the second study we did not
observe a statistically significant effect of co-factors on the experimental results.
Learning Effect in Study 4.2: We investigated a possible learning effect that may
be caused by between-subjects design. Figure 4.6 shows the interaction plots between
F -measure by modeling notation and scenario and session. The results of permutation
test for two-way ANOVA test show that there are no statistically significant interactions.
The test returned p = 0.88 for the scenario and risk modeling notation and p = 0.96 for
the session and risk model type.
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(a) Study 4.1
Better expertise corresponds to obviously better results but otherwise security and modeling expertise do not interact
with the modeling notation. There is only a limited interaction for participants who are just competent in modeling
notation but this is not confirmed by either novices or experts. A permutation test for two-way ANOVA did not
reveal any statistically significant interaction.
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Once again better expertise corresponds to better results but otherwise security and modeling expertise do not
have major interactions with the modeling notation. The difference in performance due to expertise is smaller for
participants using the tabular notation. The permutation test for two-way ANOVA did not reveal any significant
interaction.
Figure 4.5: Interaction of Modeling Notations with Expertise Co-factors
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There is no interaction between scenario, session and modeling notation. There is a slight improvement in actual
comprehension in favor of the risk model based on the Online Banking scenario as it is clearly more familiar than a
Health Care Network. The improvement between two sessions is due to the learning effect, the participants became
experienced in fulfilling comprehension task throughout the sessions.
Figure 4.6: Interaction of Scenario and Session vs Modeling Notation – Study 4.2
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4.6 Discussion and Implications
In this section we discuss our results with respect to the hypotheses presented in Sec-
tion 4.3.6. We also discuss possible explanation of the outcomes and their implications to
research and practice.
The first null hypothesis H4.10 (about no difference between tabular and graphical
risk models in the level of comprehensibility when performing comprehension task) can
be rejected for both precision and recall. The second null hypothesis H4.20 (no difference
between simple and complex questions in the level of comprehensibility when perform-
ing comprehension task) can be rejected only for tabular representation, but not for the
graphical one.
The results show that, overall, the tabular risk model is more effective than the graphi-
cal one when stakeholders need to find relevant information about threats, vulnerabilities,
or other elements of risk models. The participants who applied the tabular risk model
gave more precise and complete answers to the comprehension questions. Regarding the
perceived comprehensibility (Q5 and Q6 in post-task questionnaire) of the two risk mod-
eling notations the participants showed equal preference for tabular and graphical risk
models. These results are consistent across both our studies.
In this respect we argue that the difference in precision between the risk models could
be explained by the cognitive fit theory itself if we do not unnecessarily restrict spatial
relationships to graphs. Indeed, it can be seen that tables also capture some aspects of
linear spatial relationships. In tabular risk models the name of the column identifies
the type of a risk element (e.g., assets, threats, vulnerabilities, impact, likelihood, and
security controls) and each row relates elements to each other. Hence, we can consider the
proximity of cells along a row or along a column as a simple spatial relationship. Further,
it is necessary to identify elements belonging to some classes, and tabular models make it
easier to search for specific risk elements.
In contrast, locating and searching is less immediate in graphical risk models because
in these models the risk elements are identified by means of graphical icons or positioning
on the arrows between model elements that first must be learned by the participants in
order to locate these elements. For complex comprehension tasks the lack of difference in
precision between two risk models may be due to the fact that the task involves identifying
complex spatial relationships, and graphical risk models provide a better overview of the
system’s risks that counterbalances the immediateness of tabular risk models. This theory
could be tested by performing additional experiments in which significantly more complex
questions are asked in order to determine whether there is a sweet spot where graphical
models are easier to understand than tabular models. If the models were to get too large
we assume that both tabular and graphical models would produce poor results.
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Implications for practice Because tabular risk model was found to be more effective
in extracting relevant information about security risks we recommend to adopt tabular
representation when security risk assessment results have to be communicated to different
stakeholders. In case of a wide range of stakeholders it is likely that some of them may
not know a particular graphical risk modeling notation, while tables provides notation
represented in a natural language. The stakeholders also may benefit from using “look-
up” bonus of tables with filters and sorting option in the tables.
The importance of our study is that we investigated a) the effectiveness of tabular
and graphical risk modeling notations in extracting correct information about security
risks and b) the effect of task complexity on the level of comprehension of risk models by
non-security experts.
4.7 Threats to Validity
In this section we discuss the main threats to validity.
Construct validity threats are mainly due to the method used to assess the outcomes
of tasks. In our experiments the main threat to construct validity is related to the design
of the questionnaires to assess the comprehension level of the participants and the risk
models. To eliminate any potential bias introduced by a particular researcher, the ques-
tions and the risk models were checked by five researchers independently. The post-task
questionnaire was designed based on previous studies [37,91]. However, the design of the
questionnaire may be strongly favoring one treatment over the other. Inspired by similar
studies [41, 108], we used the names of element types in the question statements.
This may work in favor of the tabular risk model as the graphical model is more
difficult to navigate and reply “look-up” questions. However, our data showed different.
If we look at Figure 4.4a, in Study 1 the drop in precision of responses between simple
and complex questions is very small for graphical representation and more evident for the
tabular one and the difference in recall is similar to both representations. In Study 2 the
drop in precision and recall is consistent for both representations. Also a significant part
of the participants (39% in study 1 and 50% in study 2) used search in PDF documents
with graphical risk models (see Tables 4.14a and 4.14b). An alternative way to validate
whether the availability of textual labels has an effect on comprehensibility, is to compare
tabular model with a UML-based graphical risk model containing names of element types
as a part of representation.
Another threat can be cause by self-evaluation the level of knowledge in related ar-
eas (i.e. Security, Modeling, Domain Knowledge, etc.) that we collected with pre-task
questionnaire. The source of threats in this case can be the so-called Dunning-Kruger
effect [19], when less competent people tend to evaluate their knowledge too high suffer-
ing from internal illusion about their skills level, while highly competent people tend to
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downgrade the level of their knowledge as they assume that others are more competent
than themselves. We possibly observed this effect in the first study when the participants
that evaluated themselves as “novices” in Modeling obtained better results than the “pro-
ficient” and “expert” participants who received worse results (see Figure 4.5a). However,
this threat is not major to our study as we used self-evaluation of participants’ knowledge
only to control for possible effects, but not as the main factor or dependent variables.
Internal validity threats are mitigated by the use of randomized assignment to the
treatments, even though some of the threats remain. The risk models used in the study
are quite generic but were designed by real experts in CORAS and correspond to realistic
models reporting risk assessment results. Also, the comprehension questions were vali-
dated by the risk model designers to ensure that the questions covered the comprehension
of all risk modeling notation concepts. As can be seen from Tables 4.14a and 4.14b, most
of the participants clearly understood the objectives of the study and the task that they
had to perform.
Conclusion validity concerns the relationship between treatment and outcome. Ag-
gregating data from different individual experiments may threaten validity due to the
differences between the settings of the experiments and the groups of participants. How-
ever, we mitigated these threats by defining the family of experiments belonging to the
same study (i.e., Study 1 or Study 2) as exact replications of the experimental procedure
described in Section 4.3.7. Another threat to conclusion validity lies in the data analysis.
We used a non-parametric test because it does not assume a normal distribution of the
data. We used permutation test for two-way ANOVA only to find a possible interaction
between the treatment and co-factors. The permutation test is a good alternative to
standard test when the assumption about normal distribution is violated or the dataset
is small [47].
External validity may be limited by the comprehension tasks and risk models used
in the experiment and by the type of participants. Regarding the first point, we can
say that the models chosen were created based on real application scenarios provided to
us by an industrial partner. The HCN scenario was provided by IBM. Regarding the
second point, others studies [122] have shown that students have a good understanding
of the way that industry behaves, and may work well as participants in empirical studies.
Moreover, students are not security experts and security standards place a big emphasis
on “communicating risk”, so that risk models/recommendations can be “consumed” by
non-experts in security ( [114, Section 2.1] or [5, Sec. 4.3]). Further studies may confirm
whether or not our results can be generalized to more experienced participants (e.g., risk
analysts and security professionals) and/or additional stakeholders’ types who may be
potential consumers of risk models (e.g., decision-makes or managers).
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarizes contribution of the thesis in relation to the research aim and
research questions discussed in Chapter 1. Moreover, we discuss the limitations and future
research directions in regard to the findings of the thesis.
5.1 Summary of the Thesis
This section summarizes the contribution of the thesis in relation to the research questions
discussed in Chapter 1. We addressed the research questions as follows:
RQ1. Which SRA methods are actually effective?
We addressed this research question by conducting a pilot experiment and a series of
three controlled experiments. We presented the results of the experiments in Chapter 2.
In the first experiment with MSc students and IT Audit professionals we compared three
classes of academic methods: threat-, goal-, and problem-based methods. The results
showed that threat-based methods have higher overall perception and perceived ease of
use than goal-based and problem-based methods. This can be explained by the fact that
threat-based methods have a clear process helping participants to identify threats and
security controls and use a graphical notation to present the results. The first experiment
also revealed no difference in the perceived usefulness of the different classes of methods.
In the next two experiments with MSc students we focused on the comparison of visual
and textual methods. The results showed that there is no clear difference between textual
and visual methods with respect to their actual effectiveness, while participants reported
higher preference for the visual methods over the textual one with respect to perceived
easy of use, perceived usefulness, and intention to use.
RQ2. How can we validate and compare different SRA methods?
To address this research question, in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.4) we propose an evaluation
framework that defines a formal procedure for comparison of SRA methods and evaluation
of results of methods application with help of external industrial experts. We use this
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framework to conduct empirical studies in regard to the research questions RQ1 and RQ3.
We believe that the availability of this framework would allow researchers to conduct
empirical evaluations of proposed methods and compare their results with the results of
other experiments conducted based on our framework.
RQ3. What criteria define the success of an SRA method?
To address this research question we built a theoretical model (Figure 2.10 in Chap-
ter 2) that extends MEM and hypotheses different features of SRA methods which deter-
mine the methods’ actual and perceived efficacy. The model is based on the qualitative
and quantitative results of three empirical studies. The qualitative analysis revealed that
the main drivers for method’s perceived ease of use is i) the presence in the method of
clear process that supports main steps of SRA like identification of assets, threats and
security controls, and ii) availability of visual summary providing a global overview of
SRA. If the visual notation does not scale well it may harm method’s perceived useful-
ness. Perceived usefulness and actual effectiveness of the method can also be increased
by providing to the analyst the security catalogues which helps in identification of threat
and security controls.
Further, we investigated two relations suggested by the theoretical model. First, in
Chapter 3 we studied the role of catalogues of threats and security controls in an SRA. The
quantitative analysis showed that for novices in both domain and security expertise there
is no difference between generic and domain specific catalogues. In contrast, professionals
with domain expertise who applied the method with catalogues identified threats and
controls of the same quality as security experts without catalogues. The qualitative
analysis indicated that security experts have different expectations from catalogues than
non-experts. Non-experts are mostly worried about the difficulty of navigating through
the catalogue (the larger and less specific the worse it was) while experts found it mostly
useful to get a common terminology and a checklist that nothing was forgotten. To
summarize our findings, we proposed a theory to explain how different catalogues’ features
contribute into an effective risk assessment process for novices and experts in either domain
or security knowledge.
Second, in Chapter 4 we explored the relation between risk modeling representation
and method’s perceived efficacy proposed by our theoretical model. We conducted a se-
ries of controlled experiments to answer the question: “how comprehensible are different
representation approaches for risk models?” The results showed that tabular risk models
are more effective than the graphical ones with respect to simple comprehension task and
slightly more effective for complex comprehension task. We believe that these results can
be explained by a simple extension of Vessey’s cognitive fit theory [125] as some linear
spatial relationships could be also (and possibly more easily) captured by tabular models.
While both tabular and graphical risk models equally good support the complex compre-
hension task because the easiness of searching elements and relationships of tabular risk
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models is compensated by the easiness of understanding the overall risk picture provided
by graphical risk model.
5.2 Limitations and Future work
In what follows, we discuss limitations and future research directions that may expand
our work:
– Students as participants. The main limitation of our work is that most experiments
involved MSc students and very few experiments were conducted with professionals.
This is a common problem of controlled experiments in SE [110]. Thus, it important
to validate the findings reported in this thesis with security professionals. This could
give us better evidence that our findings are related to industrial practice.
– SRA actual efficiency. Another possible research line is an evaluation of the ef-
fort required to conduct SRA. This type of experiments requires very precise metrics
and data collection approach allowing to quantify participants’ efforts on SRA. Ex-
isting empirical studies employ mainly self-reporting (e.g. diary or self-estimation) or
software-aided effort data collection approaches. The first approach is quite subjective
and can be biased by not very motivated participants or participants that would like
to impress others (e.g., students participating in the experiment which is a part of the
study course). The second approach does not work well in case the object of the study
requires activities not supported by computers, e.g., brainstorming or creative thinking.
This challenge is still an open question for our topic.
– Improve existing SRA methods. A logical extension of the current work is the
creation of a mix-method incorporating the strong features from both tabular (e.g., clear
process, tabular summary, catalogues support) and graphical methods (e.g., graphical
risk models), and providing a good tool support. However, this work require careful
implementation and validation in order to avoid the creation of another hard to use
method.
– Automated SRA. Having a tool support for SRA raises another question: which re-
search methods are appropriate for the evaluation of automated SRA methods? The
evaluation framework proposed in this thesis compares SRA methods in general and
does not investigate such aspects as usability of methods’ tool. We can propose to
consider the use of techniques to study usability from Human-Computer Interaction
domain [113]. Also it is important to find a balance between human expertise and au-
tomation. This requires an analysis of currently used SRA techniques and best practices
in order to evaluate what can be successfully automated using existing technologies.
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– Grounded theory validation. In Chapter 3 we proposed a theory for understand-
ing [34] the role of catalogues in SRA. The initial validation of the theory was done
in two ways. First, we quantitatively evaluate the effect of catalogues on the quality
of SRA by comparing results of non-security and security professionals who conducted
SRA with catalogues vs. results of security professionals who performed SRA with-
out catalogues. The main limitation of this part is a small number of participants. It
would be interesting to replicate this study with more professionals to confirm findings
of the experiments. Second, we conducted focus groups with domain professionals and
collected their qualitative opinion about catalogue’s features. This part would bene-
fit from further studies aiming to quantitatively validate the relationships between the
theoretical concepts of the model similar to the work by Sabi et al. [93].
– Risk Models Comprehension and Memorization. In Chapter 4 we investigated
the effectiveness of graphical and tabular risk modeling notations in extracting cor-
rect information about security risks. The main limitations of this study are a) that
it includes only two risk modeling notations and b) involved only students. Also our
comprehension task is limited by a “look-up” nature which might favoring tabular repre-
sentation. To validate this we need to extend our research questions and to investigate
which representation better supports memorization of information presented in models,
a suggested by one of our reviewers. The experiment can use existing comprehension
task but the models will be provided to participants just for a limited time to read
and memorize. Then participants have to answer questions without having the models
available.
– Comprehension Task Complexity. A task complexity factor requires further inves-
tigation as well. Our results showed that tabular representation is prone to questions’
complexity, while graphical representation seems to be equally good for both simple
and complex questions. Therefore, task complexity should be always taken into ac-
count when researchers investigate the comprehensibility of different representations
and not only in security.
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Chapter 6
Detailed Experimental Data for
Chapter 2
6.1 Experiment 2.1
The goal of the experiment was to compare different classes of methods to identify threats
and security controls: threat-based, goal-based and problem-based methods. It involved
all methods listed in Table 2.3.
6.1.1 Experiment Execution
Table 6.1 summarizes the different phases of the execution of the first experiment by
reference to our protocol.
The experiment uses a between-groups design: each group applied one method to
one of industrial application scenarios. Groups were randomly assigned to methods and
scenarios.
During the experiment we have collected an average of 37 responses out of 40 for each
questionnaire sampling. We discarded questionnaire responses of some participants due to
incompleteness (i.e., they did not answer all questions in a questionnaire). We accepted in
total 147 questionnaire responses that were correctly completed, i.e. 91,9% response rate.
We collected 203 post-it notes with methods advantages and disadvantages during post-it
notes sessions and 5 hours of audio of focus group interviews. Participants delivered 15
group reports.
Table 6.2 shows for each method the number of groups and participants who have
applied it. Groups were randomly assigned to methods and scenarios.
6.1.2 Method Designers Evaluation
Table 6.3 reports the results of reports evaluation by method designers.
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Table 6.1: Execution Details – Experiment 2.1
Step Date Description
Training
T
re
nt
o
M1 May 7, 2012 Distribution of background and demographics questionnaire.
E1 May 9-10, 2012 Participants attended lectures on the application scenarios.
E2 May 8, 2012 Participants attended lectures about the methods.
M2 May 10, 2012 Distribution of post-training questionnaire.
Application
E3 May 10-11, 2012 During the first application phase groups spent 8,5 hours working on risks, and security
and privacy requirements for each method.
E4 May 11, 2012 Groups gave a 10 minutes presentation of preliminary results.
M3 May 11, 2012 Distribution of post-task questionnaire about participants’ perception of the method after
the first application session.
P
ar
is
E32 June 14, 2012 Groups had 4 hours to finalize the security and privacy analysis using the assigned method.
E42 June 15, 2012 Groups gave a 10 minutes presentation of the results of their analysis using the assigned
method.
M32 June 15, 2012 Distribution of post-task questionnaire about participants’ perception of the method after
the first application session.
Evaluation
M4 June 15, 2012 Participants took part in focus groups interviews and post-it notes session.
E5 June 30, 2012 Groups delivered final reports.
M5 June 30, 2012 Distribution of post-task questionnaire about quality of experiment organization.
M6, M7 July 1-15, 2012 Method designers and domain experts assessed groups final reports.
Table 6.2: Experimental Design – Experiment 2.1
Method/Scenario Smart Grid eHealth No of Participants
CORAS 1 2 8
SREP 2 1 8
LINDDUN 1 2 7
SECURE TROPOS 2 1 9
SECURITY ARGUMENTATION 1 2 9
N. of Groups 7 8 42
6.1.3 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we report the results of post-task questionnaires analysis.
Questionnaire Analysis: As we have 5 methods and we want to find the differ-
ence in participants’ perception of methods we can use the KW test. This test requires
homogeneity of variances and observations independence. By design, participants’ an-
swers about the evaluated methods are totally independent of each other, i.e. we have
independence within samples and mutual independence between samples. We test the
homogeneity of variances with the Levene’s test. The test returned p-value > 0.05 for
all samples and, thus, the assumption on homogeneity of variances is met. Since the
assumptions are satisfied, we can apply the KW test. We also conducted a post-hoc test
to compare participants’ answers for each pair of methods with the MW test with Holm
correction [46, Chap. 14.2]. Besides conditions a) homogeneity of variances and b) ob-
servations independence the test requires that response variables are measured in ordinal
scale but this assumption holds because our data are answers on a 5-point Likert scale.
Therefore, we can conclude that MW is a suitable test.
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Table 6.3: Reports Assessment by Methods Designers – Experiment 2.1
Group Method Method Completeness
Group 1 CORAS 3
Group 2 CORAS 4
Group 3 CORAS 2
Group 4 SECTRO 2
Group 5 SECTRO 3
Group 6 SECTRO 4
Group 7 SECARG 4
Group 8 SECARG 3
Group 9 SECARG 3
Group 10 SREP 2
Group 11 SREP 4
Group 12 SREP 3
Group 13 LINDDUN 4
Group 14 LINDDUN 2
Group 15 LINDDUN 4
Table 6.4: Median Statistics and Results of the KW Test for Participants’ Answers – Experiment 2.1
Question Type CORAS SREP LINDDUN SECTRO SECARG Stat.
sign.
BEFORE APPLICATION (One day after the Training)
Q31#5: Overall applying the method
was?
PEOU 3 4 3 2 3
Q31#8: Conceptual model was easy to
understand?
PEOU 3 4.5 4 2 3 *
Q31#11: Results of your analysis are
complete?
PU 2.5 3 2 2 2 •
Overall Q31 PE 3 4 3 2 3 **
AFTER APPLICATION (One month after the Training with at least 2 full days of application)
Q32#5: Overall applying the method
was?
PEOU 3 4 3 3 3 **
Q32#6: Conceptual model was easy to
understand?
PEOU 4 4 4 3 3 **
Q32#9: Results of your analysis are com-
plete?
PU 4 3 4 3 2
Overall Q32 PE 4 4 3.5 3 3 ***
• - p-value <0.1, * - p-value <0.05, ** - p-value <0.01, *** - p-value <0.0001
For each question related to PEOU and PU, Table 6.4 reports the median value of
participants’ answers given for each method at the beginning (Q31) and at the end (Q32)
of the Application phase, and the level of statistical significance based on p-value returned
by the KW test. The table also reports the median of participants’ answers related to
methods’ overall perception (questions #5, #8 and #11 in Q31 and #5, #6 and #9 in
Q32) with the p-value returned by the KW test.
The overall perception of SREP is higher than the one of other methods at the begin-
ning of the Application phase. At the end of the Application phase also CORAS’ overall
perception is definitely higher than the one of other methods. We had similar results
for PEOU: at the beginning of the Application phase SREP’s PEOU is higher than the
one of other methods, and at the end of the Application phase we see that also CORAS’
has higher PEOU than other methods. In case of PU the KW test did not reveal any
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(b) At the end of the Application phase
Immediately after the training, only the textual threat-based method (SREP) is perceived as the most useful. After a
calendar month of remote application and almost two days full time of controlled application, two others threat-based
methods (CORAS and LINDDUN) are perceived as useful. The observation is significant with 10% level after the training
and not significant after the application (KW test).
Figure 6.1: Responses to the Question about Completeness of Analysis Results – Experiment 2.1
statistically significant difference between the methods.
We have also analyzed the individual questions to understand whether the difference
in methods’ overall perception could be due to PEOU or PU.
Figure 2.7 in Chapter 2 shows the medians of participants’ answers to question about
understandability of conceptual model at the beginning (Q31 #8) and at the end (Q32 #6)
of the Application phase. We can observe that participants’ perception of the methods
varies between the beginning and the end of the phase. SREP is better than other methods
with respect to understandability of the conceptual model both at the beginning and at
the end of the phase with statistical significance.
The results of the KW test run for the questions about difficulty of method application
and about understandability of conceptual model reveal that SREP’s and CORAS’ per-
ceived ease of use is higher than s other methods with statistical significance. Figure 6.1
represents the median of participants’ answers about completeness of analysis results at
the beginning (Q31 #11) and at the end of the Application phase (Q32 #9).
As for the question on understandability of conceptual model, participants’ perception
of the methods with respect to completeness of analysis results varies between the begin-
ning and the end of the Application phase. At the beginning of the Application phase,
participants’ perceived usefulness of SREP is higher than the other methods. Instead,
at the end the perceived usefulness of CORAS and LINDDUN is higher than the other
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Table 6.5: Qualitative Coding of Participants’ Statements – Experiment 2.1
(a) Positive and Negative Aspects Influencing PEOU
PEOU Category CORAS SREP LINDDUN SECTRO SECARG Total
Positive Aspects
Clear Process 16 9 9 7 9 50
Easy to Understand 3 15 3 4 4 29
Easy to Use 5 17 10 3 6 41
Formal Language 1 1 8 10
Visual Summary 15 9 4 1 29
Total Pos PEOU 40 41 31 19 28 159
Negative Aspects
No clear process 6 5 7 10 28
Not easy to understand 2 5 3 5 6 21
Not easy to use 4 6 3 5 11 29
Primitive tool 9 11 5 25
Redundant Steps 6 3 1 10
Too time consuming 4 7 7 4 3 25
Total Neg PEOU 31 26 14 32 35 138
Total PEOU 71 67 45 51 63 297
(b) Positive and Negative Aspects Influencing PU
PU Category CORAS SREP LINDDUN SECTRO SECARG Total
Positive Aspects
Help to Model 4 7 4 15
Help in Identifying
Sec./Privacy Req.
1 1 2 6 10
Security/Privacy Specific 8 4 1 13
Total Pos PU 5 8 5 9 11 38
Negative Aspects
Theoretical 1 6 7 4 18
Total Neg PU 1 6 7 0 4 18
Total PU 6 14 12 9 15 56
methods.
6.1.4 Qualitative analysis
Tables 6.5a and 6.5b present the coding results of questionnaires’ open questions, post-it
notes and focus group interviews transcripts related to PEOU and PU, respectively.
Each table presents for each evaluated method the categories that have a positive or
negative impact on methods’ PEOU and PU, and the total number of statements made
by the participants for each of them. The number of statements is used as a relative
indicator of category’s importance.
In what follows we summarize the main aspects that may influence methods’ PEOU
and PU.
Perceived Ease of Use: Below we discuss the top PEOU categories. Participants
made a significant number of statements (25% of positive and 20% of negative statements)
supporting the importance of methods’ ease of use.
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Clear process has been reported as the main aspect that could affect PEOU of a
method (31% of positive and 21% of negative statements). For CORAS (40% of positive
statements) and LINDDUN (29% of positive statements and no negative) having a clear
process positively affects their PEOU, while for SECURE TROPOS and SECURITY
ARGUMENTATION there is no clear consensus among participants. Here are examples
of statements made by participants about process of these methods: “For me it was
very clear steps from the first till the last one.” (CORAS); “The process is very clear
and it is easy to understand the method.” (LINDDUN); “Clear identification of security
requirements and goals.” (SECURITY ARGUMENTATION); “I think the process of the
method is heavy, slow, complex to follow.” (SECURITY ARGUMENTATION).
Easy to understand is another category that has an impact on participants’ PEOU.
Participants made 18% of positive and 15% of negative statements about it. For example,
37% of positive statements made about SREP were related to this aspect, while there
is no consensus about ease of understanding of SECURE TROPOS (18% of positive
and 16% of negative statements) and SECURITY ARGUMENTATION (13% of positive
and 17% of negative statements). Examples of statements made by participants related
to this category are the following: “The process is not so technical, so it is easy to
understand.” (SREP); “Some constructs are not the same with the other tools, which
makes understanding of the concept difficult.” (SECURE TROPOS).
Visual summary has positive impact on method PEOU (18% of positive statements).
In CORAS are 37.5% of positive statements and in LINDDUN are 29% of positive state-
ments about this aspect. Here are some examples of participants’ statements about it:
“The explicit description of the analysis process with diagrams.” (CORAS); “Data flow
diagram based. Method is clear and easy to follow and is focused on data flow diagrams.”
(LINDDUN).
Perceived Usefulness: Here we discuss the most emerged PU categories.
Help to model is a category which has a great impact on methods’ PU (24% of positive
statements). SECURE TROPOS has 54% of positive statements are about it. Here is
an example of statement made by participants about this aspect: “I liked the fact that it
helps you to model the use case that you are treating.”
Security/privacy specific is another important PU category (25% of positive state-
ments). For example, SREP is security specific method because 73% of positive statements
are about it or LINDDUN is as privacy specific methods because 50% of positive state-
ments are about it. Participants made the following statements related to this category:
“The thing I found positive in the process is the fact that I had to do some research on the
security aspects.” (SREP); “Focus on usually neglected aspects of privacy.” (LINDDUN).
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Table 6.6: Execution Details – Experiment 2.2
Step Date Description
Training
E1 October 2012 Participants attended lectures on the application scenario (2 hours).
E2 October 2012 Participants attended lectures about the methods (2 hours for each method).
M1 October 2012 Distribution of background and demographics questionnaire.
Participants were divided in groups and received their assignments.
Application session was repeated for each task, i.e. we had four application sessions.
2012 Participants attended lecture on the threats and possible security controls specific for the task
but not concretely applied to the scenario (2 hours).
E31 2012 Groups had one week to identify threats and security controls specific for the task using the
assigned method.
E41 2012 Groups gave a 10 minutes presentation of preliminary results of the methods application and
received feedback from the trainer.
E31 2012 Groups had one week to deliver an intermediate report to get feedback.
Evaluation
E5 January 2013 Groups delivered final reports.
E4 Mid January, 2013 Groups gave a presentation summarizing their work in front of the experimenters and of the
domain expert.
M6 Mid January, 2013 Domain expert evaluated the quality of the threats and the security controls proposed by groups.
M3 January 2013 Distribution of online post-task questionnaire about participants’ perception of the methods.
M4 January, 2013 Participants shared their perception of the methods during the individual interview with one of
the experimenters.
Table 6.7: Experimental Design – Experiment 2.2
Scenario MethodVisual Textual
Mgmnt 6 10
WebApp/DB 9 7
Net/Teleco 9 7
Mobile 8 8
6.2 Experiment 2.2
The goal of the second experiment was to evaluate and compare the two best methods
emerging from the first experiment with respect to their effectiveness in identifying threats
and security controls, and participants’ perception of the two methods.
6.2.1 Experiment Execution
Table 6.6 shows the timeline and details of the execution of the second experiment.
To ensure a sufficient number of observations to produce significant conclusions we
chose a within-subjects design where all groups apply both methods. To avoid learning
effects groups identified threats and controls for four different tasks of the Smart Grid
application scenario. Each group applied the visual method (CORAS) to exactly two
different tasks and the textual method (SREP) to the remaining two tasks. For each
task, the method to be applied by groups was randomly determined. Table 6.7 shows for
each task the number of groups assigned to visual and textual methods.
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As presented in Table 6.6 at the step M4 we conducted individual interviews with
participants to collect their perception of methods. All interview were conducted accord-
ing to interview guide which contained open questions about the overall opinion about
methods, their advantages and disadvantages, the difficulties encountered during the ap-
plication of methods and the main differences among them. The interview questions were
the same for all interviewees even though some specific questions were added for some of
participants when their answers to the post-task questionnaire were contradictory. The
questions are reported in Section 6.5.
The questionnaire distributed at the step M3 was adapted from the questionnaire
reported in [86] which was inspired to TAM [14]. The questionnaire consisted of 22
questions which were formulated in an opposite statements (positive statement on the
right and negative statement on the left) format with answers on a 5-point Likert scale.
To avoid that participants answered on “auto-pilot”, some of the questions (e.g. Q2, Q10,
Q13) were given with the most positive response on the left and the most negative on the
right. The questionnaire is reported in Table 6.17 in Section 6.4.
6.2.2 Quantitative Analysis
This section presents the results of quantitative analysis of reports and post-task ques-
tionnaire.
Report Analysis: To assess the effectiveness of visual and textual methods, final
reports delivered by groups were coded by researchers to count the number of threats and
security controls. The groups who have got from a domain expert at least one assessment
higher than Generic for threats or security controls were classified as Good Groups.
The experimental design of our second experiment is two-factor (the method and the
task). Thus, we can use the two-way ANOVA or its non-parametric analog, the Friedman
test, to analyze the number of threats and security controls identified with each of two
methods and for each of four tasks. We have observation independence by design be-
cause groups worked individually. This gave us independence within sample and mutual
independence within sample as the tasks were different. We applied the Levene’s test to
evaluate the homogeneity of variances. The test returned p = 0.56 for security controls,
and = 0.65 for threats. So we have no evidence to reject this assumption. We verified
whether dependent variables were normally distributed with the Shapiro-Wilk test. It
returned p = 7.7 ∗ 10−3 for security controls and p = 0.51 for threats. Therefore, this
assumption is met only for threats.
Since all ANOVA assumptions are satisfied for threats, we applied it to test the effec-
tiveness of visual and textual methods with respect to the number of identified threats.
For the security controls we used the Friedman test.
The results of reports analysis show that the visual method is more effective in identify-
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Table 6.8: ANOVA for Threats – Experiment 2.2
(a) All Threats
Variable DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F-value P-value
Group 14 439.0 31.36 2.047 0.040164 *
Method 1 260.4 260.42 17.003 0.000195 ***
Task 3 431.1 143.70 9.383 9.01e-05 ***
Method:Task 3 12.7 4.24 0.277 0.841597
Residuals 38 582.0 15.32
(b) Good Threats
Variable DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F-value P-value
Group 5 257.00 51.40 3.812 0.030034 *
Method 1 294.00 294.00 21.805 0.000683 ***
Task 3 142.87 47.62 3.532 0.051995 •
Method:Task 3 18.32 6.11 0.453 0.720511
Residuals 11 148.31 13.48
• - p value <0.1, * - p <0.05, ** - p <0.01, *** - p <0.001
Table 6.9: Friedman test for Threats – Experiment 2.2
Variable Chi-square DF F-value P-value
Method (all threats) 5.4 1 7.875 0.0089 **
Task (all threats) 12.66 3 5.48 0.0029 **
Method (good threats) 15 1 Inf 0.0000 ***
Task (good threats) 8.71 3 3.36 0.0469 *
• - p value <0.1, * - p <0.05, ** - p <0.01, *** - p <0.001
Table 6.10: Friedman test for Security Controls – Experiment 2.2
Variable Chi-square DF F-value P-value
Method (all controls) 0.692 1 0.68 0.4172
Task (all controls) 7.152 3 2.65 0.0614 •
Method (good controls) 9 1 19.29 0.0071 **
Task (good controls) 27.85 3 22.73 0.0145 *
• - p value <0.1, * - p <0.05, ** - p <0.01, *** - p <0.001
ing threats than the textual one. This result is confirmed for all groups (Figure 2.8 (left))
and good groups (Figure 2.8 (right)). The results of the ANOVA test (Table 6.8) show
that the effect of the applied methods on the number of identified threats is statistically
significant for all groups and good groups. The results of the Friedman test in Table 6.9
show that this is statistically significant for both all groups and good groups.
However, as it shown in Figure 6.2, the textual method is slightly better than the
visual one in identifying security controls and this is true for controls of any quality and
good ones. The results of the Friedman test in Table 6.10 shows that the difference is
not statistically significant for all controls, but it is statistically significant for specific
controls.
Questionnaire Analysis: We have analyzed the responses to post-task questionnaire
to determine if there is a difference in participants’ perception of visual and textual
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The textual method performed slightly better in security controls identification in both cases of all and good groups.
However, the difference is statistically significant for good groups, but not for all groups (Friedman test)
Figure 6.2: Numbers of Identified Security Controls by Quality – Experiment 2.2
methods. All participants independently answered same post-task questionnaire about
each method. Full questionnaire is reported in Section 6.4. We collected two paired
samples of answers about both methods from our participants. Questions were formulated
in an opposite statements format (positive statement on the right and negative statement
on the left) with answers on a 5-point Likert scale. Therefore, to test the answers of
participants we need to use the Wilcoxon test because responses are paired and have
ordinal values. As our samples had ties, we have used the exact Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test with Wilcoxon method for handling ties [9].
The analysis results are summarized and compared in Table 6.11. For each question,
the table reports to which perception variable the question refers to (PEOU, PU, ITU),
the median of answers by all and by good participants (the one who were part of groups
that produced good quality threats and security controls based on experts’ assessment),
and the level of statistical significance based on the p-value returned by the Wilcoxon
test. The table also reports the average of responses for each perception variable and for
all questions related to perception (Q1-Q12).
6.2.3 Qualitative Analysis
For a better understanding of which features influence visual and textual methods effec-
tiveness, we complemented our experiment by interviewing each participant for half an
hour. Similar to the first experiment, the interview transcripts were analyzed by using
coding technique. Table 6.12 presents the categories and the frequency of statements
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Table 6.11: Wilcoxon Test of Responses of All and Good Participants – Experiment 2.2
The level of statistical significance is specified by • (p<0.1), or * (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).
All participants Good participants
Q Type Median Z Median Z
Textual Visual Textual Visual
With Group 2
1 PEOU 3 4 -0.89 2.5 4 -2.14 *
2 PU 3 4 -2.07 * 3 4 -0.64
3 PEOU 3 3.5 0.35 4 4 -0.69
4 ITU 3 3 -0.23 3 4 -1.5
5 PU 3 3 0.25 3 4 -2.27 *
6 ITU 3 3 0.02 2.5 3 -1.26
7 PEOU 3 3 -0.22 3 3 0
8 PU 4 4 0.43 4 4 0
9 ITU 3 4 -0.94 3 4 -1.26
10 PEOU 4 4 -0.49 4 4 0.19
11 PU 3 3 -0.41 3 3.5 -1
12 ITU 3 4 -0.83 3 4 -1
13 Control 4 4 -0.19 4 4 -1.73
14 Control 4 4 3.13 *** 5 4 2.27 *
15 Control 4 4 0.9 5 4 1.34
16 Control 3 4 -2.49 * 3 4 -1.81
17 Control 3 4 -1.67 3 4 -2.33 *
PEOU 3 3 -0.74 3.5 4 -1.65 •
PU 3 4 -1.03 3 4 -1.97 •
ITU 3 3 -0.96 3 4 -2.46 *
Without Group 2
1 PEOU 3 4 -0.9 2.5 4 -2.2 *
2 PU 3 4 -1.7 3.5 4 0.11
3 PEOU 3 3.5 0.18 4 4 -1.09
4 ITU 3 3 -0.23 3 4 -1.5
5 PU 3 3 0.39 3 4 -2.07 •
6 ITU 3 3 0.17 3 3 -1
7 PEOU 3 3 -0.64 3.5 3.5 -0.63
8 PU 4 4 1.11 4 4 1.34
9 ITU 3 4 -0.97 3 4 -1.41
10 PEOU 4 4 -0.49 4 4 0.19
11 PU 3 3 -0.41 3 3.5 -1
12 ITU 3 4 -0.95 3 4 -1.2
13 Control 4 4 0.29 4 4 -1.19
14 Control 4 4 3.05 ** 4.5 4 2.12 •
15 Control 4 4 0.9 5 4 1.34
16 Control 3 4 -2.28 * 3 3.5 -1.51
17 Control 3 4 -1.34 3 4 -1.89
PEOU 3 3.5 -1.02 4 4 -2.13 *
PU 3 4 -0.46 3 4 -1.19
ITU 3 3 -0.97 3 4 -2.52 *
in each category made by the participants. We report here only categories for which
participants made at least 10 statements.
Perceived Ease of Use: Here we discuss the aspects reported by participants related
to PEOU with respect to findings of our first experiment (see Section 6.1.4). Ease of use
and remember is very important aspect of methods’ success and participants supported
this fact (35% of positive statements made by participants related to this PEOU aspect).
If in the first experiment participants thought that textual method (SREP) is better
than visual method (CORAS) with respect to ease of use and understand, than in the
second experiment they changed their opinion and reported that visual method is a “good
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Table 6.12: Positive and Negative Aspects Influencing Method Perception – Experiment 2.2
(a) PEOU
PEOU Category Vis. Text. Total
Positive Aspects
Clear process 12 16 28
Easy to use and remember 17 11 28
Support visual summary 24 0 24
Total Pos PEOU 53 27 80
Negative Aspects
No clear process 2 11 13
Primitive tool 20 0 20
Too time consuming 11 9 20
Total Neg PEOU 33 20 53
Total PEOU 86 47 133
(b) PU
PU Category Vis. Text. Total
Positive Aspects
Help to understand interdependen-
cies
6 7 13
Help in brainstorming threats 21 15 36
Help in brainstorming sec. ctrls 12 24 36
Total Pos PU 39 46 85
Negative Aspects
No help in brainstorming sec. ctrls 9 1 10
Visual summary does not scale 10 0 10
Total Neg PU 19 1 20
Total PU 58 47 105
methodology, not difficult to use. It is much clear to understand the security case there”.
Clear process is one of the main aspects related to PEOU reported by participants. As
in our first experiment, participants think that visual method has a clear process (23% of
positive statements on visual method’s PEOU), and they have no consensus about clear
process of the textual method. Participants made the following statements about clear
process of methods: “Well defined steps. Clear process to follow” (SREP).
Primitive tool. This category demonstrated greater impact on method’s PEOU in
the second experiment: 23% of all negative statements was made about CORAS tool.
The major problems reported were bad memory usage that makes the tool too slow and
the modeling feature of the tool that does not provide automatic support for diagrams
generation (e.g. generating a treatment diagram from a threat diagram). Examples of
typical statements for this category were: “The tool is not difficult to use but it is very
slow. It is impossible to copy a diagram from a type of diagram to another. Objects
have no references between the diagrams. Changes on an object in a diagram are not
reflected on the same object in other diagrams.” and “The tool takes too much to arrange
things. Drawing assets and threats is not easy. When the diagrams are too large, the tool
occupies too much memory”.
Visual summary. There is no surprise in this PEOU category. Like in the first ex-
periment we observed the strong positive impact (45% of positive statements on visual
method’s PEOU) of visual summary on methods’ perception. Indeed, diagrams give an
overview of assets, possible threats scenarios and treatments. A typical statement made by
participants referring to this advantage was: “Diagrams are useful. You have an overview
of the possible threat scenarios and you can find links among the scenarios”.
Perceived Usefulness: Here we discuss aspects reported by participants related to
PU with respect to findings of our first experiment.
Help in identifying threats and Help in identifying security controls. In the second
experiment participants classified visual method as helpful in identification of threats (54%
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of positive statements on visual method’s PU): “Yes it helped to identify which are the
threats. In CORAS method everything is visualized. The diagrams helped brainstorming
on threats." While the textual method according to participants is helpful in identification
of security controls (53% of positive statements on textual method’s PU): “SREP helped
in brainstorming. The steps were pretty much defined. Step by step helped to discover
more” and “SREP helped in brainstorming. The order of the steps helped to identify
security requirements”.
Visual summary does not scale. Participants of the second experiment also admitted
that visual notation does not scale well for complex scenarios (53% of negative statements
on visual method’s PU). Typical statements in this category were: “The diagrams are not
scalable when there are too many links” and “For big systems the diagrams would be very
large. Even with the support of the computer it would be difficult to see them”.
6.3 Experiment 2.3
The goal of the third experiment was to generalize the previous results and investigated
different textual method. As instance of textual method we selected SecRAM [21], an
industrial method used by EUROCONTROL to conduct SRA in the air traffic manage-
ment domain (ATM). SecRAM supports SRA process for a project initiated by an air
navigation service provider, or ATM project, system or facility. It provides a systematic
approach to conduct SRA which consists of five main steps: defining the scope of the sys-
tem, assessing the impact of a successful attack, estimating the likelihood of a successful
attack, assessing the security risk to the organization or project, and defining and agreeing
a set of management options. As shown in Figure 6.3b) tables are used to represent the
results of each step’s execution in contrast to the CORAS which uses diagrams for this
purpose (see Figure 6.3a).
6.3.1 Experiment Execution
Table 6.13 shows the timeline and details of the execution of the second experiment.
To ensure a sufficient number of observations to produce significant conclusions we
chose a within-subjects design where all participants apply both methods. To avoid
learning effects participants identified threats and controls for the two different tasks of
the Smart Grid application scenario. Participants were randomly assigned to treatments:
one half of participants applied first the visual method to Network Security task and then
the textual method for the Web Application and Database Security task, while the other
half applied methods in the opposite order. Table 6.14 shows for each task the number of
participants assigned to visual and textual methods.
The post-task questionnaire distributed at the step M3 was revised and extended
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(a) CORAS - Threat Diagram
Threat
Agent
Asset At-
tacked
Attack
Likelihood
Justification
Compromised
MPO
SM, EMS Probable Can use message replay attack and access customer
data.
Malicious at-
tacker
EMS, HAN,
SA, S&C
Probable By Eavesdropping and Sniffing on the HAN, can use
DoS attack to deny availability of HAN, Hacking the
EMS and tampering the S&C and accessing the SA.
(b) SECRAM - Threat Agent Table
Figure 6.3: Examples of Visual (CORAS) and Textual (SecRAM) Methods’ Artifacts Generated by
Participants
version of the questionnaire from the second experiment. The questionnaire consisted
of 31 questions which were formulated in an opposite statements (positive statement on
the right and negative statement on the left) format with answers on a 5-point Likert
scale. To prevent participants from “auto-pilot” answering, 15 out of 31 questions were
given with the most positive response on the left and the most negative on the right. The
questionnaire is reported in Table 6.18 in Section 6.4.
Similar to the second experiment, at the step M4 we conducted individual interviews
with participants to collect their perception of the methods. The questions are reported
in Section 6.5.
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Table 6.13: Execution Details – Experiment 2.3
Step Date Description
Training
E1 October 2013 Participants attended lectures on the application scenario (2 hours).
E2 October 2013 Participants attended lectures about the methods (2 hours for each method).
M1 October 2013 Distribution of background and demographics questionnaire.
Participants received individual assignments.
Application session was repeated for each task, i.e. we had two application sessions.
2013 Participants attended lecture on the threats and possible security controls specific for the task
but not concretely applied to the scenario (2 hours).
E31 2013 Groups had 2 weeks to identify threats and security controls specific for the task using the assigned
method.
E41 2013 Groups gave a 10 minutes presentation of preliminary results of the methods application and
received feedback from the trainer.
E31 2013 Groups had one week to deliver an intermediate report to get feedback.
Evaluation
E5 January 2014 Groups delivered final reports.
E4 Mid January 2014 Groups gave a presentation summarizing their work in front of the experimenters and of the
domain expert.
M6 Mid January 2014 Domain expert evaluated the quality of the threats and the security controls proposed by groups.
M3 January 2014 Distribution of online post-task questionnaire about participants’ perception of the methods.
M4 January 2014 Participants shared their perception of the methods during the individual interview with one of
the experimenters.
Table 6.14: Experimental Design – Experiment 2.3
Scenario MethodVisual Textual
Network 14 15
WebApp/DB 15 14
6.3.2 Quantitative Analysis
Report Analysis: Since a method is effective based not only on the quantity of results,
but also on their quality, we asked two domain experts to independently evaluate each
individual report. To evaluate the quality of threats and security controls experts used a
four item scale: Unclear (1), Generic (2), Specific (3) and Valuable (4). In terms of the
final assessment we observed that:
• the experts marked bad participants the same way,
• they consistently marked moderately good participants,
• a couple of participants were border line. In other words their threats and controls
were neither definitely good nor bad.
• they had a different evaluation only for 3 out of 29 participants. This may be ex-
plained by different expertise of the domain experts: more management and seniority
of one expert, more operational and junior other expert.
In order to validate whether the difference in experts’ evaluation is statistically signif-
icant we run the Wilcoxon paired test. The results show that there are no statistically
significant differences in the evaluations of two experts (p = 0.58).
111
CHAPTER 6. DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL DATA FOR CHAPTER 2
Expert Assessment on Threats
Ex
pe
rt 
As
se
ss
m
en
t o
n 
Se
c.
 C
trl
s
1 (Unclear) 2 (Generic) 3 (Specific) 4 (Valuable)
1 
(U
nc
lea
r)
2 
(G
en
eri
c)
3 
(S
pe
cif
ic)
8
3
1
1
6
5 1
2
2
5
1
1
2
1
2
9
2
2
2
2
Figure 6.4: Overall Experts Assessment of Threats and Security Controls for the Two Tasks – Experiment
2.3
Figure 6.4 illustrates the average of the evaluation of two experts for all participants.
As each participant applied one of the methods on both tasks, there are 58 method
applications in total. The number inside each bubble denotes the number of methods’ ap-
plications which achieved a given assessment for threats (reported on x-axis) and security
controls (reported on y-axis). There were 24 method applications that generated some
good threats and/or security controls. The remaining methods’ applications delivered
unclear and/or generic threats and security controls. We evaluated actual effectiveness of
methods based on the number of good threats and security controls. In what follows, we
will compare the results of all methods’ applications with the results of those applications
that produce good threats and security controls.
As the design of our experiment is two-factor (the method and the task), we could
use the two-way ANOVA test or Friedman test (non-parametric analog of the ANOVA)
to analyze the number of threats and security controls identified with each method and
within each task. We have observation independence by design because participants’
worked individually. This gave us independence within sample and mutual independence
within sample, as tasks were different. We checked the homogeneity of variance with
the Levene’s test. This test returned p equal to 0.27 for threats and 0.52 for security
controls. Therefore, we can assume homogeneity of variance for our samples. To check
the distribution normality we used the Shapiro-Wilk normality test. This test returned p
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Figure 6.5: Numbers of Identified Security Controls by Quality – Experiment 2.3
= 0.01 for threats and 0.93 for security controls. So, normality assumption holds only for
security controls.
Based on these results, we could use the Friedman test to analyze the difference in
the number of threats and ANOVA test for security controls. However, since we also
considered good results, we had unbalanced samples because some participants produced
good threats and security controls for the application of one method while for the other
method they did not. Therefore, we used the analog of the Friedman test, Skilling-Mack
test [6], that can work with unbalanced samples for the analysis of difference in the number
of threats, and the ANOVA test with Type II of Sum of Squares [60] for the analysis of
difference in the number of security controls. The results related to threats identification
are reported in Figure 2.9 in Section 2.7.
The results of reports analysis show that the textual method is more effective in iden-
tifying threats than the textual one for good participants only (Figure 2.9 (right)). But
the results of the Skillings–Mack test did not confirm this (test returned p = 0.17).
Figure 6.5 shows that visual and textual methods produce the same number of security
controls. This is attested also by the results of the statistical tests which showed there
was no statistically significant difference in the number of security controls of any quality
(Friedman test returned p = 0.57) and specific security controls (ANOVA test returned
p = 0.72).
We also found that there is no statistically significance difference in the number of
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threats and controls identified by participants within each security task.
Questionnaire Analysis: We compare answers of all participants with answers of
those participants whose methods applications produced specific threats and/or security
controls (denoted as good participants in what follows). We analyzed answers of all par-
ticipants with the Wilcoxon test since the data are ordinal and responses of participants
are paired. Instead, we used the MW test to analyze the answers of participants who
produced specific results because some observations were unpaired. Since the MW test
requires homogeneity of variance of samples, we checked this assumption. The Levene’s
test revealed that in general the variances of our samples are equal (p = 0.95). However,
there is no equal variance for responses on overall PEOU of method (p = 0.036). Thus,
we could not consider the results of the MW test of this category as valid.
Table 6.15 presents the results of questionnaire analysis. For each question, the table
reports to which perception variable the question refers to (PEOU, PU, ITU), the mean
of answers, and Z statistics returned by the test and the level of statistical significance
based on the p-value returned by the test.
6.3.3 Qualitative Analysis
The interview transcripts were coded and analyzed using the list of core codes from the
second experiment. Table 6.16 reports the positive and negative aspects of visual and
textual methods that may affect PEOU and PU and other aspects that may influence
methods’ success. For each aspect we report the total number of statements made by
participants as relative indicator of its importance. Here we report only the aspects for
which participants made at least 10 statements.
Perceived Ease of Use: The main aspect influencing PEOU of visual method is that
it provides a visual summary of the results of security analysis (29% of positive statements
made by participants on visual method’s PEOU). Examples of these statements are: “there
are many summary diagrams which are useful to summarize what has been done” and “the
advantage is the visualization”. Another noteworthy positive aspect for visual method’s
PEOU is that the visual method has clear process (19% of positive statements):“The
advantages of CORAS is very clear structure”. Instead, the main aspects that can affect
negatively the visual method’s PEOU are that it is a time consuming method and it has a
primitive tool (26% of negative statements). As participants indicated “the diagrams are
really time consuming” and “first I tried the CORAS tool. And somehow, it was confusing.
So, I switched to the Visio”. Another negative aspect for visual method’s PEOU is that
the process has redundant steps (17% of negative statements): “I think CORAS has some
duplications.”.
The main positive aspect for the textual method’s PEOU is time effectiveness (26%
of positive statements): “I used very little time to do my work ”. Instead, there is no
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Table 6.15: Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon Tests of Responses of All and Good Participants – Experiment
2.3
The level of statistical significance is specified by • (p<0.1), or * (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).
All participants Good participants
Q Type Mean ZW ZMW Mean ZMW
Tex Vis Tex Vis
Q1 PU 4 4 -1.66 • -1.63 • 4 4 -1.54
Q2 Control 4 4 0.07 -0.1 4 4 -0.41
Q3 Control 4 4 -0.37 -0.75 4 4 -0.75
Q4 PU 3 4 -2.37 * -2.15 * 4 4 -1.34
Q5 PU 3 4 -2.03 * -1.53 3 3 -0.47
Q6 PEOU 3 4 -2.7 * -2.84 *** 3 4 -1.57
Q7 PEOU 3 4 -2.42 * -2.5 * 3 4 -1.42
Q8 PU 4 4 -1.79 • -1.69 • 4 4 -1.38
Q9 PEOU 2 4 -3.33 *** -2.98 *** 2 4 -2.03 •
Q10 PU 3 4 -2.36 * -2.63 * 3 4 -2.04 •
Q11 PU 3 4 -2.15 * -1.89 • 3 3 -0.78
Q12 PU 3 4 0.61 0.09 3 3 -0.67
Q13 PU 3 3 0.41 0.06 3 3 -0.2
Q14 PU 4 4 -0.88 -0.73 4 4 -0.82
Q15 ITU 3 4 -1.83 • -1.97 • 3 3 -0.55
Q16 ITU 4 4 -0.57 -0.66 4 4 -0.91
Q17 Control 3 4 -3.32 *** -3.42 *** 2 4 -1.93 •
Q18 Control 3 4 -2.73 * -2.66 * 3 4 -0.98
Q19 ITU 3 4 -2.26 * -2.14 * 3 4 -1.85 •
Q20 ITU 3 4 -1.55 -1.39 3 4 -1.08
Q21 Control 4 3 1.95 • 1.89 • 3 3 -0.16
Q22 PU 3 3 -1.11 -0.89 3 3 -1.45
Q23 ITU 3 4 -1.52 -1.53 3 3 -0.95
Q24 ITU 3 4 -1.03 -1.05 3 3 -0.9
Q25 PU 3 4 -2.02 • -1.63 3 4 -1.61
Q26 PU 3 4 -1.39 -1.47 3 4 -1.03
Q27 PEOU 3 4 -2.73 * -2.78 * 3 4 -1.9 •
Q28 ITU 3 4 -1.19 -1.22 3 4 -1.31
Q29 ITU 3 4 -0.14 -0.39 3 3 -0.59
Q30 PEOU 3 4 -2.78 * -1.91 • 2 3 -1.06
Q31 PEOU 3 4 -2.39 * -2.07 * 2 4 -2.19 *
PEOU 3 4 -6.51 *** -6.16 *** 2.5 4 -4.19 ***
PU 3 4 -4.82 *** -4.56 *** 3 4 -3.88 ***
ITU 3 4 -3.57 *** -3.67 *** 3 4 -2.94 ***
consensus among participants about other two aspects: clear process and ease of use. In
fact, participants made a similar number of statements that indicate these aspects as both
positive and negative: “it’s quite easy” (positive statement) and “it was sometimes a bit
confusing how to apply the methodology” (negative statement).
The main negative aspect (28% of negative statements) impacting textual method’s
PEOU is related to poor worked examples illustrating method application. As participants
reported “the main problem was about the example that it uses - instead of defining in
more general way, and you are misguided by this example”.
Perceived Usefulness: There are two main aspects that could positively affect PU
of visual method: help in identifying threats (55% of positive statements) and security
controls (31% of positive statements): “when you’re doing a diagram you can actually see
the flaw of the actions and it is easy to identify the threats, the attacks” and “I find it good
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Table 6.16: Positive and Negative Aspects Influencing Method Perception – Experiment 2.3
(a) PEOU
PEOU Category Vis. Text. Total
Positive Aspects
Clear Process 28 18 46
Visual summary 43 43
Time effective 7 16 23
Easy to Understand 18 18
Worked examples 12 4 16
Easy for Customer 13 2 15
Total Pos PEOU 121 40 161
Negative Aspects
Time consuming 36 7 43
Unclear Process 4 28 32
Primitive Tool 30 30
Poor worked examples 2 27 29
Not easy to Use 6 18 24
Redundant Steps 19 4 23
No Evolution Support 15 2 17
Not easy to Understand 3 11 14
Total Neg PEOU 115 97 212
Total PEOU 236 137 373
(b) PU and Other
PU Category Vis. Text. Total
Positive Aspects
Help in Identifying Threats 39 18 57
Help in Identifying Security Con-
trols
22 16 38
Help to Model 10 2 12
Total Pos PU 71 36 107
Negative Aspects
No Help in Identifying Security
Controls
9 16 25
No Tool Support 21 21
Visual Complexity 17 17
Total Neg PU 26 37 63
Total PU 97 73 170
Other Category Vis. Text. Total
Positive Aspects
Catalog of Sec. Controls 23 31 54
Catalog of Threats 30 29 59
Total Pos Other 53 60 113
for finding some security requirements and risk ”. The negative aspect for visual method
PU is that visual notation does not scale well for complex scenarios (65% of negative
statements): “these diagrams are getting soon very huge and very complex ”.
Similarly, the main positive aspect for textual method PU is that “it has detailed steps
and helps to identify assets, threat agents and management options” (50% of positive
statements). Instead, there is no consensus among participants about the textual method
helping in the identification of security controls. In fact, they made equal number of pos-
itive and negative statements about this aspect. Here are examples of typical statements
made by participants about it: “After we already known that our system description, the
vulnerabilities, the threat or agents is easy to identify the control.” (positive statement)
or “ I can’t say that they allow you to find the threat, the security control, whatever you
want. It’s just a framework to help you.” (negative statement).
The most significant negative aspect mentioned for textual method’s PU is the fact
there is no software supporting execution of the textual method’s steps: “It is needed
because it would save half of the time if the table were generated automatically” (57% of
positive statements).
Other Relevant Aspects: In participants’ interview we also identified other possible
aspect influencing methods’ success. Participants think that both methods would benefit
from availability of catalogues of threats and security controls: “I think that SecRAM
could just employ some catalog by default.”.
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6.4 Post-Task Questionnaires
Table 6.17: Post-Task Questionnaire – Experiment 2.2
Left statement 1 2 3 4 5 Right statement
Q1.I found X hard to use m m m m m I found X easy to use
Q2. X made the security analysis easier than an ad
hoc approach
m m m m m X made the security analysis harder than an ad hoc
approach
Q3. X was difficult to master m m m m m X was easy to master
Q4. If I need to identify threats and security require-
ments in a future project course, I would not use X
m m m m m If I need to identify threats and security requirements
in a future project course I would use X
Q5. I would have found threats and security require-
ments more quickly using common sense
m m m m m X made me find threats and security requirements
more quickly than using common sense
Q6. If I need to identify threats and security require-
ments in a future project at work, I would avoid X if
possible
m m m m m If I need to identify threats and security requirements
in a future project at work, I would use X if possible
Q7. I was often confused about how to apply X to
the problem
m m m m m I was never confused about how to apply X to the
problem
Q8. X made the search for threats and security re-
quirements less systematic
m m m m m X made the search for threats and security require-
ments more systematic
Q9. If a company I’m employed by in the future dis-
cusses what technique to introduce for early security
analysis argue and someone suggests X, I would be
against that
m m m m m If a company I’m employed by in the future discusses
what technique to introduce for early security analysis
and someone suggests X, I would support that
Q10. X will be easy to remember (in case I must use
it again in the future)
m m m m m X will be hard to remember (in case I must use it
again in the future)
Q11. X made me less productive in finding threats
and security requirements
m m m m m X made me more productive in finding threats and
security requirements
Q12. If working as a freelance consultant for a cus-
tomer who needs help finding security threats and se-
curity requirements to his software, I would not use
X in discussions with that customer
m m m m m If working as a freelance consultant for a customer
who needs help finding security threats and security
requirements to his software, I would like to use X in
discussions with that customer
Q13. X process is well detailed m m m m m X process is not well detailed
Q14. A catalog of threats would have made the iden-
tification of threats easier with X
m m m m m A catalog of threats would have made the identifica-
tion of threats harder with X
Q15. A catalog of security requirements would have
made the identification of security requirements easier
with X
m m m m m A catalog of security requirements would have made
the identification of security requirements harder with
X
Q16. X helped me in brainstorming on the threats
for the tasks
m m m m m X did not help me in brainstorming on the threats for
the tasks
Q17. X helped me in brainstorming on the security
requirements for the tasks
m m m m m X did not help me from brainstorming on the security
requirements for the tasks
Q18.* CORAS tool is hard to use m m m m m CORAS tool is easy to use
Q19. The first task (Management) was very hard m m m m m The first task (Management) was very easy
Q20. The second task (WebApp/DB) was very hard m m m m m The second task (WebApp/DB) was very easy
Q21. The third task (Net/Telecom) was very hard m m m m m The third task (Net/Telecom) was very easy
Q22. The fourth task (Mobile) was very hard m m m m m The fourth task (Mobile) was very easy
* - This question is asked only in the questionnaire about CORAS
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Table 6.18: Post-Task Questionnaire – Experiment 2.3 (Part 1)
Left statement 1 2 3 4 5 Right statement
Q1.The method defines the right level of granularity
of asset, security risk and security control.
m m m m m The method defines the wrong level of granularity of
asset, security risk and security control.
Q2. A catalog of threats would have made harder the
identification of threats with this method.
m m m m m A catalog of threats would have made easier the iden-
tification of threats with this method.
Q3. A catalog of security controls would have made
easier the identification of security controls with this
method.
m m m m m A catalog of security controls would have made
harder the identification of security controls with this
method.
Q4. Overall, I think the method provide an effective
solution to the identification of security risks
m m m m m Overall, I think the method does not provide an ef-
fective solution to the identification of security risks
Q5. Overall, I think the method does not provide
an effective solution to the identification of security
controls
m m m m m Overall, I think the method provides an effective so-
lution to the identification of security controls
Q6. I found the method easy to adopt and use to
different contexts.
m m m m m I found the method hard to adopt and use to different
contexts.
Q7. Overall, I found this method difficult to use m m m m m Overall, I found this method easy to use
Q8. Overall, I found this method to be useless m m m m m Overall, I found this method to be useful
Q9. I found the procedure for applying the method
complex and difficult to follow
m m m m m I found the procedure for applying the method simple
and easy to follow
Q10. Using this method would make harder to iden-
tify security risks specific for the context.
m m m m m Using this method would make easier to identify se-
curity risks specific for the context.
Q11. Using this method would make easier to iden-
tify security controls specific for the context.
m m m m m Using this method would make harder to identify se-
curity controls specific for the context.
Q12. I believe that this method would reduce the
effort required to identify security risks of complex
systems
m m m m m I believe that this method would increase the effort
required to identify security risks of complex systems
Q13. I believe that this method would increase the
effort required to identify security controls of complex
systems
m m m m m I believe that this method would reduce the effort
required to identify security controls of complex sys-
tems
Q14. Using this method would make harder to find
the most complete set of security risks.
m m m m m Using this method would make easier to find the most
complete set of security risks.
Q15. If working as a freelance consultant for a cus-
tomer who needs help in identification of security risks
to his software, I would not use the method in discus-
sions with that customer
m m m m m If working as a freelance consultant for a customer
who needs help in identification of security risks to
his software, I would use the method in discussions
with that customer
Q16. If working as a freelance consultant for a cus-
tomer who needs help in identification of security con-
trols to his software, I would use the method in dis-
cussions with that customer
m m m m m If working as a freelance consultant for a customer
who needs help in identification of security controls
to his software, I would not use the method in discus-
sions with that customer
Q17. Using this method would make harder to com-
pare security risks identified in the risk assessment
with security risks identified by other methods.
m m m m m Using this method would make easier to compare se-
curity risks identified in the risk assessment with se-
curity risks identified by other methods.
Q18. Using this method would make easier to com-
pare security controls identified in the risk assessment
with security controls identified by other methods.
m m m m m If a company I’m employed by in the future discusses
what technique to introduce for identification of secu-
rity risks and someone suggests the method, I would
support that
Q19. If a company I’m employed by in the future dis-
cusses what technique to introduce for identification
of security risks and someone suggests the method, I
would be against that
m m m m m If a company I’m employed by in the future discusses
what technique to introduce for identification of secu-
rity risks and someone suggests the method, I would
support that
Q20. If a company I’m employed by in the future dis-
cusses what technique to introduce for security con-
trols identification and someone suggests the method,
I would support that
m m m m m If a company I’m employed by in the future discusses
what technique to introduce for identification of se-
curity controls and someone suggests the method, I
would be against that
Q21. Using this method would make easier to update
the risk assessment when something changes.
m m m m m Using this method would make harder to update the
risk assessment when something changes.
Q22. The method makes the traceability of security
controls down to security risk and assets harder.
m m m m m The method makes the traceability of security con-
trols down to security risk and assets easier.
Q23. If I need to identify security risks in future
project at work, I would avoid the method if possible
m m m m m If I need to identify security risks in a future project
at work, I would use the method if possible
Q24. If I need to identify security controls in a future
project at work, I would use the method if possible
m m m m m If I need to identify security controls in a future
project at work, I would avoid the method if possible
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Table 6.19: Post-Task Questionnaire – Experiment 2.3 (Part 2)
Left statement 1 2 3 4 5 Right statement
Q25. I believe that this method would make easier
to find cost effective mitigation of security risks to an
acceptable level
m m m m m I believe that this method would make harder to find
cost effective mitigation of security risks to an accept-
able level
Q26. The method made me more productive in iden-
tification of security risks
m m m m m The method made me less productive in identification
of security risks
Q27. I found the method difficult to learn m m m m m I found the method easy to learn
Q28. If I need to identify security risks in a future
study project, I would use the method if possible
m m m m m If I need to identify security risks in a future study
project, I would avoid the method if possible
Q29. If I need to identify security controls in a future
study project, I would avoid the method if possible
m m m m m If I need to identify security controls in a future study
project, I would use the method if possible
Q30. I am not confident that I am now competent to
apply this method in practice
m m m m m I am confident that I am now competent to apply this
method in practice
Q31. The method will be easy to remember (in case
I must use it again in the future)
m m m m m The method will be hard to remember (in case I must
use it again in the future)
6.5 Interview Guide
Table 6.20 presents the questions that were asked both for the visual (CORAS) and the
textual method (SREP or SecRAM) and mapping of the questions to the experiments.
Table 6.20: Interview Guide
Q# Question statement Exp. 2.2 Exp. 2.3
1 What do you think about method? × ×
2 Do you think the method is an easy method to apply? Why? ×
3 While applying the method where you got confused about how to apply it? ×
4 Do you think the method helps you brainstorming? Why? ×
5 Do you think the method helped you to identify threats? × ×
5.1 Do you think the method helped you to identify threats in a reasonable time? ×
5.2 Do you think a catalog of threats would have made the identification easier? Did
you use any catalog? Which one?
×
6 Do you think the method helped you to identify security controls? × ×
6.1 Do you think the method helped you to identify security controls in a reasonable
time?
×
6.2 Do you think a catalog of security controls would have made the identification
easier? Did you use any catalog? Which one?
×
7 What are the advantages of the method? × ×
8 What are the disadvantages of the method? × ×
9 [CORAS only] Did you use CORAS tool? Which version of the CORAS tool did
you use? If not, what did you use to draw the diagrams?
× ×
10 [SecRAM only] Do you think tool support is needed for SecRAM? ×
11 What do you think are significant differences between the two methods? ×
12 Which task was according to you the most difficult? And why? ×
13 Can you suggest possible improvements for the method? ×
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Chapter 7
Additional Data for Chapter 3
7.1 Studies Using 5-item Likert Scale
In total our search returned 22 papers that were published in MISQ, 20 papers in ISR,
and 14 papers in ManSci journals. After checking the papers, we obtained a sample of 7
papers that reported descriptive statistics (incl. number of participants, mean and stan-
dard deviation of each group) of dependent variables on a 5-item Likert scale. Table 7.1
describes the final set of selected papers.
Table 7.1: Studies Using 5-item Likert Scale
Authors Title Journal Year Dependent variables #subj.
Ferratt
et al.
Synergy and Its Limits in Managing In-
formation Technology Professionals
ISR 2012 Job search behaviour 251
Gopal and
Koka
The asymmetric benefits of relational
flexibility: evidence from software devel-
opment outsourcing
MISQ 2013 Requirements Uncertainty; Human
Asset Specificity; Employee Turnover;
Client MIS Experience; Quality
105
Gove and
Parson
Is query reuse potentially harmful? An-
choring and adjustment in adapting ex-
isting database queries
ISR 2010 Reuse of queries results in higher con-
fidence in query correctness
157
Maruping
and Magni
Motivating Employees to Explore Collab-
oration Technology in Team Contexts
MISQ 2014 CT Exploration; Team Empowerment;
Continued Intention to Explore; Con-
tinued Expectation to Explore; Per-
ceived Usefulness; Facilitating Condi-
tions; Personal Innovativeness with IT;
Intention to Explore; Training; Task
Interdependence
212
Montizaan
et al.
The Impact of Negatively Reciprocal In-
clinations on Worker Behavior: Evidence
from a Retrenchment of Pension Rights
Man.
Sci.
2016 Negative reciprocity; Positive reci-
procity
5287
Phang
et al.
What Motivates Contributors vs. Lurk-
ers? An Investigation of Online Feedback
Forums
ISR 2016 Civic skill 101
Sutanto
et al.
Addressing the Personalization-Privacy
Paradox: An Empirical Assessment From
a Field Experiment on Smartphone Users
MISQ 2013 Excessive advertisements 60
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Table 7.2: Results of the Coding Analysis for Each Focus Group and Overall
Codes – Success Criteria FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 TOTAL
Applicable to different domains 4 0 0 3 7
* Appropriate to the problem 4 1 1 0 6
Assessment techniques 0 0 0 0 0
Catalogue of threats and security controls 3 0 1 1 5
Clear steps in the process 8 1 3 4 16
Comparability of results 5 2 0 7 14
Compliance with standards 8 0 3 1 12
Comprehensibility of method outcomes 3 7 2 2 14
* Cost effective 3 0 1 0 4
Coverage of results 0 2 0 5 7
Documentation templates 5 2 1 0 8
* Domain expertise is needed 1 3 0 3 7
* Easy to apply 5 2 0 4 11
* Effective risk mitigation 6 4 3 3 16
Evolution support 1 3 0 1 5
* Granularity 0 1 7 2 10
Help to identify threats 2 1 2 2 7
Holistic process 0 1 0 2 3
* Interoperability 1 5 2 1 9
* Learn new things 1 4 1 1 7
Modelling support 1 0 0 0 1
Practical guidelines 11 0 1 2 14
* Record failed attacks 1 0 2 0 3
* Security expertise is needed 2 2 0 1 5
Specific controls 4 1 5 2 12
Systematic listing 0 0 0 0 0
Time effective 4 4 0 1 9
Tool support 3 1 4 4 12
* Traceability 1 2 1 0 4
Visualization 0 1 1 0 2
Well defined terminology 5 6 1 2 14
Worked examples 3 0 1 0 4
TOTAL 95 56 43 54 248
Categories – Tasks FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 TOTAL
Finding information 16 9 10 8 43
Presenting-sharing information 9 16 7 3 35
Validating information 12 5 3 9 29
TOTAL 37 30 20 20 107
Note: ∗ marks codes different from Table 6.16.
Table 7.3: Focus Groups Interview Guide
Q# Question statement
1 What makes a security risk assessment methodology successful?
2 What are typical weaknesses of security risk assessment methodologies?
3 What factors influence your intention to use a methodology for security risk as-
sessment?
4 Is compliance with your organizational requirements and procedures, an aspect
that you consider when you select the security risk assessment methodology to
use?
5 What makes a security risk assessment methodology easy to use?
6 What makes a security risk assessment methodology effective? (e.g in terms of
identification of threats, security controls)
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Figure 7.1: Quality Evaluation Guidelines for Experts
Table 7.4: Post-task Questionnaire
Table reports post-task questions and their perception type, PU or PEOU (questions about intention to use and
perceive leverage are omitted). Some questions do no specify whether the method was used for threats or for controls.
In that case we have used the corresponding answers for both threats and controls.
Q# Type Question (positive statement)
1 PEOU SecRAM helped me in brainstorming on the threats
2 PEOU SecRAM helped me in brainstorming on the security controls
3 PEOU I found SecRAM easy to use
4 PU SecRAM process is well detailed
5 PEOU SecRAM was difficult to master
6 PEOU I was never confused about how to apply SecRAM to the application
7 PU I would have found specific threats more quickly with the SecRAM
8 PU I would have found specific security controls more quickly with the Se-
cRAM
9 PU SecRAM made the security analysis more systematic
10 PEOU SecRAM made it easier to evaluate whether threats were appropriate to
the context
11 PEOU SecRAM made it easier to evaluate whether security controls were appro-
priate to the context
12 PU SecRAM made the search for specific threats more systematic
13 PU SecRAM made the search for specific security controls more systematic
14 PU If I need to update the analysis it will be easier with SecRAM than with
common sense
15 PU SecRAM made the security analysis easier than an ad hoc approach
16 PU SecRAM made me more productive in finding threats
17 PU SecRAM made me more productive in finding security controls
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Table 7.5: Participants, Their Results and Quality Assessment – Experiment 3.1 (Novices (Students))
Table presents the information about number of threats and security controls identified by participants and the
assessment from three ATM experts on the quality of threats and security controls. Note: T – threats, SC – security
controls.
ID Catalog Quantity Quality
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3
T SC T SC T SC T SC
G01 DOM CAT 17 32 3 3 2 2 2 2
G02 DOM CAT 53 61 4 3 3 3 3 3
G03 DOM CAT 35 145 4 4 4 4 4 4
G04 DOM CAT 28 55 4 3 3 4 3 3
G05 DOM CAT 15 16 3 3 3 3 5 5
G06 GEN CAT 18 42 3 4 3 3 4 4
G07 GEN CAT 36 26 3 4 3 4 3 3
G08 GEN CAT 44 44 2 3 4 4 3 3
G09 GEN CAT 30 33 3 4 3 3 3 4
Table 7.6: Participants, Their Results and Quality Assessment – Experiment 3.2 (ATM Professionals)
Table presents the information about security knowledge, working experience and degree of participants; number of
threats and security controls identified by participants and the assessment from two ATM experts on the quality of
threats and security controls. Note: T – threats, SC – security controls.
ID Security Working Education Catalog Quantity Quality
Knowl. Exp. Degree Expert 1 Expert 2
T SC T SC T SC
P01 No 6 MSC GEN CAT 17 28 2 2 3 3
P02 No 5 PHD GEN CAT 9 17 1 2 2 2
P03 Yes 4 MSC GEN CAT 27 50 4 4 4 3
P04 No 5 MSC GEN CAT 9 23 2 2 3 3
P05 Yes 4 PHD GEN CAT 9 15 3 3 3 3
P06 No 8 DIPLOMA DOM CAT 22 38 4 3 3 3
P07 No 4 MSC DOM CAT 7 14 2 2 2 2
P08 No 5 PHD DOM CAT 24 66 4 4 4 4
P09 Yes 2 MSC DOM CAT 24 45 5 4 5 4
P10 No 7 PHD DOM CAT 16 32 4 4 3 3
P11 No 5 MSC NO CAT 10 13 2 1 3 3
P12 Yes 14 PHD NO CAT 15 47 3 3 4 3
P13 Yes 17 MSC NO CAT 15 19 2 3 3 3
P14 Yes 18 MSC NO CAT 24 28 2 2 3 3
P15 Yes 15 MSC NO CAT 6 13 2 4 4 3
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Table 7.7: Responses to the Post-task Questions – Experiment 3.1
Table reports mean and median value of participants’ responses in the first experiment to each post-task question
and the type of the question.
Q# Type DOM CAT GEN CAT
Mean Median Mean Median
1 PEOU 3.4 4 3.625 3.5
2 PEOU 3.7 4 3.5 3.5
3 PEOU 3.5 4 4.25 4.5
4 PU 3.2 3.5 2.625 2.5
5 PEOU 3.8 4 3.875 4
6 PEOU 3.1 3.5 3.375 3.5
7 PU 3.5 3 3 3
8 PU 3.8 4 3.25 3
9 PU 3.9 4 3.625 4
10 PEOU 3.7 4 2.75 3
11 PEOU 3.7 4 3 3
12 PU 3.8 4 3.25 3
13 PU 3.8 4 3.625 4
14 PU 3.8 4 2.875 3
15 PU 3.6 3 3.125 3
16 PU 3.7 4 3 3
17 PU 3.9 4 3.375 3
Table 7.8: Responses to the Post-task Questions – Experiment 3.2
Table reports mean and median value of participants’ responses in the second experiment to each post-task question
and the type of the question.
Q# Type DOM CAT GEN CAT NO CAT
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1 PEOU 4.2 4 4 4 3.2 3
2 PEOU 4.2 4 3.2 4 3.2 3
3 PEOU 3.4 3 3.2 4 4.2 4
4 PU 3.4 4 3.4 3 3.8 4
5 PEOU 3 3 3.4 4 3.8 4
6 PEOU 2.8 3 2.6 3 4 4
7 PU 3.4 3 2.4 2 3.2 3
8 PU 3.8 4 2.4 2 3.2 3
9 PU 3.8 4 4.2 4 4.2 5
10 PEOU 3.2 3 3.4 4 3 3
11 PEOU 2.8 3 2.6 2 3 3
12 PU 3.8 4 3.8 4 3.6 3
13 PU 3.4 3 3.6 4 3.6 4
14 PU 4 4 3.6 4 4.6 5
15 PU 2.8 3 2.6 3 3.6 4
16 PU 4.2 4 3 4 3.4 4
17 PU 4 4 3.4 4 3.4 3
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Chapter 8
Additional Data for Chapter 4
Table 8.1: Post-Task Questionnaire
This is the post-task questionnaire that we distributed to the participants. Questions Q1-Q8 included closed answers
on a 5-point Likert scale: 0 – strongly agree, 1 – agree, 2 – not certain, 3 – disagree, and 4 – strongly disagree. Only
question Q9 had “yes” and “no” answers.
Q# Statement
Q1 I had enough time to perform the task
Q2 The objectives of the study were perfectly clear to me
Q3 The task I had to perform was perfectly clear to me
Q4 The comprehensibility questions were perfectly clear to me
Q5 I experienced no difficulty to answer the comprehensibility questions
Q6 I experienced no difficulty in understanding the risk model tables (diagrams)
Q7 I experienced no difficulty in using electronic version of the risk model tables
(diagrams)
Q8 I experienced no difficulty in using SurveyGizmo
Q9 [Tabular] Did you use search, or filtering, or sorting function in Excel or OpenOffice
document?
[Graphical] Did you use search in the PDF document?
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Figure 8.1: Risk Model for HCN Scenario in Tabular Notation Provided to the Participants
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Figure 8.2: Risk Model for HCN Scenario in Graphical Notation Provided to the Participants
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Table 8.2: Comprehension Questions for Graphical Risk Model – Study 4.1
This table presents the exact comprehension questionnaire that we provided to the participants of the first study with
graphical risk model.
Q# Complexity Question statement
1 2 Which threat scenarios can be initiated by exploiting vulnerability
“Insufficient routines”, according to the risk model? Please list all
threat scenarios:
2 4 Which unwanted incidents are possible as a result of exploit-
ing vulnerability “Lack of security awareness” by Cyber criminal?
Specify all unwanted incidents:
3 2 Which are the assets that can be harmed by the unwanted incident
“Unauthorized access to HCN”? Please list all assets:
4 2 What is the likelihood that unwanted incident “Unauthorized data
access” occurs? Specify the likelihood:
5 6 What is the highest possible consequence for the asset “Data con-
fidentiality” that Cyber criminal or Hacker can cause? Please
specify the consequence:
6 2 Which threats can exploit the vulnerability “Insufficient routines”?
Please specify all threats:
7 3 What are the vulnerabilities that can be exploited to initiate each
of the following threat scenarios: “HCN network infected by mal-
ware” and “Elevation of privilege”? Please list all vulnerabilities:
8 4 Which treatments are used to mitigate vulnerabilities “Insufficient
routines” or threat scenario “Elevation of privilege”? Please spec-
ify all treatments:
9 2 Which threats can attack the asset “Privacy”? Please specify all
threats:
10 4 Which threat scenarios can Cyber criminal initiate to harm the
asset “Data confidentiality”? Please list all threat scenarios:
11 4 Which treatments can be used to mitigate vulnerabilities exploited
by Cyber criminal to attack the asset “Privacy”? Please list all
treatments:
12 6 Which are the unwanted incidents that can be initiated by Hacker
or Cyber criminal and can occur, according to the risk model?
Please list all unwanted incidents:
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Table 8.3: Comprehension Questions for Graphical Risk Model – Study 4.2
This table presents the exact comprehension questionnaire that we provided to the participants of the second study
with graphical risk model.
Q# IC R J Question statement
1 1 1 - What are the consequences that can be caused for the asset “Avail-
ability of service”? Please specify the consequences that meet the
conditions.
2 1 1 - Which vulnerabilities can lead to the unwanted incident “Unau-
thorized transaction via Poste App”? Please list all vulnerabilities
that meet the conditions.
3 2 1 - Which assets can be impacted by Hacker or System failure? Please
list all unique assets that meet the conditions.
4 2 1 - Which unwanted incidents can be initiated by Cyber criminal with
consequence equal to “sever”? Please list all unwanted incidents
that meet the conditions.
5 2 2 - Which threat scenarios can be initiated by Cyber criminal to im-
pact the asset “Confidentiality of customer data”? Please list all
unique threat scenarios that meet the conditions.
6 2 2 - Which treatments can be used to mitigate attack paths caused
by any of the vulnerabilities “Poor security awareness” or “Lack
of mechanisms for authentication of app”? Please list all unique
treatments for all attack paths caused by any of the specified vul-
nerabilities.
7 1 1 1 What is the lowest consequence that can be caused for the asset
“User authenticity”? Please specify the consequence that meet the
conditions.
8 1 1 1 Which threats can impact assets with consequence equal to “se-
vere” or higher? Please list all threats that meet the conditions.
9 2 1 1 Which unwanted incidents can be initiated by Hacker with likeli-
hood equal to “likely” or higher? Please list all unwanted incidents
that meet the conditions.
10 2 1 1 What is the lowest likelihood of the unwanted incidents that can
be caused by any of the vulnerabilities “Use of web application”
or “Poor security awareness”? Please specify the lowest likelihood
of the unwanted incidents that can be initiated using any of the
specified vulnerabilities.
11 2 2 1 Which vulnerabilities can be exploited by Hacker to initiate
unwanted incidents with likelihood equal to “likely” or higher?
Please list all vulnerabilities that meet the conditions.
12 2 2 1 What is the lowest consequence of the unwanted incidents that
can be caused by Hacker and mitigated by treatment “Regularly
inform customers of security best practices”? Please specify the
lowest consequence that meets the conditions.
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Table 8.4: Precision and Recall by Questions – Study 4.1
The most significant difference (≥ 0.2) in precision was observed for Q1, Q6 and in recall for Q2, Q5-Q7, and Q10.
In all these questions tabular models showed better results. Column “∅” reports the number of empty responses to
a question which can be caused by task termination forced by SurveyGizmo due to time limit.
Q# Comp- Tabular Graphical
lexity #obs. ∅ mean med. sd #obs. ∅ mean med. sd
Precision
Q1 2 33 0 1.00 1.00 0.00 36 0 0.79 1.00 0.37
Q2 4 33 0 0.92 1.00 0.25 36 0 0.81 1.00 0.40
Q3 2 33 0 0.99 1.00 0.06 36 0 0.95 1.00 0.19
Q4 2 33 0 0.94 1.00 0.24 36 0 0.86 1.00 0.35
Q5 6 33 0 0.64 1.00 0.46 36 0 0.46 0.25 0.48
Q6 2 33 0 0.99 1.00 0.06 36 0 0.66 1.00 0.44
Q7 4 33 0 0.97 1.00 0.10 36 0 0.94 1.00 0.20
Q8 4 33 0 0.99 1.00 0.06 36 0 0.96 1.00 0.18
Q9 2 33 0 0.94 1.00 0.24 36 0 0.88 1.00 0.32
Q10 4 33 0 0.87 1.00 0.27 36 0 0.85 1.00 0.31
Q11 4 33 0 0.83 1.00 0.29 36 0 0.85 1.00 0.31
Q12 6 33 0 0.53 0.50 0.27 36 0 0.61 0.50 0.35
Overall 33 0 0.88 1.00 0.27 36 0 0.80 1.00 0.36
Recall
Q1 2 33 0 0.97 1.00 0.12 36 0 0.79 1.00 0.37
Q2 4 33 0 0.92 1.00 0.25 36 0 0.61 0.5 0.38
Q3 2 33 0 1.00 1.00 0.00 36 0 0.96 1.00 0.18
Q4 2 33 0 0.94 1.00 0.24 36 0 0.86 1.00 0.35
Q5 6 33 0 0.70 1.00 0.47 36 0 0.50 0.5 0.51
Q6 2 33 0 0.95 1.00 0.15 36 0 0.65 1.00 0.44
Q7 4 33 0 0.89 1.00 0.20 36 0 0.62 0.75 0.24
Q8 4 33 0 0.80 0.67 0.17 36 0 0.78 1.00 0.28
Q9 2 33 0 0.87 1.00 0.26 36 0 0.73 0.80 0.32
Q10 4 33 0 0.91 1.00 0.23 36 0 0.66 0.67 0.30
Q11 4 33 0 0.98 1.00 0.09 36 0 0.89 1.00 0.27
Q12 6 33 0 0.80 1.00 0.35 36 0 0.79 1.00 0.38
Overall 33 0 0.90 1.00 0.25 36 0 0.74 1.00 0.36
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Table 8.5: Precision and Recall by Questions – Study 4.2
The most significant difference (≥ 0.2) in precision was revealed for Q1, Q8, Q10, and Q12, and in recall of almost
half of the questions (Q1, Q4-Q6,Q8,Q10, and Q12). For all these questions tabular model showed better results than
the graphical one. Column “∅” reports the number of empty responses to a question which can be caused by task
termination forced by SurveyGizmo due to time limit.
Q# Comp- Tabular Graphical
lexity #obs. ∅ mean med. sd #obs. ∅ mean med. sd
Precision
Q1 2 83 1 0.95 1.00 0.22 83 0 0.64 1.00 0.48
Q2 2 83 1 0.95 1.00 0.22 83 1 0.95 1.00 0.20
Q3 3 83 1 1.00 1.00 0.04 83 0 0.99 1.00 0.07
Q4 3 83 0 0.95 1.00 0.20 83 2 0.90 1.00 0.29
Q5 4 83 0 0.99 1.00 0.07 83 0 0.90 1.00 0.28
Q6 4 83 0 1.00 1.00 0.03 83 0 0.99 1.00 0.08
Q7 3 83 2 0.89 1.00 0.32 83 0 0.73 1.00 0.44
Q8 3 83 1 0.97 1.00 0.15 83 0 0.71 1.00 0.44
Q9 4 83 1 0.85 1.00 0.29 83 0 0.88 1.00 0.24
Q10 4 83 1 0.65 1.00 0.48 83 1 0.43 0.00 0.50
Q11 5 83 0 0.93 1.00 0.19 83 0 0.84 1.00 0.32
Q12 5 83 1 0.85 1.00 0.36 83 0 0.64 1.00 0.48
Overall 83 9 0.91 1.00 0.26 83 4 0.80 1.00 0.39
Recall
Q1 2 83 1 0.95 1.00 0.22 83 0 0.64 1.00 0.48
Q2 2 83 1 0.94 1.00 0.23 83 1 0.76 1.00 0.28
Q3 3 83 1 1.00 1.00 0.00 83 0 0.96 1.00 0.14
Q4 3 83 0 0.87 1.00 0.25 83 2 0.63 0.67 0.29
Q5 4 83 0 0.94 1.00 0.15 83 0 0.64 0.75 0.32
Q6 4 83 0 0.86 1.00 0.17 83 0 0.60 0.60 0.20
Q7 3 83 2 0.89 1.00 0.32 83 0 0.73 1.00 0.44
Q8 3 83 1 0.97 1.00 0.14 83 0 0.64 0.67 0.42
Q9 4 83 1 0.77 1.00 0.32 83 0 0.81 1.00 0.29
Q10 4 83 1 0.65 1.00 0.48 83 1 0.43 0.00 0.50
Q11 5 83 0 0.84 1.00 0.25 83 0 0.67 0.50 0.32
Q12 5 83 1 0.85 1.00 0.36 83 0 0.64 1.00 0.48
Overall 83 9 0.88 1.00 0.28 83 4 0.68 1.00 0.38
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8.1 Effect of Task Complexity Components on the Risk Model
Comprehension
Figure 8.3 shows the interaction plots between F -measure by model type (graphical vs.
tabular) and the levels of IC.
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Figure 8.3: Effect of Complexity (IC) on F -measure
Figure 8.4 shows the interaction plots between F -measure by model type (graphical
vs. tabular) and the levels of R.
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8.1. EFFECT OF TASK COMPLEXITY COMPONENTS ON THE RISK MODEL
COMPREHENSION
Figure 8.5 shows the interaction plots between F -measure by model type (graphical
vs. tabular) and the presence of the judgment component.
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